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Abstract 
 
Jumps, or significant discontinuities, exhibit in many financial variables such as stock prices, 
currencies, interest rates and volatilities. To date, research on jumps, while using advanced and 
complicated models, is atheoretical, being based on purely mathematical and statistical techniques. 
This thesis aims to provide a theoretical framework to tie jumps into a fundamental economic 
model of valuation—the Arrow-Debreu state preference approach.  
Three essays of the thesis apply the state preference approach to jump risk at both market and 
individual security levels. The first essay focuses on the development of a theoretical framework to 
value market-wide downside jump risk using the state preference approach. We introduce a concept 
of catastrophe bonds that offer a $1 payoff in states when jumps occur and zero otherwise. In this 
essay, state prices and prices of catastrophe bonds are estimated using the Black-Scholes (1973) risk 
neutral framework. Based on the difference between prices of the catastrophe bonds under the 
conditional model (taking advantage of the CBOE volatility index, VIX) and the unconditional 
model (using historical volatility), we construct out-of-sample predictors of the S&P 500 downside 
jump risk. Our predictors provide good explanatory power in predicting the future realised 
downside jump risk. This shows the appropriateness of using the state preference approach to 
measure downside jump risk. The result implies that VIX is a better volatility measure than 
historical volatility in predicting future downside jump risk. Furthermore, based on our model’s 
predictions, we develop trading strategies using one-month futures contracts. These strategies are 
shown to generate positive profit over the whole sample period and they perform even better during 
the global financial crisis (GFC) when investors need to be protected the most. 
The second essay also applies the state preference approach to measure the market-wide downside 
jump risk. However, this essay moves one step forward from the log normal price assumption in 
Black and Scholes (1973) employed in the first essay and estimates state prices and the prices of 
catastrophe bonds using the Merton (1976) risk neutral jump-diffusion framework. We investigate 
two conditional sub-models including (i) the model conditioning only the instantaneous volatility 
on VIX, and (ii) the model conditioning both the instantaneous volatility and jumps volatility on 
VIX. Similar to the findings in the first essay, we find that downside jump predictors possess high 
predictability and VIX does a better job than historical volatility in forecasting future downside 
jump risk. The results from the two conditional sub-models are consistent. However, the higher 
McFadden R-squared and adjusted R-squared obtained in the second sub-model lead to the 
 
 
 
 
conclusion that the second sub-model outperforms the first one in predicting future downside 
jumps. Profitable trading strategies are also developed based on our model’s predictions. 
The third essay extends essays one and two to predict downside jump risk at the individual security 
level. This essay applies the state preference approach in a three-fold manner. First we measure the 
individual expected volatility, which is a counterpart of VIX at the individual security level. It is 
demonstrated to provide an unbiased estimate for the realised volatility. A horse race is also 
conducted between our state price volatility measure, the 30-day historical volatility and 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1) volatility. We conclude that our state price volatility measure provides a better 
forecast than the other two alternative volatility measures. Second, we use our state price volatility 
measure to predict future downside jump risk of the sample banks. In line with the findings in the 
previous essays, our downside jump risk predictors, on average, have high out-of-sample 
predictability. Finally, we develop a monthly Value at Risk (VaR) estimate at a 95% confidence 
level using our state price volatility. The test of model accuracy indicates the high quality of our 
VaR estimate. Moreover, we also find that our method yields a better 1 month/95% VaR than the 
historical simulation, which is attributable to the good performance of our state price volatility in 
predicting the future monthly volatility. 
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Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“The hurdles in asset pricing are really conceptual rather than mathematical”. 
Cochrane (2005, p.xvii)  
 
Jumps or significant discontinuities exhibit in many financial variables such as stock prices, 
currencies, interest rates and volatilities. Numerous studies have documented the presence of jumps 
(Jiang & Oomen, 2008; Lee, 2012) and their impact on many aspects of portfolio and risk 
management (Cont & Tankov, 2009, jumps and constant proportion portfolio insurance; Maheu, 
McCurdy, & Zhao, 2013, jumps and equity premium; Zhou, 2001, jumps and credit premium). 
Despite the existence of complicated models of jumps and advances in inference techniques 
(Barndorff-Nielsen & Shephard, 2006, using bipower variation; Eraker, Johannes, & Polson, 2003, 
using Markov Chain Monte Carlo; Mancini, 2009, using threshold technique), research on jumps in 
finance thus far is atheoretical, being based on purely mathematical and statistical techniques with 
no underlying theoretical framework. Our aim in this thesis is to tie jumps into a fundamental 
approach to valuation in Economics and Finance, the Arrow-Debreu state preference approach. 
We are primarily motivated by what happens during financial crises, especially the recent global 
financial crisis (GFC) of 7/2007-6/2009. During these turbulent periods, we observed massive drops 
in stock prices over a very short period of time. A further investigation of the previous literature on 
jumps indicates that the incorporation of jumps in modelling stock price is mainly to capture the 
empirical features of the return distribution such as excess kurtosis and the implied volatility smiles. 
For example, the Merton (1976) jump-diffusion model introduces a jump component into the Black-
Scholes (1973) geometric Brownian motion to capture implied volatility smiles and skews. The 
Bates (1996) model of stochastic volatility with jumps is motivated by the fact that the Heston 
(1993) stochastic volatility model is unable to generate short term asset returns that adequately vary 
 
 
2 
 
to match the skewness of the implied volatility. Another example is Eraker et al. (2003) who 
develop a model of jumps in both returns and volatility to generate a rapid increase in the return 
conditional volatility, which is difficult to generate with a diffusion process on volatility and jumps 
in returns. 
Discovering that jumps are hitherto investigated in an atheoretical way provides the motivation and 
the main contribution of the thesis i.e., the introduction of the state preference approach into the 
literature of jump valuation. Jumps, as defined in this thesis, occur if returns fall below a certain 
threshold, which is re-identified daily to accommodate a time varying log-price process. More 
specifically, we report results of jumps below the 5th, 2.5th and 1st percentiles.  
As documented in the literature, large returns are not necessarily generated by a jump process (Aı̈t-
Sahalia, 2004; Eraker et al., 2003). Even when we observe a large return as far as 3.5 standard 
deviations into the tail, the probability of one jump is still lower than that of zero jump (Aı̈t-Sahalia, 
2004). In other words, it is still less likely to be driven by a jump process. In light of this literature, 
one might argue that our three chosen thresholds are only about 1.64, 1.96 and 2.32 standard 
deviations into the tail, thus returns below those cut-off points are more likely to be produced by a 
Brownian noise than a jump process. We emphasise that our aim in this thesis is to demonstrate the 
application of the state preference approach to downside jump prediction. The chosen thresholds are 
merely for expedience. Our method, however, is applicable to any threshold. 
As can be seen from the definition of jumps given earlier, we limit ourselves to downside jumps as 
previous literature supports that investors do not view positive and negative shocks in the same 
way. Rather, their value function is steeper in the loss domain than in the gain domain; or they are 
more averse to downside loss (Jarrow & Zhao, 2006; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Following the introductory chapter, chapter two of the thesis starts with the development of the 
theoretical framework to model downside jump risk. The state preference approach was first 
introduced by Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959). It stems from the concept of state price or the price 
of an Arrow-Debreu security, where state price is the price of a security that pays one monetary unit 
in a particular state and zero otherwise. Based on the definitions of jumps and of the Arrow-Debreu 
security, we introduce a concept of a catastrophe bond1, which offers a one unit payoff if jumps 
occur and zero elsewhere. Later, we show that the price of the catastrophe bond is actually the sum 
of state prices across states of jumps, and construct downside jump risk predictors based on the 
                                                
1 In the literature, catastrophe bonds are insurance-linked securities, whose cash flows are contingent on the occurrence 
of catastrophic events such as earthquakes and hurricanes (Vaugirard, 2003). In this thesis, catastrophe bonds are 
defined in a slightly different way and somewhat more general. Natural disasters when occurring are likely to cause but 
not the only source of jumps. 
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difference between the catastrophe bond prices under the conditional model (using conditional 
volatility) and the unconditional model (using historical volatility). 
Chapter two then provides an empirical test of the downside jump risk predictors of the S&P 500 
over the period 1996-2010. Using the Black-Scholes (1973) risk neutral framework to estimate the 
price of the catastrophe bond under both a conditional model (using the CBOE volatility index, 
VIX) and an unconditional one (using historical volatility), we construct out-of-sample predictors of 
downside jump risk. Those measures are shown to be good predictors of the future realised 
downside jumps regardless of the chosen thresholds. When there is an indication of jumps in our 
model, we find jumps are more likely to occur in reality. Moreover, the higher the downside jump 
risk value, the higher the probability of realised downside jumps. The results also indicate that our 
model performs the best when predicting small jumps or jumps below the 5th percentile, and that 
VIX is a better volatility measure than historical volatility when predicting future downside jumps. 
Moving one step further, we use our model’s prediction of jumps or no jumps to develop trading 
strategies using one-month future contracts. The trading strategies are demonstrated to be profitable 
even during the GFC. 
Chapter three is a continuation of chapter two. As the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model 
has been documented to induce systematic mispricing (Jarrow & Rosenfeld, 1984; Jorion, 1988; 
Pan, 2002), we perform the same set of empirical tests of chapter two in chapter three. State prices, 
then prices of catastrophe bonds are estimated using the Merton (1976) risk neutral jump-diffusion 
framework. Under the Merton (1976) jump-diffusion framework, stock returns are modelled by 
both continuous process (Wiener process) and jump process (“Poisson-driven” process). Again, 
prices of catastrophe bonds are calculated in both the unconditional model (using historical 
volatility) and two conditional sub-models (using VIX). The two conditional sub-models use two 
slightly different conditional volatility measures. While the first conditional sub-model employs the 
conditional instantaneous volatility on VIX, the second one takes into account the impact of VIX on 
both instantaneous volatility and jump volatility. 
Our findings in chapter three are in line with those of chapter two i.e., the downside jump risk 
predictors constructed using the state preference approach obtain high predictability. The predictors 
estimated using the second conditional sub-model slightly outperforms the other when predicting 
future downside jumps. Profitable trading strategies are also proposed based on our model’s 
predictions.  
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Chapter four then examines the application of the state preference approach to measure downside 
jump risk at the individual security level. Our sample includes thirty (30) U.S. banks over the period 
1996 - 4/2013. This chapter is structured around three stages. First we apply the state preference 
approach to measure the individual expected volatility, 𝐻𝑖. We find that 𝐻𝑖 is an unbiased estimate of 
the 30-day subsequent volatility and outperforms the 30-day historical volatility and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1) 
volatility, especially during the GFC. Therefore, it can be used as the volatility input of the 
conditional model to predict future downside jump risk of individual banks in the next step. 
We proceed in chapter four to develop the downside jump risk predictors of individual banks. We 
perform the same empirical tests specified in chapter two to test the predictability of those 
predictors. The results across chapters are consistent. Our constructed downside jump risk 
predictors possess a high predictive power. Even though our model performs better when predicting 
small jumps – jumps below the 5th percentile – than the bigger jumps (jumps below the 2.5th and 1st 
percentiles), the difference in performance when predicting jumps of different sizes is negligible. 
The good performance of state price volatility measure demonstrated earlier motivates us to extend 
the method to estimate Value at Risk (VaR). In the last section of chapter four, we predict one-
month VaRs at the 95% confidence level using 𝐻𝑖. Testing the model accuracy using the Likelihood 
Ratio (LR) test of Kupiec (1995), we obtain supporting evidence for the high quality of our VaR 
estimates. The results also suggest that our method outperforms the 250-day historical simulation in 
predicting 1 month/95% VaRs. 
 
We provide conclusions of the thesis in chapter five.  
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Chapter 2  
 
STATE PREFERENCE APPROACH TO MARKET 
DOWNSIDE JUMP RISK UNDER THE BLACK-
SCHOLES (1973) RISK NEUTRAL FRAMEWORK 
 
“Robert C. Merton and Myron S. Scholes have, in collaboration with the late 
Fischer Black, developed a pioneering formula for the valuation of stock 
options. Their method has had profound importance for economic valuations in 
many areas. It has also helped generate new financial instruments and 
facilitated more efficient management of risk in society”. 
(Nobelprize.org, 1997) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Jumps or significant discontinuities in price changes are regarded as an important component of 
price dynamics of financial assets (Chernov, Ronald Gallant, Ghysels, & Tauchen, 2003; Jiang & 
Oomen, 2008). The recent global financial crisis (GFC) has renewed research interest in jumps 
estimation2. Despite the existence of countless papers on jumps, research on jumps in finance thus 
far is atheoretical, being based on purely mathematical and statistical techniques (for example, 
Barndorff-Nielsen & Shephard, 2006, using bipower variation; Dobrev, 2007, using range statistics; 
Eraker et al., 2003, using Markov Chain Monte Carlo; Jiang & Oomen, 2008, using a swap variance 
contract; Mancini, 2009, using a threshold technique).  
The state preference approach, first proposed by Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959), is a fundamental 
valuation model, which can be used to value any financial asset in a world of uncertainty. Under the 
state preference approach, a theoretical price of an asset is equal to the sum of state prices 
                                                
2 A search of research on jumps and returns in Google Scholar shows over 28,000 journal articles since 2007. 
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multiplied by their correspondent payoff, where the Arrow-Debreu state price is the price of a 
security that pays one unit in a particular state and zero otherwise. Even though a lot of research has 
developed theoretical models incorporating state prices (Cox, Ingersoll, & Ross, 1985; Merton, 
1973a), much less attention has been paid to the empirical work of this theory. 
We thus aim to develop a theoretical framework to measure jumps using the state preference 
approach and provide empirical tests for the model. We introduce a concept of a catastrophe bond, 
which offers a 1 unit payoff if jumps occur and zero elsewhere. Jumps are defined to occur if 
returns fall below a predetermined threshold. In this chapter (as well as in the thesis), we arbitrarily 
choose three thresholds of 5th, 2.5th and 1st percentiles. The magnitudes of the thresholds change 
over time to reflect the time varying process of log price. Downside jump risk predictors are 
developed based on the prices of catastrophe bonds under the conditional model (using VIX) and 
the unconditional model (using historical volatility), where state prices and then prices of 
catastrophe bonds are estimated using the Black-Scholes (1973) risk neutral framework. 
Based on the theoretical framework developed in the first part of the chapter, we then construct out-
of-sample downside jump risk predictors of the S&P 500 during 1996-2010 and examine their 
predictive power. The results indicate that our predictors perform well when predicting future 
downside jump risk, which then motivate the development of trading strategies based on the 
model’s jumps and no jumps predictions. The trading strategies are shown to be profitable, even 
during the GFC.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, we develop the theoretical 
framework for the prediction of downside jump risk using the state preference approach. More 
specifically, we derive a theoretical pricing formula of catastrophe bonds and show a theoretical 
correlation between the price of the catastrophe bonds and the probability of downside jumps’ 
occurrence. Section 2.3 describes the method that we apply in this chapter to develop and test the 
predictability of downside jump risk predictors. Data collection is summarised in section 2.4. 
Section 2.5 empirically examines the predictability of our downside jump risk predictors. Section 
2.6 provides economic implications of our downside jump risk prediction. Section 2.7 concludes. 
2.2 State preference approach and valuation of downside jump risk 
This section introduces a theoretical framework for measuring downside jump risk using the state 
preference approach by developing a pricing formula of catastrophe bonds. 
 
 
7 
 
2.2.1 Asset pricing using the state preference approach 
There is one concept that unifies all asset pricing theories: price equals discounted expected payoff 
(Cochrane, 2005). The basic pricing equation can be expressed as follows (Bakshi, Cao, & Chen, 
1997; Ferson & Siegel, 2003; Kan & Zhou, 1999): 
 𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 𝐸𝑖�𝑀𝑖+1𝑋𝑖,𝑖+1�      ∀𝑖, 𝑡 (1) 
Where:  
𝑃𝑖𝑖 denotes the current price of an asset 𝑖. 
𝐸𝑖 denotes the expectation operator conditioning on the information set available at time 𝑡. 
𝑀𝑖+1 is the stochastic discount factor (SDF). 
𝑋𝑖+1 denotes the future payoff. 
In a world of certainty, the payoff in time 𝑡 + 1 is known at time 𝑡. The SDF would then become 
constant, or simply a conversion factor of expected future payoffs into today’s value (Barraclough, 
2007; Campbell, 2000). In other words, it acts as a time discount factor. Therefore, asset price can 
be expressed via the standard formula of present value: 
 𝑃𝑖𝑖 = 1𝐺𝑓 𝑋𝑖,𝑖+1      ∀𝑖, 𝑡 (2) 
Where 𝐺𝑓 denotes the gross risk free rate.  
Since the gross risk free rate is greater than 1, the discount factor 1
𝑅𝑓
 leads to a discount price 𝑃𝑖𝑖 of 
a payoff 𝑋𝑖,𝑖+1 (Cochrane, 2005). 
However, under a world of uncertainty being modelled by a number of states of nature, the SDF is a 
random variable. It not only captures the investors’ time preference, but also represents their 
consumption preferences across different states (Barraclough, 2007; Cochrane, 2005). 
As an asset can be thought as a bundle of different state-contingent claims, its price can be valued 
accordingly based on prices of state-contingent claims or state price (Cochrane, 2005). The 
definition of state prices stems from the concept of a primitive security, which was first introduced 
by Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959). A state price is the price of a state contingent claim that offers 
one unit payoff in a particular state and zero otherwise. It is calculated based on the subjective 
assessment of an individual investor 𝑘 on the likelihood that a certain state 𝑠 actually occurs at time 
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𝑡 + 1 (𝜋𝑖+1,𝑠𝑘 ) and the marginal rate of substitution between the consumption in time 𝑡 + 1 state 𝑠 
and the consumption at time 𝑡  �𝑈𝑡+1,𝑠′𝑘 �𝐶𝑡+1,𝑠𝑘 �
𝑈𝑡𝑠
′𝑘�𝐶𝑡𝑠
𝑘 �
�. 
 Φ𝑖+1,𝑠𝑘 = 𝜋𝑖+1,𝑠𝑘 𝑈𝑖+1,𝑠′𝑘 �𝐺𝑖+1,𝑠𝑘 �𝑈𝑖𝑠′𝑘�𝐺𝑖𝑠𝑘 �  (3) 
Where 𝜙𝑖+1,𝑠𝑘  denotes the state price for time 𝑡 + 1 state s assessed by an investor k. 
Based on (3), the state price can be interpreted as the price at time 𝑡 of a unit of consumption in 
time 𝑡 + 1, state 𝑠. In other words, it represents the number of consumption units that an investor 𝑘 
is willing to sacrifice at time 𝑡 in order to receive one unit of consumption in time 𝑡 + 1, state 𝑠.  
∑ 𝜙𝑖+1,𝑠𝑆𝑠=1  is, as a result, the price of a security that promises to pay 1 unit payoff at any state 𝑠 in 
time 𝑡 + 1; or in other words, it is the price of a risk free asset. Consequently, ∑ 𝜙𝑖+1,𝑠𝑆𝑠=1  = 𝑒−𝑟𝑟, 
in which 𝑟 is the risk free rate. 
Solving the investor’s problem of utility maximisation in a two-period world framework, the price 
of any asset 𝑖 can be calculated as the multiplication of the state price (𝜙𝑖+1,𝑠𝑘 ) and the 
correspondent payoff (𝑑𝑖+1,𝑠𝑖 ), summed over states and time (Coval, Jurek, & Stafford, 2009; 
Duffie, 2001): 
 𝑃𝑖𝑖 = �𝜋𝑖+1,𝑠𝑘 𝑈𝑖+1,𝑠′𝑘 �𝐺𝑖+1,𝑠𝑘 �𝑈𝑖𝑠′𝑘�𝐺𝑖𝑠𝑘 �  𝑑𝑖+1,𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑠=1 =  �𝜙𝑖+1,𝑠𝑘 𝑑𝑖+1,𝑠𝑖𝑆𝑠=1        ∀𝑖 = 1 … .𝑁 (4) 
In a complete market, all investors face the same asset price, which results in an equal marginal rate 
of substitution across all investors. In other words, 𝜙𝑖+1,𝑠𝑘  is the same across k, thus (4) can be 
rewritten as: 
 𝑃𝑖𝑖 = �𝜙𝑖+1,𝑠𝑑𝑖+1,𝑠𝑖𝑆
𝑠=1
 (5) 
As other approaches such as mean-variance or logarithmic utility are just special cases of the state 
preference approach, this approach is viewed to be the most general theory of asset selection 
(Cochrane, 2005; Kraus & Litzenberger, 1975).  
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2.2.2 The state preference approach and the price of a catastrophe bond as a 
downside jump risk measure 
The state preference approach is a general and elegant framework that can be used to value any 
financial asset. As a result, a financial asset whose payoff is dependent on states of jumps can also 
be valued using the state preference approach.  
We construct a catastrophe bond whose payoff is one dollar if log-returns of the market index fall 
below a cut-off point 𝜏 and zero otherwise. In other words, the payoff of the catastrophe bond is one 
dollar when downside jumps occur and zero otherwise. Therefore, price of the catastrophe bond is a 
multiplication of state price with its correspondent payoff, summed over states of the market 
index’s jumps. 
 𝑃𝐶𝐶 = � 𝜙𝑠𝑠𝜏
𝑠=𝑠−∞
1 (6) 
Where:  
𝑃𝐶𝐶 is the price of the catastrophe bond. 
𝑠 denotes states. 
𝑠−∞ denotes the state where log-return approaches −∞. 
𝑠𝜏 denotes the state where log-return equals 𝜏. 
1 is the dollar payoff of the catastrophe bond. 
Economically, 𝑃𝐶𝐶 can be interpreted as the price of a security that one has to pay to obtain $1 
wealth for consumption in bad states. As a result, when the market indicates a high price of this 
bond, it is an indication that bad states are more likely to occur. In other words, it is an indication of 
the high probability of downside jump risk. As the price of the catastrophe bond is highly correlated 
with the probability of downside jump risk, it is used as our measure of downside jump risk.  
In this chapter, we determine three cut-off points, corresponding to 5%, 2.5% and 1% left tail area 
under the return distribution. Those cut-off points are conventionally chosen for illustration 
purposes; in practice any cut-offs could be used.  
Focusing on measuring downside jump risk predictors given a predetermined cut-off point, our task 
is to value the price of the catastrophe bonds. Based on (6), this task includes identifying the states 
of jumps’ occurrence and calculating the sum of state prices over those states.  
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2.3  Research method 
This section provides a thorough discussion of the research method that is employed in this chapter. 
We develop the predictors of the catastrophe bond price of the S&P 500 under the state pricing 
approach. 
2.3.1 Prediction of the price of the catastrophe bonds using the state 
preference approach 
2.3.1.1 Estimation of state prices  
As documented in previous literature, state prices can be modelled as the second derivative of a 
European call option (Banz & Merton, 1978; Breeden & Litzenberger, 1978). This result comes 
about by constructing a butterfly spread with a unit payoff. Assume that an investor goes long one 
call at a strike price of 𝑋 = 𝑀 − Δ𝑀, one call at 𝑋 = 𝑀 + Δ𝑀 and goes short two calls at 𝑋 = 𝑀. If 
the market price of the underlying asset is 𝑀, the payoff of his portfolio would be Δ𝑀. As a result, 
dividing the cost of that portfolio by Δ𝑀 and taking the limit as Δ𝑀 tends to 0 will provide us with 
a call portfolio that gives $1 payoff at the market price of M and zero otherwise. 
lim
Δ𝑀→0
𝐺(𝑀 + Δ𝑀,𝑇) − 2𝐺(𝑀,𝑇) + 𝐺(𝑀 − Δ𝑀,𝑇)(Δ𝑀)2 = 𝜕2𝐺(𝑋,𝑇)𝜕𝑋2 |𝑋=𝑀   (7) 
As shown in (7), state price is the second derivative of the European call options with respect to the 
strike price.  
Different approaches can be used to estimate state prices, including (i) the approach using traded 
option prices and (ii) the Black-Scholes (1973) risk neutral framework. 
a.  Estimation of state prices using traded option prices 
State prices can be estimated using the numerical derivative from traded options based on the 
following formula: 
 𝜙𝑀 = 𝜕2𝐶𝜕𝑋2 |𝑋=𝑀 ≈ 𝐶𝑀+Δ𝑀−2𝐶𝑀+𝐶𝑀−Δ𝑀 (𝛥𝑀)2  where Δ𝑀 → 0 (8) 
Even though this approach does not rely on any distributional assumption, state prices cannot 
always be calculated using this method due to the limited number of available traded option prices. 
Moreover, the application of this approach using the real world data is shown to possibly lead to 
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zero (due to the occasionally equal prices of deep OTM options of consecutive strike prices) or 
negative state prices (due to irrational bids of deep OTM options or bids leading to 𝐺𝑀+Δ𝑀 − 2𝐺𝑀 +
𝐺𝑀−Δ𝑀 < 0) (Liu, 2012). In addition, Liu (2012) shows that the state prices under this approach lead 
to pricing results which are almost perfectly correlated with the parametric approach outlined in the 
next section. 
b. Estimation of state prices using the Black-Scholes (1973) risk-neutral framework3 
State prices can be identified using the Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model generalised by 
Merton (1973b): 
 𝜙𝑀 = 𝜕2𝐺𝜕𝑋2 |𝑋=𝑀 = 𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑀𝑟𝜎√𝑇 𝑛[𝑑2(𝑋 = 𝑀𝑟)] (9) 
Where: 
 𝑑2 = ln �𝑀0𝑋 � + �𝑟 − 𝛿 − 𝜎22 � 𝑇
𝜎√𝑇
 
(10) 
In which: 
𝑟 denotes the risk free rate. 
𝑀𝑟 denotes the value of the underlying asset in time T, state M. 
𝑀0 denotes the today value of the underlying asset. 
𝜎 denotes the volatility parameter. 
𝛿 is the continuously paid dividend yield. 
𝑛(𝑑2) = (2𝜋)−12𝑒−𝑑22  is the standard normal probability density function. 
This approach is parametric as it is based on the assumption of log normal distribution of stock 
price (Black & Scholes, 1973). Due to the aforementioned disadvantages of the approach using 
traded option prices in estimating state prices, this chapter uses the Black-Scholes (1973) risk 
neutral framework to estimate state prices and then prices of the catastrophe bonds. 
Using the parametric approach of state prices estimation derived from the Black-Scholes-Merton 
(1973) options pricing formula, based on Breeden and Litzenberger (1978), we can estimate the 
price of the catastrophe bond as follows:  
                                                
3 The Black-Scholes (1973) risk neutral framework is chosen as it is a celebrated option pricing model. Different option 
pricing models can be used to estimate state prices. 
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 𝑃𝐶𝐶 = � 𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑛(𝑑2)𝑋𝜎√𝑇 𝑑𝑋𝑆𝜏0 =  � 𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑛(𝑑2)𝑋𝜎√𝑇 𝑑𝑋+∞0 − � 𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑛(𝑑2)𝑋𝜎√𝑇 𝑑𝑋+∞𝑆𝜏  = 𝑒−𝑟𝑟 − 𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝑁[𝑑2(𝑋 = 𝑆𝜏)] = 𝑒−𝑟𝑟{1 − 𝑁[𝑑2(𝑋 = 𝑆𝜏)]} (11) 
Where: 
𝑆𝜏 denotes the price level at which log-return is at one of the cut-off points. 
𝑁(𝑑2) denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
2.3.1.2 Identification of the cut-off points  
We assume price follows a log normal distribution to be consistent with the Black-Scholes (1973) 
framework of state prices estimation. We identify the states of the S&P 500 jumps’ occurrence by 
identifying the three predetermined cut-off points corresponding to the left tail area of 5%, 2.5% 
and 1% under the unconditional return distribution.  
2.3.2  Unconditional versus conditional models 
We predict the downside jump risk under both unconditional and conditional models. Under the 
unconditional model, we identify the cut-off points using a growing window from the start of the 
sample period so that the likelihood of log-returns falling below the three predetermined cut-off 
points are 5%, 2.5% and 1% correspondingly.4  
Under the conditional model, these above probabilities are re-estimated daily by incorporating VIX. 
VIX is chosen as it is the most widely used volatility index. It is tested and shown to be a good 
predictor of the S&P 500 index movements (Whaley, 2009). The incorporation of VIX not only 
enriches the information content of our model but also turns the model from a backward-looking 
into a forward-looking one. As VIX is calculated and reported daily or even intra-daily based on the 
volatility implied in the at-the-money and out-of-the-money S&P 500 options (CBOE, 2009), the 
model updating VIX is the conditional model. 
We use the closing VIX of the previous day as a daily input to estimate the price of the catastrophe 
bond conditionally. VIX helps to update the conditional mean and volatility of the risk neutral 
distribution5. Taking advantage of VIX allows us to form a new normal distribution of returns 
                                                
4 A “pre-sample” window of 6 months is used to obtain the initial cut-offs. Although not included in the thesis, using 
the whole sample period to obtain the 5%, 2.5% and 1% cut-offs yields similar results. 
5 𝐺𝐻𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝐻𝑛𝐶𝑙 𝑚𝑒𝐶𝑛𝑖 = 𝑟𝑓𝑖−1 − 12 𝐻𝑉𝑋𝑖−12  and 𝐺𝐻𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝐻𝑛𝐶𝑙 𝑣𝐻𝑙𝐶𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑣𝑖 = 𝐻𝑉𝑋𝑖−1.  
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everyday based on the market’s expectation of volatility and re-estimate the price of the catastrophe 
bond. By using VIX, we actually transform our model’s volatility measure from an almost constant 
volatility into a time-varying volatility. 
2.3.3  Downside jump risk predictors and test of their predictive power  
We construct our downside jump risk predictors and test their predictive power using the following 
steps: 
2.3.3.1 Construction of downside jump risk predictors 
Two downside jump risk predictors are constructed based on prices of the catastrophe bonds 
estimated using the state preference approach. 
As we calculate the price of the catastrophe bond under the unconditional model based on the 
predetermined cut-off points, which correspond to the left tail area of 5%, 2.5% and 1%, this price 
is expected to serve as the base case for the calculation under the conditional model (see Figure 2.1 
for a more intuitive illustration). It is not expected to play the role of a downside jump risk 
predictor. Therefore, we calculate the difference in prices of the catastrophe bonds, or the sum of 
state prices over the left tail area between the conditional and unconditional models. The price 
difference is then called downside jump risk value.  
Insert Figure 2.1 about here 
Based on the difference in predicted prices of the catastrophe bonds between the two models, we 
construct a downside jump risk indicator, which takes the value of 1 when the calculated difference 
in catastrophe bonds’ prices or downside jump risk value is positive and 0 otherwise. 
2.3.3.2 Estimation of realised jumps variables 
Following the definition of downside jump risk specified earlier and the predetermined cut-off 
points, which correspond to the left tail area of 5%, 2.5% and 1%, we are able to identify the 
number of realised jumps. As VIX measures the market’s expectation of future volatility over the 
next 30 calendar days, we also count the actual number of jumps over the next 30 days (i.e., 22 
trading days). Dividing the number of realised jumps over the next 22 trading days by 22, we obtain 
the realised probability of jumps. 
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Based on the actual number of jumps over the next 22 trading days, we also create a realised jumps 
indicator, which indicates whether or not any jump occurs over the next 22 trading days. The 
realised jumps indicator takes the value of 1 when at least one jump occurs over the next 22 trading 
days and zero otherwise. 
2.3.3.3 Tests of the predictive power of the two constructed downside jump 
risk predictors 
We test the predictive power of the two constructed downside jump risk predictors by running 
different regressions of the realised jumps variables on the downside jump risk predictors. As we 
have two downside jump risk predictors (including downside jump risk value and downside jump 
risk indicator) and two realised jumps variables (including realised probability of jumps and 
realised jumps indicator), we end up running four different regressions as follows6: 
Model 1 Realised jumps indicator = f(Downside jump risk indicator) (12) 
Model 2 Realised jumps indicator = f(Downside jump risk value) (13) 
Model 3 Realised probability of jumps= f(Downside jump risk indicator) (14) 
Model 4 Realised probability of jumps = f(Downside jump risk value) (15) 
The first two models are used to evaluate the power of the two constructed downside jump risk 
predictors in predicting the realised jumps indicator. As the realised jumps indicator is binary, 
probit regressions are used for regressions 1 and 2. We use models 3 and 4 to test the predictive 
power of the two constructed downside jump risk predictors in explaining the realised probability 
of jumps. With regard to these two regressions, we obtain OLS estimates with HAC robust standard 
errors. 
As our jump risk predictors are constructed based on the prices of catastrophe bonds estimated 
using the state preference approach, the outputs of the above regressions help us to identify whether 
it is appropriate to use the state preference approach to predict downside jump risk. Moreover, as 
indicated earlier, the downside jump risk indicator and downside jump risk value are constructed 
based on the difference in predicted prices of catastrophe bonds between the conditional and 
unconditional models. The outputs of the above analyses then give an insight of whether the 
                                                
6 We also consider the price of catastrophe bonds under the conditional model as downside jump risk value and perform 
the tests for models 2 and 4 as robustness checks. Similar output is obtained (see Figure 2.1 for a visual demonstration). 
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conditional model is superior to the unconditional one in predicting downside jump risk. In other 
words, it implies the appropriateness of VIX when measuring the downside jump risk. 
We perform a further measure of the suitability of model 1 using the method reviewed by Fielding 
and Bell (1997) as this model is a presence/absence model. According to Fielding and Bell (1997), 
an error matrix can be used to summarise the performance of the model (see Table 2.1). The data 
for the error matrix can be presented as either counts or percentages. 
Insert Table 2.1 about here 
Based on the error matrix, we can derive different measures of classification accuracy, which are 
illustrated in Table 2.2. 
Insert table 2.2 about here 
2.4 Data collection 
We choose the S&P 500 as our market proxy and estimate the daily total return (including capital 
gain and dividends) of the S&P 500 based on the data available in Datastream. Data for the risk free 
rate are obtained from WRDS-CRSP. The CBOE volatility index (VIX) is collected from WRDS-
CBOE. Continuous dividend yields of the S&P 500 are obtained from OptionMetrics. Our sample 
period is from 04/01/19967 to 29/10/2010.  
2.5 Empirical results 
We construct our downside jump risk indicator and downside jump risk value so that those 
predictors are completely out-of-sample. More specifically, in order to measure the downside jump 
risk indicator and downside jump risk value of any particular day 𝑡, we only take into account the 
information available up to its previous day 𝑡 − 1. 
Insert Figure 2.2 about here 
Figure 2.2 provides an overview of the predictive power of our model. More specifically, panel A 
describes the relationship between the predicted jump risk value and the realised probability of 
downside jumps below the 5% cut-off point. The graph clearly shows that our constructed jump risk 
value reflects the realised probability of downside jumps. It appears to be high during the period of 
                                                
7 04/01/1996 is the first day that data for S&P 500 dividend yield is available in OptionMetrics. 
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crises (including the dot com bubble early 2000s and the GFC) and quite low during 2003-2007. 
The realised probability of downside jumps are also shown to correspond with the volatility level of 
the log-returns of the S&P 500. The same conclusion holds for the conditional price of catastrophe 
bonds illustrated in Panel B of this figure. 
2.5.1 Predictive power of the constructed downside jump risk predictors 
in explaining the realised jumps indicator 
We test the predictive power of the downside jump risk predictors in explaining the realised jumps 
indicator by running two probit regressions of the realised jumps indicator on those predictors. 
2.5.1.1 Predictive power of downside jump risk indicator in explaining the 
realised jumps indicator 
a.  Running a probit regression and naïve simulation 
We run a probit model of the realised jumps indicator on the downside jump risk indicator (model 
1). The output of the regression is reported in panel A, Table 2.3.  
The performance of our constructed downside jump risk predictor is also examined in a comparison 
with a naïve simulated downside jump risk predictor.8 We simulate three different series of 
downside jump risk indicators corresponding to three predetermined cut-off points as follows. For 
each day of the sample period, we simulate a number in the interval [1,1000]. We thus end up with 
a series of 3586 random numbers. As we want to predict jumps below 5%, 2.5% and 1% cut-off 
points, our daily simulated downside jump indicator takes the value of 1 if the simulated number is 
less than the respective cut-off point and 0 otherwise. The simulated downside jump risk indicator 
takes the value of 1 if at least 1 jump is simulated over the next 22 trading days and zero otherwise. 
The output of a regression of the realised jump indicator on the simulated downside jump indicator 
is reported in panel B, Table 2.3. 
Insert Table 2.3 about here 
As can be seen in panel A, Table 2.3, the coefficient of our constructed downside jump risk 
indicator is statistically significant and positive regardless of the chosen cut-off point. Even though 
the estimated coefficient of the downside jump risk indicator of the probit model given in panel A, 
Table 2.3 should not be interpreted as the marginal impact on the dependent variable, its sign 
                                                
8 One might argue that our predictors are persistent due to the fact that daily data is used to predict monthly jumps. This 
comparison addresses that issue. 
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actually determines the direction that a change in the downside jump risk indicator affects the 
realised jumps indicator. As a result, the positive coefficient of the downside jump risk indicator, 
regardless of the cut-off point, indicates that when the downside jump risk indicator takes the value 
of 1, jumps are more likely to occur over the next 22 trading days. The McFadden R-squared is 
highest (approximately 26%) in the model predicting the realised jumps indicator below the 5% 
cut-off point. 
On the other hand, the obtained low McFadden R-squared in panel B indicates that overall the 
simulated jump indicator has no power in predicting future downside jumps. This conclusion is 
supported by the insignificant coefficient of the simulated jump indicator in all three models 
predicting jumps below three predetermined cut-off points. 
The results obtained in panel A and panel B of Table 2.3 show that our constructed downside jump 
risk indicator possesses good power in predicting realised downside jumps, and is much more 
powerful than that of the simulated downside jump risk indicator. 
b. Investigation of the model’s suitability measures 
We further investigate suitability measure for model 1. The output is presented in Table 2.4.  
Insert Table 2.4 about here 
As shown by the correct classification rate (or the misclassification rate) in Table 2.4, our 
downside jump risk indicator predicts jumps accurately more than 55.97% of the time regardless of 
the chosen cut-off point. Again, the correct classification rate of around 78% in the model 
predicting jumps below the 5% cut-off point reinforces our finding in Table 2.3 that among the 
three chosen cut-off points, our downside jump risk indicator performs the best when predicting the 
presence or absence of downside jumps below the 5% cut-off point. We obtain high negative 
predictive power measures (over 88%) regardless of the chosen cut-off point, showing high 
fractions of correct prediction of “no jumps”. More specifically, on average, it is correct more than 
88 times out of 100 times predicting “no jumps”. Meanwhile, our model results in a high level of 
sensitivity, about 93%, (or low level of false negative rate). This leads to the conclusion that about 
93% of the time downside jump (below any of the three chosen cut-off points) occurs in reality is 
captured and predicted by our model. Together with the medium level of positive predictive power, 
all of the measures above indicate that our downside jump risk indicator, which is developed using 
the state preference approach, possesses a good predictive power of the realised jump risk indicator. 
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The conclusions drawn from negative predictive power and sensitivity also imply that our 
conditional model (using VIX) actually over-estimates the probability of downside jump risks. 
2.5.1.2 Predictive power of downside jump risk value in explaining the 
realised jumps indicator 
We examine the predictive power of downside jump risk value in explaining the realised jumps 
indicator by running a probit model of the realised jumps indicator on downside jump risk value 
(model 2). The output is summarised in Table 2.5. 
Insert Table 2.5 about here 
Similar to the results from model 1 (see Table 2.3 and Table 2.4), a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient of downside jump risk value regardless of the chosen cut-off point in Table 
2.5 indicates that the higher the downside jump risk value, the higher the probability of jumps 
occurring over the next 22 trading days. Moreover, we also obtain the highest McFadden R-squared 
in the model predicting a realised jumps indicator below the 5% cut-off point (27.31%), which 
implies that our constructed jump risk value performs the best in predicting whether or not jumps 
below the 5% cut-off point would occur in the next 22 trading days. 
2.5.2 Predictive power of the constructed downside jump risk predictors 
in explaining the realised probability of jumps 
We measure the power of the constructed downside jump risk predictors in predicting the realised 
probability of jumps by running two regressions of the realised probability of jumps on each of the 
jump risk predictors. 
2.5.2.1 Predictive power of downside jump risk indicator in explaining the 
realised probability of jumps 
We run a simple linear regression of the realised probability of jumps on the constructed downside 
jump risk indicator and report the output in Table 2.6. 
Insert Table 2.6 about here 
As shown in Table 2.6, the coefficient of the downside jump risk indicator is statistically significant 
and positive with regard to all of the three cut-off points. This indicates that when the downside 
jump risk indicator takes the value of 1 or when the predicted price of the catastrophe bond in the 
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conditional model is greater than that in the unconditional one, downside jump is more likely to 
occur in reality. When the indicator of downside jumps below the 5% cut-off point takes the value 
of 1, on average, the realised probability of jumps increases by 7.3%, whereas these figures, which 
correspond to cut-off points 2 and 3, are 5.2% and 3.2% respectively.  
We obtain the highest adjusted R-squared in the model predicting jumps below the 5% cut-off 
point. This result is consistent with what is found in section 2.5.1.1 that the constructed downside 
jump risk indicator possesses the highest predictive power when predicting downside jumps below 
the 5% cut-off point.  
2.5.2.2 Predictive power of downside jump risk value in explaining the 
realised probability of jumps 
The predictive power of the downside jump risk value in explaining the realised probability of 
jumps is identified by running a simple linear regression (with HAC robust standard errors) of the 
realised probability of jumps on the downside jump risk value (see Table 2.7 for the output).  
Insert  Table 2.7 about here 
Note that we construct our downside jump risk value so that it is an out-of-sample predictor. As a 
result, the adjusted R-squared of over 27.98% regardless of the cut-off point reported in Table 2.7 is 
considered to be reasonably high. Our constructed downside jump risk value is statistically 
significant implying that our downside jump risk value can predict in excess of 27.98% of the 
variation of the realised probability of jumps. Again, our downside jump risk value performs the 
best when the 5% cut-off point is chosen, which explains over 34% of the variation of the realised 
probability of jumps. The positive and statistical significance of downside jump risk value 
regardless of the chosen cut-off point indicates that an increase in downside jump risk value 
explains an increase in the realised probability of jumps. When the downside jump risk value of 
jumps below the 5% cut-off point increases by 1%, on average, the realised probability of jumps 
increases by 0.73%, whereas these figures which correspond to cut-off points 2 and 3 are 0.65% and 
0.70% respectively.  
The fact that we obtain the coefficients of downside jump risk value of less than 1 in all three cut-
off points demonstrates that a 1% increase in the difference between the catastrophe bond prices 
predicted by the conditional and unconditional models is equivalent to less than 1% increase in the 
realised probability of jumps. This result is supportive to the previous conclusion that our 
conditional volatility measure (VIX) actually over-estimates the probability of downside jump risk.  
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2.5.3 Comparison of the predictive power of downside jump risk indicator and 
downside jump risk value 
The previously summarised regression outputs of our four (4) models indicate that both of our 
constructed downside jump risk predictors including the downside jump risk indicator and the 
downside jump risk value are good predictors of the realised downside jumps. As both the downside 
jump risk indicator and the downside jump risk value are constructed based on the difference in 
predicted prices of the catastrophe bonds between the conditional model and the unconditional 
model, their statistical significance implies that the conditional model is superior to the 
unconditional one or VIX is a better volatility measure than the historical volatility in predicting 
downside jump risk.  
When comparing the McFadden R-squared of model 2 with model 1, we conclude that the downside 
jump risk value performs much better in explaining the (no) occurrence of jumps below the 1% cut-
off point (15.24% vs. 10.85%), slightly better in explaining the (no) occurrence of jumps below the 
5% cut-off point (27.31% vs. 25.90%) and slightly worse in explaining the (no) occurrence of 
jumps below the 2.5% cut-off point (18.41% vs. 19.58%).  
However, when the adjusted R-squared of model 4 is compared with that of model 3, we conclude 
that the downside jump risk value outperforms the downside jump risk indicator in predicting the 
realised probability of jumps regardless of the chosen cut-off point. This conclusion is supported by 
the higher adjusted R-squared of model 4 than that of model 3 in all of the three chosen cut-off 
points (5% cut-off point: 34% vs. 17% , 2.5% cut-off point: 28% vs. 13% and 1% cut-off point: 
28% vs. 7%). 
2.6 Economic implications 
2.6.1 Using a strategy based on “jumps” predictions 
We develop a trading strategy to take advantage of the accuracy of our model’s “jumps” prediction. 
We only evaluate the performance of the strategy using our prediction of jumps below the 5% cut-
off point due to the similarity of this process to those of 2.5% and 1% cut-off points. The rationale 
of this strategy is that when our model predicts the occurrence of jumps in the next 22 trading days, 
we expect a sharp drop in returns of the S&P 500. As a result, we short one-month futures contracts 
on the S&P 500. 
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We report the performance of the two variations of this strategy: 
(i) We short one-month futures contracts of the S&P 500 when there is a prediction of 
downside jumps. We realise the loss/profit of the transaction at maturity (in one month 
or 22 trading days) by taking the difference between the selling price (one-month futures 
price of the S&P 500 when selling futures contracts) and the buying price (spot price of 
the S&P 500 at maturity). 
(ii) We short one-month futures contracts of the S&P 500 when there is a prediction of 
jumps. Over the next 22 trading days, when our model reverses its signal, which means 
that the prediction changes from “jumps” to “no jumps”, we realise the loss/profit of the 
transaction by taking the difference between the selling price (one-month futures price of 
the S&P 500 when selling futures contracts) and the buying price (one-month futures 
price of the S&P 500 when our model reverses its prediction). If the model persistently 
predicts jumps over the next 22 trading days, we realise the loss/profit of the transaction 
at the end of the next 22 trading days as what is done in the first variation of the strategy. 
Insert Table 2.8 about here 
As can be seen from Table 2.8, the trading strategy based on our model’s jumps predictions results 
in a positive profit over both the whole sample period and the GFC. During the whole sample 
period, the first variation of this strategy generates much higher profit whereas the second variation 
of this strategy generates lower profit compared with that of the buy-and-hold strategy. If an 
investor just buys/sells one contract every transaction, he would generate $532,152.5 using the first 
variation of the strategy and only $96,582.5 using the second variation of the strategy over the 
whole sample period. Meanwhile, if the investor decided to follow the buy-and-hold strategy, he 
could make $128,157.5. However, during the GFC, both variations of the strategy outperform the 
buy-and-hold strategy. An investor can make $2,853,052.5 in the first variation of the strategy and 
$2,621,022.5 in the second variation of the strategy, but incur a loss of $146,007.5 if he chose the 
buy-and-hold strategy. As the S&P 500 futures market is liquid and the profit generated based on 
our model’s “jumps” predictions is much higher than that of the buy-and-hold strategy, our above 
conclusions are believed to hold when transaction costs are taken into account. However, numerical 
evidence needs to be obtained in the future to support the conclusion. We find no difference in daily 
profit earned over the whole sample period and during the GFC between using the two variations of 
this strategy.  
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2.6.2 Using a strategy based on “no jumps” predictions 
Similar to what is reported in section 2.6.1, this section reports the performance summary of the 
trading strategy which takes advantage of the model “no jumps” predictions. When the model 
predicts that no jumps occur over the next 22 trading days, we long one-month futures contracts on 
the S&P 500. However, as the prediction of “no jumps” does not necessarily mean the prediction of 
no drop in the S&P 500, we would not expect a significant economic value created by this strategy 
as we do from the previous trading strategy. 
Again, we report the performance of the two variations of this strategy: 
(i) We long one-month futures contracts of the S&P 500 when there is a prediction of no 
jumps. We realise the loss/profit of the transaction at maturity (in one month or 22 
trading days) by taking the difference between the selling price (spot price of the S&P 
500 at maturity) and the buying price (one-month futures price of the S&P 500 when 
buying futures contracts). 
(ii) We long one-month futures contracts of the S&P 500 when there is a prediction of no 
jumps. Over the next 22 trading days, when our model reverses its signal, which means 
that it predicts jumps instead, we realise the loss/profit of the transaction by taking the 
difference between the selling price (one-month futures price of the S&P 500 when our 
model reverses its signal) and the buying price (one-month futures price of the S&P 500 
when buying futures contracts). If the model persistently predicts no jumps over the next 
22 trading days, we realise the loss/profit of the transaction at the end of the next 22 
trading days following the process described in the first variation of the strategy. 
Insert Table 2.9 about here 
The results in Table 2.9  indicate that both variations of the strategy based on the model’s “no 
jumps” predictions outperform the buy-and-hold strategy over the whole sample period. More 
specifically, assuming one contract is traded in every single transaction, the strategy where we long 
one-month futures contract on the S&P 500 when there is a prediction of no jumps and hold it for 
22 trading days generates $873,790 profit over the whole period; whereas this figure in the second 
variation is $1,058,000. Meanwhile, under the buy-and-hold strategy, we would gain $128,157.5 
over the whole period. During the GFC, both variations of the strategy and the buy-and-hold one 
did not perform well. An investor would lose $541,857.5 if he performed the first variation of the 
strategy. Even though the buy-and-hold strategy incurred less loss during the GFC than the first 
variation of this strategy ($146,007.5), more loss could be cut if the second variation of the strategy 
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were conducted ($131,800). As mentioned earlier, the liquid futures market of the S&P 500 leads to 
a small spread between the futures bid and ask, which helps to lower the transaction costs when 
trading in this market. The above conclusions might hold when the transaction costs are counted. 
Similar to what is found in section 2.6.1, we find no difference between the daily profits earned 
over the whole sample period using the two variations of the trading strategy based on the model’s 
“no jumps” predictions. However, during the GFC, the trading strategy where we buy one-month 
futures contracts when there is a prediction of no jumps and close out the position when the 
predictive signal changes or hold them for 22 trading days if the predictive signal remains the same 
would incur significantly less loss at a 5% significant level compared to the other variation of the 
trading strategy. Nevertheless, if the trading strategy based on “jumps” predictions generates profits 
over the GFC, this trading strategy based on “no jumps” predictions does not seem to perform well 
during the crisis. The reason lies in the fact that while the former trading strategy takes advantage of 
the prediction of jumps (or drop in returns) during the crisis, the latter one’s prediction of “no 
jumps” is not equivalent to the prediction of “no return drop” during the GFC, which in turn cannot 
guarantee the profit of a long position even when the prediction of “no jumps” turns out to be true. 
2.6.3 Comparison of the trading strategy based on “jumps” predictions and that 
based on “no jumps” predictions 
We conduct a comparison of the performance of the two strategies, one of which is based on the 
model’s “jumps” prediction and the other is based on the model’s “no jumps” prediction. Based on 
the analyses following Table 2.8 and Table 2.9, it is sufficient to compare the performance of the 
first variation of the former trading strategy with that of the second variation of the latter trading 
strategy. In other words, we only need to compare the strategy of selling futures contracts when 
there is a signal of jumps and holding them for the next 22 trading days with the strategy of buying 
futures contract when there is a signal of no jumps and closing out this position if the prediction 
changes anytime over the next 22 trading days. 
Insert Table 2.10 about here 
Consistent with what is expected after the previous analyses, we find no difference in daily profits 
generated by the two strategies over the whole sample period but significant difference in profits 
generated over the GFC at a 1% significance level. As crises are when investors need to be 
protected the most, it is concluded that the trading strategy based on “jumps” predictions performs 
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better than the strategy based on “no jumps” predictions. It also helps to reinforce the practical 
importance of our model.  
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter provides a theoretical framework to measure downside jump risk by developing a 
pricing formula of catastrophe bonds using a state preference approach. The catastrophe bond is 
defined in this chapter to offer a $1 payoff in bad states i.e., states when jumps occur, and zero 
otherwise. Theoretically, the price of the catastrophe bond reflects the probability of downside jump 
risk. A high price of the catastrophe bond indicates the market’s expectation that downside jumps 
are more likely to occur in the future.  
We estimate the price of the catastrophe bonds under both the unconditional model (using historical 
volatility) and the conditional model (using VIX) using the state preference approach. Our downside 
jump risk predictors including a downside jump risk indicator and a downside jump risk value are 
constructed based on the difference in the prices of the catastrophe bonds predicted by the 
conditional and unconditional models. Examining the power of the downside jump risk predictors 
in predicting the future realised downside jumps, we find that both the downside jump risk indicator 
and the downside jump risk value are statistically significant in predicting the realised jump 
indicator and the realised probability of jumps. Moreover, we obtain positive coefficients of the 
downside jump risk indicator and the downside jump risk value regardless of the chosen cut-off 
point, which are consistent with their theoretically predicted signs. It indicates that the higher the 
values of our downside jump risk predictors, the more likely downside jumps will occur in the next 
22 trading days. The relatively high McFadden R-squared in models predicting the realised jumps 
indicator and high adjusted R-squared in models predicting the realised probability of jumps also 
indicate the appropriateness of using the state preference approach in predicting downside jumps.  
Among three predetermined cut-off points, both of our downside jump risk predictors appear to 
perform the best when predicting the realised downside jumps (both indicator and probability) 
below the 5% cut-off point. Comparing the predictive power of the downside jump risk indicator 
and the downside jump risk value, it can be seen that their performance depends on the chosen cut-
off points when predicting the realised jump indicator. However, when predicting the realised 
probability of jumps, the downside jump risk value always outperforms the downside jump risk 
indicator regardless of the chosen cut-off point. 
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As our downside jump risk predictors are constructed based on the difference in prices of the 
catastrophe bonds in the conditional and unconditional models, their significant coefficients imply 
that the conditional model outperforms the unconditional one in predicting the realised downside 
jumps. In other words, it implies that VIX is a better volatility measure than the historical volatility 
when predicting downside jump risk. However, VIX is also found to over-estimate the likelihood of 
downside jump risk.  
We also develop trading strategies that are based on our model’s predictions of “jumps” and “no 
jumps”. Both of the trading strategies help to generate positive profits over the whole sample 
period. However, during the GFC, when investors need the most protection, the trading strategy 
based on “jumps” predictions significantly outperforms the other based on “no jumps” predictions 
at a 1% significance level. This conclusion is attributable to the fact that given our model’s correct 
prediction, “no jumps” does not guarantee no drop in the S&P 500, especially during the crisis. The 
profit generated during the GFC based on our model’s prediction of jumps reinforces the 
application of the state preference approach in predicting downside jump risk. 
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Figure 2.1: Construction of downside jump risk predictors  
  
 
Left-tailed area under 
the conditional model 
 
Left-tailed area under 
the unconditional 
model = 5% 
 
5% threshold under the 
unconditional model 
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Figure 2.2: Overview of the model’s forecasting power 
 
Panel A. Jump risk value and realised probability of downside jump below the 5% cut-off point over time 
 
Panel B. Conditional price of catastrophe bonds and realised probability of downside jump below the 5% 
cut- off point over time 
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Table 2.1: An error matrix of a presence/absence model 
  Actual 
  + /Presence - /Absence 
Predicted 
+ /Presence True Positives (TP) False Positives (FP) 
- /Absence False Negatives (FN) True Negatives (TN) 
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Table 2.2: Measures of classification accuracy derived from the error matrix 
Measures 
Calculation  
(using count data) 
Interpretation 
Prevalence = (𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)/𝑁 The actual proportion of jumps in the population 
Overall diagnostic power = (𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁)/𝑁 The actual proportion of no jumps in the population 
Correct classification rate = (𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁)/𝑁 The proportion of correct prediction in the population 
Sensitivity = 𝑇𝑃/(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁) The proportion of correct prediction of jumps in the actual population of jumps 
Specificity = 𝑇𝑁/(𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁) The proportion of correct prediction of no jumps in the actual population of no jumps 
False positive rate = 𝐹𝑃/(𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁) The proportion of false prediction of jumps in the actual population of no jumps 
False negative rate = 𝐹𝑁/(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁) The proportion of false prediction of no jumps in the actual population of jumps 
Positive predictive power = 𝑇𝑃/(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃) The proportion of correct prediction of jumps in total prediction of jumps 
Negative predictive power = 𝑇𝑁/(𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑁) The proportion of correct prediction of no jumps in total prediction of no jumps 
Misclassification rate = (𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)/𝑁 The proportion of false prediction in the population 
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Table 2.3: Predictive power of the downside jump risk indicators in explaining 
the realised jumps indicator 
Panel A of this table presents the coefficients and the McFadden R-squared of the probit regression of model 
1: Realised jumps indicator = f(Downside jump risk indicator), whereas panel B presents the coefficients 
and the McFadden R-squared of the probit regression of a simulated version of model 1: Realised jumps 
indicator = f(simulated jump risk indicator). The predicted downside jump risk indicator takes the value of 1 
if the predicted price of the catastrophe bond under the conditional model is larger than that of the 
unconditional one, and 0 otherwise. We simulate a random number in the interval [1,1000] for each day of 
the sample period. As our purpose is to simulate the indicator of jumps below three cut-off points 
corresponding to a left tail area of 5%, 2.5% and 1%, the daily simulated downside jump risk indicator takes 
the value of 1 if the simulated number is less than the respective cut-off point, and 0 otherwise. The 
simulated downside jump risk indicator takes the value of 1 if at least 1 jump is simulated over the next 22 
trading days and zero otherwise. The realised jumps indicator takes the value of 1 if at least 1 jump occurs 
over the next 22 trading days and zero otherwise. 
Panel A. 
  
5% cut-off point 2.5% cut-off point  1% cut-off point  
 (left tail of 5%) (left tail of 2.5%) (left tail of 1%) 
Intercept -1.2103*** -1.3249*** -1.5071*** 
Downside jump risk indicator 1.8206*** 1.6218*** 1.2250*** 
McFadden R-squared 0.2590 0.1958 0.1085 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
Panel B. 
  
5% cut-off point 2.5% cut-off point  1% cut-off point  
 (left tail of 5%) (left tail of 2.5%) (left tail of 1%) 
Intercept 0.1247*** -0.0899*** -0.5539*** 
Downside jump risk indicator -0.0488 -0.0643 -0.0340 
McFadden R-squared 0.0002 0.0005 0.0001 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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Table 2.4: Measures of classification accuracy of model 1 
This table reports measures of classification accuracy of model 1: Realised jumps indicator = f(Downside jump risk indicator) following methods reviewed by 
Fielding and Bell (1997). The predicted downside jump risk indicator takes the value of 1 if the predicted price of the catastrophe bond under the conditional model 
is larger than that of the unconditional model and 0 otherwise. Meanwhile, the realised jump risk indicator takes the value of 1 if at least 1 jump occurs over the next 
22 trading days and 0 otherwise. 
 
Formula 
5% cut-off point 
 (left tail of 5%) 
2.5% cut-off point 
 (left tail of 2.5%) 
1% cut-off point 
 (left tail of 1%) 
Summary Actual Predicted Count % Count % Count % 
-          TP + + 1796 50.08% 1519 42.36% 958 26.72% 
-          TN - - 996 27.77% 1019 28.42% 1049 29.25% 
-          FP - + 667 18.60% 944 26.32% 1505 41.97% 
-          FN + - 127 3.54% 104 2.90% 74 2.06% 
Number of predictions (N)    3586 100.00% 3586 100.00% 3586 100.00% 
Measures of classification accuracy                
- Prevalence = (𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)/𝑁   53.63%   45.26%   28.78% 
- Overall diagnostic power = (𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁)/𝑁   46.37%   54.74%   71.22% 
- Correct classification rate = (𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁)/𝑁   77.86%   70.78%   55.97% 
- Sensitivity = 𝑇𝑃/(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)   93.40%   93.59%   92.83% 
- Specificity = 𝑇𝑁/(𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁)   59.89%   51.91%   41.07% 
- False positive rate = 𝐹𝑃/(𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁)   40.11%   48.09%   58.93% 
- False negative rate = 𝐹𝑁/(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)   6.60%   6.41%   7.17% 
- Positive predictive power = 𝑇𝑃/(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃)   72.92%   61.67%   38.90% 
- Negative predictive power = 𝑇𝑁/(𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑁)   88.69%   90.74%   93.41% 
- Misclassification rate = (𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)/𝑁   22.14%   29.22%   44.03% 
 
 
32 
 
Table 2.5: Predictive power of the downside jump risk value in explaining the 
realised jumps indicator 
This table presents the coefficients and the McFadden R-squared of the probit regression of model 2: 
Realised jumps indicator = f(Downside jump risk value), where the predicted downside jump risk value 
measures the difference in predicted prices of the catastrophe bond between the conditional and 
unconditional models. The realised jumps indicator takes the value of 1 if at least 1 jump occurs over the 
next 22 trading days and 0 otherwise. 
  
5% cut-off point 2.5% cut-off point  1% cut-off point  
 (left tail of 5%) (left tail of 2.5%) (left tail of 1%) 
Intercept -0.4650*** -0.6338*** -1.0480*** 
Downside jump risk value 14.6801*** 13.6784*** 14.3915*** 
McFadden R-squared 0.2731 0.1841 0.1524 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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Table 2.6: Predictive power of the downside jump risk indicator in explaining 
the realised probability of jumps 
This table reports the coefficients and the adjusted R-squared of the OLS regression with HAC robust 
standard errors of model 3: Realised probability of jumps = f(Downside jump risk indicator), where the 
predicted downside jump risk indicator takes the value of 1 if the predicted price of the catastrophe bond 
under the conditional model is larger than that of the unconditional one, and 0 otherwise. The realised 
probability of jumps is measured by dividing the number of actual jumps over the next 22 trading days by 22. 
  
5% cut-off point 2.5% cut-off point 1% cut-off point 
(left tail of 5%) (left tail of 2.5%) (left tail of 1%) 
Intercept 0.0102*** 0.0057*** 0.0039*** 
Downside jump risk indicator 0.0728*** 0.0523*** 0.0318*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1698 0.1318 0.0657 
 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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Table 2.7: Predictive power of the downside jump risk value in explaining the 
realised probability of jumps 
This table reports the coefficients and the adjusted R-squared of the OLS regression with HAC robust 
standard errors of model 4: Realised probability of jumps = f(Downside jump risk value), where the predicted 
downside jump risk value measures the difference in predicted prices of the catastrophe bond between the 
conditional and unconditional models. The realised probability of jumps is measured by dividing the number 
of jumps over the next 22 trading days by 22. 
  
5% cut-off point 2.5% cut-off point 1% cut-off point 
(left tail of 5%) (left tail of 2.5%) (left tail of 1%) 
Intercept 0.0296*** 0.0170*** 0.0048* 
Downside jump risk value 0.7290*** 0.6488*** 0.6976*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3401 0.2847 0.2798 
 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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Table 2.8: Summary of profit/loss of the trading strategy using “jumps” predictions 
This table provides a summary of the performance of two variations of the trading strategy using “jumps” (below the 5% cut-off point) prediction of our model. In the first variation 
of the trading strategy we short one-month futures contract on the S&P 500 when there is a prediction of jumps. We realise the loss/profit of the transaction at the maturity (in one 
month or 22 trading days) by taking the difference between the selling price (one-month futures price of the S&P 500 when selling futures contracts) and the buying price (spot price 
of the S&P 500 at maturity). With regard to the second variation of the trading strategy, we short one-month futures contract of the S&P 500 when there is a prediction of jumps. 
Over the next 22 trading days when our model reverses its signal (meaning that the prediction changes from “jumps” to “no jumps”), we realise the loss/profit of the transaction by 
taking the difference between the selling price (one-month futures price of the S&P 500 when selling futures contracts) and the buying price (one-month futures price of the S&P 500 
when our model reverses its prediction). If the model persistently predicts jumps over the next 22 trading days, we realise the loss/profit of the transaction at the end of the next 22 
trading days as what is done in the first variation of the strategy.  
Panel A reports the performance of the trading strategy over the whole sample period and panel B reports that performance during the GFC (7/2007-6/2009). 
Panel A. Whole sample 
  
  
 Based on jumps prediction Based on the buy- 
and-hold strategy 
 
Holding the futures position  
for 22 trading days 
Closing out the futures position  
when the signal changes 
Difference 
P&L in index point 2,128.61 386.33  512.63 
P&L in $ ($250/index point) 532,152.5 96,582.5 435,300 128,157.5 
Average daily volume of 1-month 
futures (in contracts) 
64,887 64,887 
  
Average daily volume per Investor 0.1% 0.15% 0.2% 0.1% 0.15% 0.2%   
Daily number of future contracts 
traded per Investor 
65 97 130 65 97 130 
  
P&L in $ 34,589,913  51,618,793     69,179,825     6,277,863     9,368,503     12,555,725    
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Panel B. GFC 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
  
 Based on jumps prediction Based on the 
buy- and-hold 
strategy 
 
Holding the futures position  
for trading 22 days 
Closing out the futures position  
when the signal changes 
Difference 
P&L in index point 11,412.21 10,484.09  -584.03 
P&L in $ ($250/index point) 2,853,052.5 2,621,022.5 232,030 -146,007.5 
Average daily volume of 1-month 
futures (in contracts) 
64,887 64,887 
  
Average daily volume per Investor 0.1% 0.15% 0.2% 0.1% 0.15% 0.2%   
Daily number of future contracts traded 
per Investor 
65 97 130 65 97 130 
  
P&L in $ 185,448,413  276,746,093  370,896,825  170,366,463  254,239,183  340,732,925    
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Table 2.9: Summary of profit/loss of the trading strategy using “no jumps” predictions 
This table provides a summary of the performance of two variations of the trading strategy using “no jumps” (below the 5% cut-off point) prediction of our model. In the first 
variation of the trading strategy, we long one-month futures contract on the S&P 500 when there is a prediction of no jumps. We realise the loss/profit of the transaction at the 
maturity (in one month or 22 trading days) by taking the difference between the selling price (spot price of the S&P 500 at maturity) and the buying price (one-month futures price of 
the S&P 500 when buying futures contracts). With regard to the second variation of the trading strategy, we long one-month futures contract of the S&P 500 when there is a 
prediction of no jumps. Over the next 22 trading days when our model reverses its signal (meaning that it predicts jumps instead), we realise the loss/profit of the transaction by 
taking the difference between the selling price (one-month futures price of the S&P 500 when our model reverses its prediction) and the buying price (one-month futures price of the 
S&P 500 when buying futures contracts). If the model persistently predicts no jumps over the next 22 trading days, we realise the loss/profit of the transaction at the end of the next 
22 trading days following the process described in the first variation of the strategy. 
Panel A reports the performance of the trading strategy over the whole sample period and panel B reports that performance during the GFC (7/2007-6/2009). 
Panel A. Whole sample 
 
  
 Based on no jumps prediction Based on the 
buy- and-hold 
strategy 
 
Holding the futures position  
for 22 trading days 
Closing out the futures position  
when the signal changes 
Difference 
P&L in index point 3,495.16 4,232  512.63 
P&L in $ ($250/index point) 873,790 1,058,000 -184,210 128,157.5 
Average daily volume of 1-month 
futures (in contracts) 
64,887 64,887  
 
Average daily volume per Investor 0.1% 0.15% 0.2% 0.1% 0.15% 0.2%   
Daily number of future contracts 
traded per Investor 
65 97 130 65 97 130 
  
P&L in $ 56,796,350  84,757,630  113,592,700   68,770,000     102,626,000     137,540,000    
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Panel B. GFC  
 
 
 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.  
 Based on no jumps prediction Based on the 
buy- and-hold 
strategy 
 
Holding the futures position  
for 22 trading days 
Closing out the futures position  
when the signal changes 
Difference 
P&L in index point -2,167.43 -523.2  -584.03 
P&L in $ ($250/index point) -541,857.5 -131,800 -411,057.5** -146,007.5 
Average daily volume of 1-month 
futures (in contracts) 
64,887 64,887  
 
Average daily volume per Investor 0.1% 0.15% 0.2% 0.1% 0.15% 0.2%   
Daily number of future contracts 
traded per Investor 
65 97 130 65 97 130 
  
P&L in $ -   35,220,738  -    52,560,178  -   70,441,475  -  8,502,000  -   12,687,600  -   17,004,000    
 
 
39 
 
Table 2.10: Comparison of profit/loss between the trading strategies using “jumps” predictions and “no jumps” 
predictions 
This table provides a comparison of the performance of the two trading strategies, one of which is based on the model’s “jumps” prediction and the other is based on the model’s “no 
jumps” prediction. The former is conducted as follows: we short one-month futures contract on the S&P 500 when there is a prediction of jumps. We realise the loss/profit of the 
transaction at the maturity (in one month or 22 trading days) by taking the difference between the selling price (one-month futures price of the S&P 500 when selling futures 
contracts) and the buying price (spot price of the S&P 500 at maturity). With regard to the latter, we long one-month futures contract of the S&P 500 when there is a prediction of no 
jumps. Over the next 22 trading days when our model reverses its signal (meaning that it predicts jumps instead), we realise the loss/profit of the transaction by taking the difference 
between the selling price (one-month futures price of the S&P 500 when selling futures contracts) and the buying price (one-month futures price of the S&P 500 when our model 
reverses its prediction). If the model persistently predicts no jumps over the next 22 trading days, we realise the loss/profit of the transaction at the end of the next 22 trading days 
taking the difference between the selling price (spot price of the S&P 500 at maturity) and the buying price (one-month futures price of the S&P 500 when buying futures contracts). 
Panel A reports the performance of the trading strategy over the whole sample period and panel B reports that performance during the GFC (7/2007-6/2009). 
Panel A. Whole sample 
 
 
Holding the futures position for 22 trading days 
based on JUMPS prediction 
Closing out the futures position when the signal 
changes based on NO JUMPS prediction 
Difference 
P&L in index point 2,128.61 4,232  
P&L in $ ($250/index point) 532,152.5 1,058,000 -525,847.5 
Average daily volume of 1-month futures (in 
contracts) 
64,887 64,887 
 
Average daily volume per Investor 0.1% 0.15% 0.2% 0.1% 0.15% 0.2%  
Daily number of future contracts traded per 
Investor 
65 97 130 65 97 130 
 
P&L in $ 34,589,913  51,618,793  69,179,825   68,770,000     102,626,000     137,540,000   
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Panel B. GFC  
 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
 
 
Holding the futures position for 22 trading days 
based on JUMPS prediction 
Closing out the futures position when the signal 
changes based on NO JUMPS prediction 
Difference 
P&L in index point 11,412.21 -523.2  
P&L in $ ($250/index point) 2,853,052.5 -131,800 2,984,852.5*** 
Average daily volume of 1-month futures (in 
contracts) 
64,887 64,887 
 
Average daily volume per Investor 0.1% 0.15% 0.2% 0.1% 0.15% 0.2%  
Daily number of future contracts traded per 
Investor 
65 97 130 65 97 130 
 
P&L in $ 185,448,413      276,746,093  370,896,825  -    8,502,000  -   12,687,600  -   17,004,000   
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Chapter 3 
 
STATE PREFERENCE APPROACH TO 
MARKET DOWNSIDE JUMP RISK UNDER 
THE MERTON (1976) RISK NEUTRAL JUMP-
DIFFUSION FRAMEWORK 
 
 
“Although the diffusive models are of great analytical convenience, there remains 
the open issue of whether such models are empirically consistent with the extreme 
violent movements sometimes seen in financial price series. It is natural to ask 
whether jump diffusions, with discontinuous sample paths, provide a more 
appropriate empirical model for financial price series. Jump diffusions have a 
long and rich history in financial economics dating back at least to Merton 
(1976).”  
(Huang & Tauchen, 2005, p. 457) 
3.1  Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we apply the state preference theory to develop a theoretical framework to 
measure downside jump risk predictors. More specifically, we introduce the concept of catastrophe 
bonds and advocate the estimation of downside jump risk predictors based on the difference of 
prices of those bonds between the conditional and unconditional models. As it is documented in the 
literature that state prices can be modelled as the second derivative of a European call option (Banz 
& Merton, 1978; Breeden & Litzenberger, 1978), our empirical test in chapter two starts using the 
estimation using the seminal Black-Scholes (1973) option pricing model. 
However, empirical evidence in previous literature reveals the systematic bias of the Black-Scholes 
option pricing model (Ball & Torous, 1985; Geske & Roll, 1984; Kim, Oh, & Brooks, 1994). The 
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main source of this bias is attributable to the model’s misspecification of the return process. Under 
the Black-Scholes model, logarithmic returns are assumed to follow a normal distribution, which 
may fail to capture some important characteristics of the true process. The Merton (1976) jump-
diffusion framework, which explicitly models jumps in the return process of the underlying stock, is 
believed to potentially mitigate these biases (Ball & Torous, 1985; Kremer & Roenfeldt, 1993; Yan, 
2011). 
This chapter, therefore, applies the Merton (1976) risk neutral jump-diffusion framework to 
measure state prices and prices of catastrophe bonds under both the conditional and unconditional 
models. It is noted that the jump component in the Merton jump-diffusion framework introduces 
extra parameters to those in the Black-Scholes framework. As a result, in this chapter, we estimate 
two conditional sub-models. The first model utilises the conditional instantaneous volatility on VIX 
and the second model conditions both the instantaneous volatility and jump volatility on VIX. 
We then follow the same process and implement the same empirical tests proposed in the previous 
chapter to construct and test the predictability of the S&P 500 downside jump risk predictors over 
the period 1996–2010. Our two sub-models yield consistent results. However, the second sub-
model outperforms the first model in predicting future downside jumps. Overall, the results are in 
line with those in the previous chapter. We are also able to develop profitable trading strategies 
based on our model’s predictions. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes the differences in research methods from the 
previous chapter. Section 3.3 reports the empirical results when the predictive power of the S&P 
500 downside jump risk predictors is examined. Section 3.4 develops trading strategies based on 
our model’s prediction to provide economic implications. Section 3.5 offers a concluding remark. 
3.2 Research method 
This section discusses the differences in the research method employed in this chapter compared 
with the previous one. 
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3.2.1 Prediction of the price of catastrophe bonds using the Merton (1976) 
risk neutral jump-diffusion framework 
3.2.1.1 The Merton (1976) jump-diffusion model 
As aforementioned, this chapter aims to estimate state prices using the Merton (1976) risk neutral 
jump-diffusion framework. Moving one step forward from the model of log normal price in chapter 
two, we apply the jump-diffusion model, a seminal jump model developed by Merton (1976) to 
predict stock log returns. This model derives the options pricing formula maintaining most of the 
assumptions introduced by Black and Scholes (1973). Merton (1976) differs from Black and 
Scholes (1973) by assuming that stock returns are modelled by both continuous process (Wiener 
process) and jump process (“Poisson-driven” process). 
 𝑑𝑆
𝑆
= (𝛼 − 𝜆𝑘)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝜎 + 𝑑𝑑 (16) 
Where: 
𝛼 denotes the instantaneous expected stock returns. 
𝜎2 denotes the instantaneous return variance, conditional on no occurrence of Poisson event. 
𝑑𝜎 denotes Wiener process. 
𝑑(𝑡) denotes the independent Poisson process. 
𝑑𝑑 and 𝑑𝜎 are assumed to be independent. 
𝜆 denotes the average number of event arrivals per unit time. 
𝑘 = 𝜀(𝑌 − 1)  
𝑌 − 1 denotes the random variable of percentage change in price when Poisson event occurs. 
𝜀 denotes the expectation operator. 
Given all of the above parameters, the gross return of the stock at time 𝑡 can be expressed as: 
 
𝑆(𝑡)
𝑆
= 𝑒𝑒𝑒 ��𝛼 − 𝜎22 − 𝜆𝑘� 𝑡 + 𝜎𝜎(𝑡)� 𝑌(𝑛)  (17) 
Where: Z(t) ∼ Gaussian (0, t)  
𝑌(𝑛) = �      1              if n = 0      ∏ Yjnj=1   if n ≥ 1 where Yj are independently and identically distributed   n ∼ Poisson(λt)  
If 𝑛 = 0  𝑌(𝑛) = 1, (17) can be written as: 
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𝑆(𝑡)
𝑆
= 𝑒𝑒𝑒 ��𝛼 − 𝜎22 − 𝜆𝑘� 𝑡 + 𝜎𝜎(𝑡)� 
 ↔ 𝑙𝑛 �
𝑆(𝑡)
𝑆
� = �𝛼 − 𝜎22 − 𝜆𝑘� 𝑡 + 𝜎𝜎(𝑡) (18) 
which in fact is the Black-Scholes (1973) model. 
If 𝑛 ≥ 1: 
Taking natural logarithms of both sides of (17), we obtain: 
       𝑙𝑛 �𝑆(𝑖)
𝑆
� = 𝑙𝑛 �𝑒𝑒𝑒 ��𝛼 − 𝜎2
2
− 𝜆𝑘� 𝑡 + 𝜎𝜎(𝑡)�� + 𝑙𝑛[𝑌(𝑛)]  
↔ 𝑙𝑛 �
𝑆(𝑖)
𝑆
� = �𝛼 − 𝜎2
2
− 𝜆𝑘� 𝑡 + 𝜎𝜎(𝑡) + 𝑙𝑛�∏ 𝑌𝑗𝑛𝑗=1 �  
↔  𝑙𝑛 �𝑆(𝑖)
𝑆
� = �𝛼 − 𝜎2
2
− 𝜆𝑘� 𝑡 + 𝜎𝜎(𝑡) + 𝑙𝑛(𝑌1) + 𝑙𝑛(𝑌2) + ⋯+ 𝑙𝑛 (𝑌𝑛)  
↔  𝑙𝑛 �𝑆(𝑖)
𝑆
� = �𝛼 − 𝜎2
2
− 𝜆𝑘� 𝑡 + 𝜎𝜎(𝑡) + 𝑄1 + 𝑄2 + ⋯+ 𝑄𝑛  where 𝑙𝑛�𝑌𝑗� = 𝑄𝑗  ∀𝑗 = 1, … ,𝑛 
↔  𝑙𝑛 �𝑆(𝑖)
𝑆
� = �𝛼 − 𝜎2
2
− 𝜆𝑘� 𝑡 + 𝜎𝜎(𝑡) + Σ𝑘=1𝑛 𝑄𝑘  
↔  𝑙𝑛 �𝑆(𝑖)
𝑆
� = �𝜇 − 𝜎2
2
� 𝑡 + 𝜎𝜎(𝑡) + Σ𝑘=1𝑛 𝑄𝑘 where 𝜇 = 𝛼 − 𝜆𝑘 (19) 
We assume 𝑄𝑘 follows an i.i.d 𝑁(𝜇𝑄,𝜎𝑄2). 
3.2.1.2 Estimation of state prices using the Merton (1976) risk-neutral 
jump-diffusion framework 
Under the Merton (1976) risk-neutral jump-diffusion framework, the expected return on the 
underlying asset is the risk free rate or 𝜇 = 𝑟. As a result, if we can obtain the data of the risk free 
rate and calibrate the four (4) parameters 𝜎, 𝜆, 𝜇𝑄 and 𝜎𝑄, we can simulate the log-returns of the 
underlying asset across different states over time. Based on the simulated logarithmic returns of the 
underlying assets, we can easily identify the cumulative risk-neutral probability that log-return falls 
below the cut-off point, 𝐹(𝑆𝜏), which is 1 − 𝑁[𝑑2(𝑋 = 𝑆𝜏)] in the Black-Scholes framework and 
then estimate prices of catastrophe bonds as follows: 
 𝑃𝐶𝐶 = 𝑒−𝑟𝑟𝐹(𝑆𝜏) (20) 
Where 𝑺𝝉 denotes the price level at which log-return is at one of the cut-off points. 
Equation (20) is also consistent with the theoretical framework proposed in chapter two where: 
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 𝑃𝐶𝐶 = � 𝜙𝑠𝑠𝜏
𝑠=𝑠−∞
1 = � 𝜋𝑖+1,𝑠𝑈𝑖+1,𝑠′ �𝐺𝑖+1,𝑠�
𝑈𝑖𝑠
′ (𝐺𝑖𝑠)𝑠𝜏𝑠=𝑠−∞  (21) 
In the risk neutral world, ∑ 𝜋𝑖+1,𝑠𝑠𝜏𝑠=𝑠−∞ = 𝐹(𝑆𝜏) and the marginal rate of substitution 𝑈𝑡+1,𝑠′ �𝐶𝑡+1,𝑠�𝑈𝑡𝑠′ (𝐶𝑡𝑠) =
𝑒−𝑟𝑟. 
3.2.2 Unconditional versus conditional models 
Following chapter two, we choose three thresholds of 5th, 2.5th and 1st percentiles and estimate 
prices of catastrophe bonds under both conditional and unconditional models. 
Under the unconditional model, prices of the catastrophe bonds are estimated based on (20), where 
𝐹(𝑆𝜏) is equal to 5%, 2.5% and 1% for thresholds 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
Under the conditional model, we re-estimate 𝐹(𝑆𝜏) daily taking into account the information of 
VIX. Prices of catastrophe bonds are estimated in two conditional sub-models. With regard to the 
first conditional sub-model, we simulate log-returns of the S&P 500 under the Merton risk-neutral 
jump-diffusion model using the calibrated parameters where the instantaneous volatility is 
substituted by VIX, re-estimate the cumulative probability 𝐹(𝑆𝜏) and then estimate the price of 
catastrophe bonds. Under the second conditional sub-model, a similar process is employed. 
However, we not only replace the calibrated instantaneous volatility parameter with VIX as in the 
first sub-model but also estimate the conditional jump volatility on VIX. We run a simple linear 
regression of the calibrated jump volatility, 𝜎𝑄, on VIX: 
𝜎𝑄 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐻𝑉𝑋 
In order for the prediction to be completely out-of-sample and to be consistent with other 
estimations in this thesis, we estimate 𝛼�, ?̂? using a growing window with the pre-sample of 6 
months from the first day when 𝜎𝑄 is available. The estimates are then used to calculate the 
predicted jump volatility based on the level of VIX on the previous day, 𝜎𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑋� . We substitute 𝜎𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑋�  
with  𝜎𝑄� when  𝜎𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑋� < 0 to ensure the positive sign of  𝜎𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑋� . 
3.2.3 Downside jump risk predictors and test of predictive power  
We develop downside jump risk predictors and examine their predictability following the steps 
outlined in chapter two, section 2.3.3. It is noted that as we have two different conditional sub-
models: (i) the model conditioning only the instantaneous volatility on VIX; and (ii) the model 
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conditioning both the instantaneous volatility and jump volatility on VIX, we end up having two 
different sets of downside jump risk predictors. 
3.3 Empirical results 
We develop downside jump risk predictors of the S&P 500 during 1996–2010 and examine their 
predictive power based on the tests outlined in the previous chapter. This section reports the output 
of those tests. 
3.3.1 Test of normality of the S&P 500 log-returns 
Our choice of using the Merton (1976) risk neutral jump-diffusion framework over the Black-
Scholes (1973) risk-neutral framework to estimate states price, results from one of the unrealistic 
assumptions under the Black-Scholes model i.e., the assumption of log normal distribution of price. 
This assumption is well documented in the literature to be incapable of capturing one of the most 
obviously observed features of returns of financial assets i.e., the ‘fat tails’ or leptokurtic feature 
(Cont & Tankov, 2004; Fama, 1965; Ferson & Siegel, 2003; Mandelbrot, 1997). The empirical 
return distribution evidences that significant changes in returns are much more likely to occur than 
addressed by the normal distribution. This conclusion is again supported by our data. 
Insert Figure 3.2 about here 
As can be seen from Figure 3.2, log-returns of the S&P 500 are not normally distributed. More 
specifically, we observe more probability within half a standard deviation of the mean (high peak), 
more probability three or more standard deviations away from the mean (fat tail) and less overall 
probability elsewhere. This conclusion is supported by the output test of normality in Figure 3.3, 
where the null hypothesis of normality is rejected based on the high Jarque-Bera test statistic. 
Insert Figure 3.3 about here 
These three aforementioned patterns observed in Figure 3.2 are also present in Figure 3.4a and 
Figure 3.4b, where we divide the sample period into the GFC and non-GFC periods. However, 
those patterns appear to be the most severe in Figure 3.4b. In other words, the assumption of normal 
returns is violated the most during the GFC. 
Insert Figure 3.4 about here 
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3.3.2 Calibration of parameters under the Merton (1976) risk neutral jump-
diffusion model 
Based on the pre-sample window of 123 trading days (from 04/01/1996 to 28/06/1996), we obtain 
3608 sets of parameters by running Differential Evolution over growing windows. Differential 
Evolution is one of the heuristic methods used for unprovable derivations. Even when sometimes 
false, it nevertheless leads to precise conclusions (Gilli, Maringer, & Schumann, 2011). The power 
and efficiency of this method in calibrating the jump-diffusion model are illustrated in Ardia, 
Arango & Gómez (2011) and Price et al (2005). Moreover, as we measure the realised jumps 
probability based on the number of jumps over the next 22 trading days, the last 22 sets of 
calibrated parameters are not counted. We are then left with 3586 sets of parameters for 3586 days 
(from 01/07/1996 to 30/09/2010). 
Insert Table 3.1 about here 
As mentioned earlier, 𝜎𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑋�  is estimated over growing windows, where the pre-sample window is 6 
months from the first day where 𝜎𝑄 is available (128 trading days from 01/07/1996 to 31/12/1996). 
Therefore, the prediction of  𝜎𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑋�  is only available from 01/01/1997. We then end up with 3458 
prediction days. 
Based on the sets of calibrated parameters, we simulate log-returns of the S&P 500 over the same 
periods where 3000 states are simulated each day. Over the sample period of 3458 days, we 
simulate a total of 10,374,000 states.   
3.3.3 Main results 
The downside jump risk indicator and downside jump risk value constructed in this section only 
incorporate the information up to and including the day prior to the prediction day. This reflects the 
set of information that investors may have access to in the real world. Thus, those predictors are 
completely out-of-sample. 
An overview of the predictability of our constructed predictors is illustrated in Figure 3.5. 
Insert Figure 3.5 about here 
Panel A, Figure 3.5 plots the time series of the jump risk value obtained from the two sub-models 
and the realised probability of downside jump below the 5% threshold. It is clear that the downside 
jump risk values of the two sub-models are mimicking each other. Moreover, they predict quite well 
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the realised probability of downside jumps. Similar to the findings in chapter two using the Black-
Scholes risk neutral framework, jump risk values are high during the turbulent periods (for example, 
during the dot com bubble and the GFC) and low during 2003-2007. The same conclusions are 
drawn when examining the patterns of the conditional prices of catastrophe bonds of the two sub-
models and realised probability of downside jumps below 5% threshold in Panel B, Figure 3.5. 
3.3.3.1 Predictive power of the constructed downside jump risk predictors in 
explaining the realised jumps indicator 
As the realised jumps indicator takes the value of 1 if jumps indeed occur and 0 otherwise, the 
predictability of the constructed downside jump risk predictors are examined by running two probit 
models of the realised jumps indicator on those predictors. 
a.  Predictive power of downside jump risk indicator in explaining the realised 
jumps indicator 
• Running a probit regression and naïve simulation 
A probit model of the realised jumps indicator is run on the downside jump risk indicator (model 1) 
for both sub-models. We report the output of this regression in panel A, Table 3.2. 
Insert Table 3.2 about here 
As expected, the coefficient of our predicted downside jump risk indicator in both of the sub-
models is statistically significant and positive at 1% significance level regardless of the chosen 
threshold. As it is a probit model, this coefficient is not interpreted as the marginal impact on the 
dependent variable, which is the realised jumps indicator. Nevertheless, the positive coefficient of 
the downside jump risk indicator specifies the direction of how a change in the downside jump risk 
indicator might affect the realised jumps indicator. Specifically, it indicates that when the downside 
jump risk indicator equals 1 or when our model predicts the occurrence of jumps, chances are the 
realisation of jumps over the next 22 trading days. We also obtain the highest McFadden R-squared 
in the model predicting a realised jumps indicator below the 5% cut-off point. In other words, the 
model is more powerful in predicting small jumps than big ones. 
The above conclusion holds across both sub-models. However, when comparing the first sub-model 
with the second one, it is clear that the second sub-model, where both of the instantaneous volatility 
and jump volatility are conditioned on VIX, outperforms the first one regardless of the chosen cut-
off point. 
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As we use daily data to predict jumps over the next 22 trading days, there might be an argument that 
our predictor may be persistent. To address this issue, we perform a naïve simulation exercise 
following the method discussed in part a, section 2.5.1.1. We report its output in panel B, Table 3.2. 
The conclusion of the overall predictive power of our downside jump risk indicator drawn from 
Panel A, Table 3.2 is supported by the output of the naïve simulation presented in Panel B, Table 
3.2. Running a simulated downside jump indicator on the realised downside jump indicator, we get 
extremely low McFadden R-squared (around 0%) regardless of the chosen cut-off point. Moreover, 
among three simulations corresponding to three cut-off points, the downside jump risk indicator is 
not always statistically significant. It is only significant in predicting the realised jumps indicator 
below cut-off points 1 and 3. However, even in that case, the McFadden R-squared of the model is 
only limited to 1.1% and 0.12%, compared with that of 15.15% and 4.3% in our first sub-model and 
20.23% and 11.96% in our second sub-model. 
•  Investigation of the model’s suitability measures 
A further examination of our model’s suitability measures is conducted for model 1 above,9 where 
Panel A, Table 3.3 summarises the suitability measures of the first sub-model using the Merton 
(1976) jump-diffusion framework conditioning only instantaneous volatility on VIX and Panel B, 
Table 3.3 reports the measures of the second sub-model using the Merton jump-diffusion 
framework conditioning both the instantaneous volatility and jump volatility on VIX. 
Insert Table 3.3 about here 
Based on the measures of classification accuracy presented in Table 3.3, it is concluded that the 
jump risk indicator constructed using the Merton jump-diffusion model possesses a good predictive 
power. Looking at the correct classification rate (or its counterpart, the misclassification rate), we 
can see that our downside jump risk indicator predicts the occurrence of jumps accurately more than 
34.93% of the time in sub-model 1 and 50.55% in sub-model 2 regardless of the chosen cut-off 
point. We obtain the highest correct classification rate and lowest misclassification rate in both 
sub-models 1 and 2 when predicting downside jump risk below the 5% cut-off point (72.96% and 
27.04% in sub-model 1, and 76.11% and 23.89% in sub-model 2). This finding is consistent with 
what is concluded based on Table 3.2 that among the three chosen cut-off points, our downside 
jump risk indicator performs the best when predicting the presence and absence of downside jumps 
below the 5% cut-off point. We obtain the higher correct classification rates (and the lower 
                                                
9 Details of the classification accuracy measures can be found in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2. 
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misclassification rate) in sub-model 2. This leads to the conclusion that the sub-model 2 overall 
outperforms the sub-model 1 in predicting downside jump risk regardless of the chosen cut-off 
point. This conclusion is again predicted as we would expect that the sub-model conditioning both 
the instantaneous volatility and jump volatility on VIX would perform better than that conditioning 
only the instantaneous volatility on VIX. 
With regard to the prediction of “no jumps”, Panel B, Table 3.3 shows high negative predictive 
power measures of over 90% in both sub-models using the Merton jump-diffusion framework. In 
other words, the model is correct more than 90 out of 100 times it predicts “no jumps”. These 
measures, as a result, show high fractions of correct prediction of “no jumps”. Furthermore, our 
model results in a high level of sensitivity, more than 96% in both sub-models, (or a low level of 
false negative rate), which supports the conclusion that our model can predict over 96% of the time 
when downside jump, below any three predetermined cut-off points, occurs in reality. 
We measure and report the positive predictive power to evaluate the performance of our model’s 
“jumps” prediction. The positive predictive power of over 22.07% in both of our sub-models when 
predicting jumps below any of the three chosen cut-off points indicates that out of 100 times, more 
than 22 times our model predicts “jumps” correctly. The highest positive predictive power in 
predicting “jumps” below the 5% cut-off point (69.91% in sub-model 1 and 72.75% in sub-model 
2) suggests that our downside jump indicator performs the best when predicting the occurrence of 
jumps below the 5% cut-off point. 
The above evaluation of the measures of classification accuracy of model 1 suggests that our 
downside jump risk indicator overall possesses a strong predictive power, especially in the model 
predicting jumps below the 5% cut-off point. Moreover, the high negative predictive power, high 
level of sensitivity and medium level of positive predictive power imply that our model somehow 
over-predicts the occurrence of jumps. When comparing the two sub-models with each other, we 
find that the second sub-model outperforms the first one in predicting downside jumps. 
b. Predictive power of downside jump risk value in explaining the realised jumps 
indicator 
The predictability of downside jump risk value in explaining the realised jumps indicator is 
investiaged by running a probit regression of the realised jumps indicator on downside jump risk 
value (model 2). We summarise the output in Table 3.4. 
Insert  Table 3.4 about here 
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Consistent with the findings of model 1, we find a positive and statistically significant coefficient of 
downside jump risk value at the 1% significance level in both of the sub-models regardless of the 
chosen threshold. It indicates that the higher the downside jump risk value, the higher the 
probability of jumps’ occurrence over the next 22 trading days. Again, we find that our downside 
jump risk value performs the best when predicting realised jumps below the 5% cut-off point. It is 
evidenced by the obtained highest McFadden R-squared when predicting jumps below the 5% cut-
off point (29.49% in sub-model 1 and 30.14% in sub-model 2). Also, the higher McFadden R-
squared in sub-model 2 regardless of the chosen cut-off point strengthens the conclusion that sub-
model 2 outperforms sub-model 1 in predicting realised jumps indicator. This better performance 
results from the fact that both of the instantaneous volatility and jumps volatility are conditioned on 
VIX – the market’s expectation of future volatility. In other words, under sub-model 2, both of the 
instantaneous volatility and jumps volatility are forward-looking and time varying. Meanwhile, only 
the instantaneous volatility is conditioned on VIX in sub-model 1. 
3.3.3.2 Predictive power of the constructed downside jump risk predictors in 
explaining the realised probability of jumps 
We examine the predictability of the two constructed downside jump risk predictors in explaining 
the realised probability of jumps by running two regressions of the realised probability of jumps on 
each of the jump risk predictors including the downside jump risk indicator and downside jump risk 
value. We report the output of the regressions in both two sub-models: (i) the sub-model 
conditioning only the instantaneous volatility on VIX, and (ii) the sub-model conditioning both the 
instantaneous volatility and jump volatility on VIX. 
a. Predictive power of downside jump risk indicator in explaining the realised 
probability of jumps 
The predictive power of the downside jump risk indicator in explaining the realised probability of 
jumps is tested by running a simple regression of the realised probability of jumps on the downside 
jump risk indicator. The output of this regression of both sub-models is reported in Table 3.5. 
Insert Table 3.5 about here 
We obtain consistent results between the two sub-models. As shown in Table 3.5, the coefficient of 
the downside jump risk indicator is statistically significant and positive regardless of the chosen 
cut-off point. It indicates that when the downside jump risk indicator takes the value of 1, we 
observe an increase in the realised probability of jumps. In other words, when the predicted price of 
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the catastrophe bond in the conditional model is greater than that in the unconditional model, in 
reality downside jump is more likely to occur. More specifically, when the indicator of downside 
jumps below the 5% cut-off point takes the value of 1, it indicates, on average, 8.3% increase in the 
realised probability of jumps in sub-model 1 and 8.67% increase in the realised probability of 
jumps in sub-model 2. The figures that correspond to cut-off points 2 and 3 are 4.76% and 1.73% in 
sub-model 1 and 4.98% and 1.86% in sub-model 2. 
The adjusted R-squared is found highest in the sub-models predicting downside jumps below the 
5% cut-off point (10.65% in sub-model 1 and 13.84% in sub-model 2). This result is consistent with 
section 3.3.3.1 where the constructed downside jump risk predictor possesses the highest predictive 
power when predicting downside jumps below the 5% cut-off point. Comparing the two sub-
models, we again conclude that the second sub-model, which conditions both of the instantaneous 
volatility and jump volatility on VIX, outperforms the first model, which conditions only the 
instantaneous volatility on VIX. This conclusion is supported by the set of higher adjusted R-
squared obtained in the second sub-model regardless of the chosen cut-off point.  
b. Predictive power of downside jump risk value in explaining the realised probability 
of jumps 
We run a regression of the realised probability of jumps on downside jump risk value to examine 
the predictive power of our constructed downside jump risk value. The output of this regression is 
summarised in Table 3.6. 
Insert Table 3.6 about here 
Overall, we obtain a significantly high out-of-sample adjusted R-squared in both sub-models when 
predicting the realised probability of jumps below any of the three chosen cut-off points. The 
adjusted R-squared of over 25.98% indicates that our downside jump risk value can predict over 
25.98% of the variation of the realised probability of jumps. Again, our downside jump risk value 
performs the best when the 5% threshold is chosen. This explains about 38.6% of the variation of 
the realised probability of jumps in sub-model 1 and 39.3% of the variation of the realised 
probability of jumps in sub-model 2. The coefficient of the downside jump risk value is found to be 
positive and statistically significant, which indicates that the higher downside jump risk value 
corresponds to the higher realised probability of jumps. When the downside jump risk value 
increases by 1%, the realised probability of jumps increases, on average, by 0.86% in sub-model 1 
and 0.83% in sub-model 2. The corresponding figures to the thresholds 2 and 3 are 0.71% and 
0.73% in sub-model 1 and 0.68% and 0.7% in sub-model 2. 
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It is noted that the coefficients of the downside jump risk value are less than 1 with regard to all 
three cut-off points in both sub-models. This result suggests that an increase by 1% in the difference 
between the catastrophe bond prices predicted by the conditional and unconditional models, can 
explain less than a 1% increase in the realised probability of jumps. In other words, it implies that 
our model over-predicts the probability of downside jump risk. 
Comparing the results using sub-model 1 with those using sub-model 2, we find that the downside 
jump risk value constructed based on sub-model 2 outperforms that constructed based on sub-model 
1 in predicting the realised probability of jumps below any of the three cut-off points. 
3.3.3.3 Comparison of the predictive power of downside jump risk indicator 
and downside jump risk value 
The aforementioned output of our four (4) models suggests that both the downside jump risk 
indicator and the downside jump risk value perform well in predicting the realised downside jumps. 
As these two predictors are constructed based on the difference between the conditional and 
unconditional prices of catastrophe bonds, the above conclusion also implies that VIX performs 
better in predicting downside jump risk than the historical volatility.  
Comparisons of the McFadden R-squared between model 2 and model 1 and of the adjusted R-
squared between model 4 and model 3 show that the downside jump risk value outperforms the 
downside jump risk indicator in forecasting the realised jumps indicator and the realised jumps 
value over the next 22 trading days. This conclusion holds for both sub-models using the Merton 
risk-neutral Jump-Diffusion framework. 
3.4  Economic implications 
This section develops different trading strategies to take advantage of our prediction of downside 
jump risk. These trading strategies closely follow those in chapter two, section 2.6. As described in 
section 3.3.3.1, part a, based on the output in Table 3.2, the second conditional sub-model 
outperforms the first one in constructing the downside jump risk indicator. Therefore, the trading 
strategies in this section are only conducted based on the prediction of the second sub-model, which 
conditions on both the instantaneous volatility and jumps volatility using VIX. We only report the 
profit obtained using our model’s prediction of 5% jumps as a similar process can be done using the 
prediction of 2.5% and 1% jumps. 
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3.4.1 Using a strategy based on “jumps” predictions 
Trading strategies are developed based on our model’s “jumps” predictions. We take a short 
position in one-month futures contracts on the S&P 500 when our model indicates that jumps are 
likely to occur in the future. Similar to section 2.6.1, profits of the trading strategies are calculated 
in two circumstances. First, loss/profit of the transaction is only realised at the end of 22 trading 
days. Second, loss/profit of the transaction is realised when the signal of the model is reversed. 
Trading profits are reported in Table 3.7. 
Insert Table 3.7 about here 
Results in Table 3.7 indicate that the above trading strategy yields a positive profit over the whole 
sample period and during the GFC. Both variations of this strategy generate much higher profit than 
that of the buy-and-hold strategy.  
If one future contract is traded every transaction, $376,522.5 and $1,067,180 would be generated 
using the two variations of the strategies during the whole sample period. This figure is limited to 
$110,630 if the buy-and-hold strategy is followed. During the GFC, the difference between the 
profit generated using our strategy and that generated using the buy-and-hold strategy is even 
higher. An investor can make $3,394,910 in either variation of the strategy but could suffer a loss of 
$146,007.5 if he followed the buy-and-hold alternative. The highly liquid S&P 500 futures market 
and the large difference in profits generated based on our prediction and the buy-and-hold strategy 
support the conclusion that after taking into account transaction costs, we may be able to generate 
higher profit than the buy-and-hold strategy using the model’s “jumps” predictions.  
Over the whole sample period, we find no difference in daily profit earned using the two variations 
of this strategy. Also, both variations of the strategy give identical profits during the GFC due to the 
consistent predictions of jumps over the period. However, those profits during the GFC are 
significantly different from the non-GFC period. 
3.4.2 Using a strategy based on “no jumps” predictions 
We report the performance summary of the trading strategy based on our model’s “no jumps” 
predictions in this section. We take a long position in one-month S&P 500 future contracts when no 
jumps are predicted to occur over the next month. As noted in section 2.6.2, the “no jumps” 
prediction is not the same as the “no return drop” prediction. Consequently, the strategy based on 
“no jumps prediction” is expected not to yield as high profit as section 3.4.1. Again, two variations 
 
 
55 
 
of this strategy are reported. First, the loss/profit of the transaction is only realised at the maturity of 
the futures contract. Second, the loss/profit of the transaction is realised as soon as the model 
reverses its signal. Profits of the two variations of this trading strategy are reported in Table 3.8. 
Insert Table 3.8 about here 
If both variations of the strategy based on the model’s “jumps” predictions outperform the buy-and-
hold strategy, only the first variation of the strategy based on the model’s “no jumps” predictions 
outperforms the buy-and-hold strategy. If we only trade one future contract in one transaction, the 
first variation would help to generate $156,202.5 profit over the whole period and nothing (no 
gain/no loss) over the GFC period. These figures in the second variation are -$120,417.5 and 0 
respectively. Meanwhile, we would gain $110,630 over the whole period and lose $146,007.5 over 
the GFC period when following the buy-and-hold strategy.  
It is noted that the unsatisfactory performance of the second variation of this strategy is expected. 
The reason is because we long one-month futures contracts of the S&P 500 when the model predicts 
no jumps and close out the future position when the signal changes. However, even when our model 
is correct in predicting “no jumps”, it cannot guarantee that the market is not going to drop. In other 
words, given the model’s correct predictions of “no jumps”, a profit cannot be guaranteed when we 
take a long position of the futures contract.  
No difference is found between the daily profits earned over the whole sample period and during 
the GFC when the two variations of the trading strategy are employed.  
3.4.3 Comparison of the trading strategy based on “jumps” predictions and that 
based on “no jumps” predictions 
This section compares the performance of the two strategies developed based on our model’s 
“jumps” and “no jumps” predictions. Based on the conclusions drawn in the previous sections, the 
above comparison can be done by comparing the performance of the second variation of the former 
with the first variation of the latter. 
Insert Table 3.9 about here 
We find no difference in profits generated by the two strategies over the whole sample period but 
significant difference in profits generated over the GFC. As previously mentioned, during the GFC, 
there was no prediction of “no jumps” based on our model. In other words, the trading strategy 
based on our model’s signal of “no jumps” is not conducted during this period based on our 
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prediction. As investors need most protection during the crises, we conclude that the trading 
strategy developed based on our model’s “jumps” predictions outperforms that based on “no jumps” 
predictions. This finding is consistent with our expectation and strengthens the practical application 
of our model.  
3.5 Conclusion 
Moving one step further from the second chapter, chapter three estimates state prices and prices of 
catastrophe bonds using the Merton (1976) risk neutral jump-diffusion framework. Downside jump 
risk predictors are constructed based on prices of catastrophe bonds in the conditional and 
unconditional models. Two conditional sub-models are investigated including (i) the model 
conditioning only the instantaneous volatility on VIX, and (ii) the model conditioning both the 
instantaneous volatility and jumps volatility on VIX.  
Empirical results suggest that our downside jump risk predictors are statistically significant in 
forecasting future realised jumps. Moreover, positive coefficients of the two downside jump risk 
predictors are obtained. This indicates that the higher the downside jump risk predictors, the more 
likely downside jumps are realised over the next 22 trading days. Moreover, high McFadden R-
squared and adjusted R-squared of the four regressions of realised downside jumps on downside 
jumps predictors reinforces the suitability of applying the state preference approach in predicting 
future downside jumps. It also implies that VIX outperforms historical volatility when predicting 
future downside jumps. 
Similar to the findings in chapter two, we find that both of our downside jump risk predictors 
perform the best when predicting small jumps (jumps below 5% threshold). A comparison of the 
predictive power between the two downside jump risk predictors suggests that the constructed 
downside jump risk value always outperforms the downside jump risk predictor in predicting the 
realised jump indicator and the realised probability of jumps regardless of the chosen cut-off point.  
Even though the results are consistent between the two sub-models, we find that the second sub-
model where both of the instantaneous volatility and jumps volatility are conditioned on VIX 
outperforms the first one in developing downside jump risk predictors. The evidence lies in the 
higher set of McFadden R-squared and adjusted R-squared that this sub-model obtains comparing 
with that of the other one. 
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To ascertain the practical application of our model, we develop trading strategies based on our 
model’s predictions of “jumps” and “no jumps”. If the trading strategies based on “jumps” 
predictions generate positive profits over the whole sample period under both variations, the trading 
strategies based on “no jumps” predictions can only generate positive profit under the first variation 
where investors buy one-month futures contracts when the model predicts “no jumps” and hold 
them for the next 22 trading days. Comparing with the buy-and-hold strategy, we find that both 
variations of the strategy using our model’s jumps predictions and the first variation of the strategy 
using our model’s no jumps predictions outperform the buy-and-hold strategy. However, we find no 
statistical evidence that the two trading strategies generate different daily profits over the whole 
sample period. During the GFC, when investors need the most protection, the trading strategy based 
on “jumps” predictions significantly outperforms the other based on “no jumps” predictions at a 1% 
significance level. This conclusion is attributable to the high accuracy rate of our model’s prediction 
and emphasises the relevance of application of the state preference approach in modelling downside 
jump risk. 
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Figure 3.1: Construction of downside jump risk predictors10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Normal fit of standardised log-returns on the S&P 500 during the 
whole sample period 
 
 
                                                
10 Different from Figure 2.1, returns may not follow a normal distribution under the Merton jump-diffusion framework. 
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Figure 3.3: Output of Test of normality 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Normal fit of standardised log-returns on the S&P 500 during the 
GFC (7/2007-6/2009) and non-GFC periods 
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Figure 3.5: Overview of the model’s forecasting power 
Panel A. Jump risk value under the two sub-models and realised probability of downside jump below the 5% cut-off point over time 
 
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
-0.10
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
Jan-97 Jan-98 Jan-99 Jan-00 Jan-01 Jan-02 Jan-03 Jan-04 Jan-05 Jan-06 Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10
5% Jump risk value - submodel 1
5% Jump risk value - submodel 2
Realised jump probability
Log returns of S&P 500
 
 
61 
 
Panel B. Conditional price of catastrophe bonds under the two sub-models and realised probability of downside jump below the 5% cut-off point over time 
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Table 3.1: Summary of the calibrated sets of parameters 
 
 LAMBDA SIGMA MUQ SIGMAQ 
 Mean 42.6955 0.1378 -0.0010 0.0184 
 Median 43.9715 0.1381 0.0005 0.0184 
 Maximum 183.8780 0.1564 0.0036 0.0281 
 Minimum 2.6624 0.0763 -0.0245 0.0001 
 Std. Dev. 21.5384 0.0122 0.0053 0.0054 
 Skewness 1.0205 -0.7171 -3.8862 -1.9272 
 Kurtosis 9.0289 3.6473 16.4134 7.7093 
 Observations 3458 3458 3458 3458 
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Table 3.2: Predictive power of the downside jump risk indicators in explaining the realised jumps indicator 
Panel A. 
Panel A of this table presents the coefficients and the McFadden R-squared of the probit regression of model 1: Realised jumps indicator = f(Downside jump risk 
indicator), where the predicted downside jump risk indicator takes the value of 1 if the predicted price of the catastrophe bond under the conditional model is larger 
than that of the unconditional model, and 0 otherwise. We report the outputs of both sub-model 1 and sub-model 2. The realised jumps indicator takes the value of 1 
if at least 1 jump occurs over the next 22 trading days and 0 otherwise. 
 SUB-MODEL 1 SUB-MODEL 2 
 
Using the Merton jump-diffusion framework conditioning 
only instantaneous volatility on VIX 
Using the Merton jump-diffusion framework conditioning both 
instantaneous volatility and jump volatility on VIX 
  
5% cut-off point 
2.5% cut-off 
point  
1% cut-off point  5% cut-off point 2.5% cut-off point  1% cut-off point  
 (left tail of 5%) (left tail of 2.5%) (left tail of 1%)  (left tail of 5%) (left tail of 2.5%) (left tail of 1%) 
Intercept 
-1.2926*** -1.7378*** -1.7900*** -1.3241*** -1.6205*** -2.0015*** 
Downside jump risk 
indicator 
1.8144*** 1.7554*** 1.0202*** 1.9294*** 1.7457*** 1.3927*** 
McFadden R-squared 
0.1515 0.1056 0.0431 0.2023 0.1576 0.1196 
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Panel B. 
 
Panel B of this table presents the coefficients and the McFadden R-squared of the probit regression of the model: Realised jumps indicator = f(Simulated downside 
jump risk indicator). We simulate a random number in the interval [1,1000] for each day of the sample period. As our purpose is to simulate the indicator of jumps 
below three cut-off points corresponding to a left tail area of 5%, 2.5% and 1%, the daily simulated downside jump risk indicator takes the value of 1 if the simulated 
number is less than the respective cut-off point and 0 otherwise. The simulated downside jump risk indicator takes the value of 1 if at least 1 jump is simulated over 
the next 22 trading days and 0 otherwise. The realised jumps indicator takes the value of 1 if at least 1 jump occurs over the next 22 trading days and 0 otherwise. 
  
5% cut-off point 2.5% cut-off point  1% cut-off point  
 (left tail of 5%) (left tail of 2.5%) (left tail of 1%) 
Intercept 0.0727** -0.1834*** -0.9056*** 
Downside jump risk indicator 
0.3219*** 0.0516 0.1313** 
McFadden R-squared 
0.0111 0.0003 0.0012 
 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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Table 3.3: Measures of classification accuracy of model 1  
This table reports measures of classification accuracy of model 1: Realised jumps indicator = f(Downside jump risk indicator) following methods reviewed by 
Fielding and Bell (1997). The predicted downside jump risk indicator takes the value of 1 if the predicted price of the catastrophe bond under the conditional model 
is larger than that of the unconditional model and 0 otherwise. Meanwhile, the realised jump risk indicator takes the value of 1 if at least 1 jump occurs over the next 
22 trading days and 0 otherwise. 
Panel A. Sub-model 1: Using the Merton jump-diffusion framework conditioning only instantaneous volatility on VIX 
 
Formula 
5% cut-off point 
 (left tail of 5%) 
2.5% cut-off point 
 (left tail of 2.5%) 
1% cut-off point 
 (left tail of 1%) 
Summary Actual Predicted Count % Count % Count % 
-          TP + + 2054 59.40% 1482 42.86% 631 18.25% 
-          TN - - 469 13.56% 513 14.84% 577 16.69% 
-          FP - + 884 25.56% 1441 41.67% 2228 64.43% 
-          FN + - 51 1.47% 22 0.64% 22 0.64% 
Number of predictions (N)    3458  3458  3458   
Measures of classification accuracy          
- Prevalence = (𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)/𝑁  60.87%   43.49%   18.88% 
- Overall diagnostic power = (𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁)/𝑁  39.13%   56.51%   81.12% 
- Correct classification rate = (𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁)/𝑁  72.96%   57.69%   34.93% 
- Sensitivity = 𝑇𝑃/(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)  97.58%   98.54%   96.63% 
- Specificity = 𝑇𝑁/(𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁)  34.66%   26.25%   20.57% 
- False positive rate = 𝐹𝑃/(𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁)  65.34%   73.75%   79.43% 
- False negative rate = 𝐹𝑁/(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)  2.42%   1.46%   3.37% 
- Positive predictive power = 𝑇𝑃/(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃)  69.91%   50.70%   22.07% 
- Negative predictive power = 𝑇𝑁/(𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑁)  90.19%   95.89%   96.33% 
- Misclassification rate = (𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)/𝑁  27.04%   42.31%   65.07% 
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Panel B. Sub-model 2: Using the Merton jump-diffusion framework conditioning both instantaneous volatility and jump volatility on VIX 
 
Formula 
5% cut-off point 
 (left tail of 5%) 
2.5% cut-off point 
 (left tail of 2.5%) 
1% cut-off point 
 (left tail of 1%) 
Summary Actual Predicted Count % Count % Count % 
-          TP + + 2045 59.14% 1462 42.28% 627 18.13% 
-          TN - - 587 16.98% 757 21.89% 1121 32.42% 
-          FP - + 766 22.15% 1197 34.62% 1684 48.70% 
-          FN + - 60 1.74% 42 1.21% 26 0.75% 
Number of predictions (N)    3458  3458  3458   
Measures of classification accuracy          
- Prevalence = (𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)/𝑁  60.87%   43.49%   18.88% 
- Overall diagnostic power = (𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁)/𝑁  39.13%   56.51%   81.12% 
- Correct classification rate = (𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁)/𝑁  76.11%   64.17%   50.55% 
- Sensitivity = 𝑇𝑃/(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)  97.15%   97.21%   96.02% 
- Specificity = 𝑇𝑁/(𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁)  43.39%   38.74%   39.96% 
- False positive rate = 𝐹𝑃/(𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁)  56.61%   61.26%   60.04% 
- False negative rate = 𝐹𝑁/(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)  2.85%   2.79%   3.98% 
- Positive predictive power = 𝑇𝑃/(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃)  72.75%   54.98%   27.13% 
- Negative predictive power = 𝑇𝑁/(𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑁)  90.73%   94.74%   97.73% 
- Misclassification rate = (𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)/𝑁  23.89%   35.83%   49.45% 
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Table 3.4: Predictive power of the downside jump risk value in explaining the realised jumps indicator 
This table presents the coefficients and the McFadden R-squared of the probit regression of model 2: Realised jumps indicator = f(Downside jump risk value), where 
the predicted downside jump risk value measures the difference in predicted prices of the catastrophe bond between the conditional and unconditional models. The 
realised jumps indicator takes the value of 1 if at least 1 jump occurs over the next 22 trading days and 0 otherwise. 
 SUB-MODEL 1 SUB-MODEL 2 
 
Using the Merton jump-diffusion framework conditioning 
only instantaneous volatility on VIX 
Using the Merton jump-diffusion framework conditioning both 
instantaneous volatility and jump volatility on VIX 
  
5% cut-off point 
2.5% cut-off 
point  
1% cut-off point  5% cut-off point 2.5% cut-off point  1% cut-off point  
 (left tail of 5%) (left tail of 2.5%) (left tail of 1%)  (left tail of 5%) (left tail of 2.5%) (left tail of 1%) 
Intercept 
-0.7963*** -0.9605*** -1.4930*** -0.6932*** -0.8777*** -1.4417*** 
Downside jump risk value 
15.9498*** 14.9234*** 19.4607*** 15.3375*** 14.2229*** 18.8298*** 
McFadden R-squared 
0.2949 0.1983 0.1916 0.3014 0.2028 0.1992 
 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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Table 3.5: Predictive power of the downside jump risk indicator in explaining the realised probability of jumps 
This table reports the coefficients and the adjusted R-squared of the OLS regression with HAC robust standard errors of model 3: Realised probability of jumps = 
f(Downside jump risk indicator), where the predicted downside jump risk indicator takes the value of 1 if the predicted price of the catastrophe bond under the 
conditional model is larger than that of the unconditional model and 0 otherwise. The realised probability of jumps is measured by dividing the number of actual 
jumps over the next 22 trading days by 22. 
 SUB-MODEL 1 SUB-MODEL 2 
 
Using the Merton Jump-Diffusion framework conditioning 
only instantaneous volatility on VIX 
Using the Merton Jump-Diffusion framework conditioning both 
instantaneous volatility and jump volatility on VIX 
  
5% cut-off point 
2.5% cut-off 
point  
1% cut-off point  5% cut-off point 2.5% cut-off point  1% cut-off point  
 (left tail of 5%) (left tail of 2.5%) (left tail of 1%)  (left tail of 5%) (left tail of 2.5%) (left tail of 1%) 
Intercept 
0.0055*** 0.0019* 0.0019* 0.0056*** 0.0019** 0.0015* 
Downside jump risk indicator 
0.0830*** 0.0476*** 0.0173*** 0.0867*** 0.0498*** 0.0186*** 
Adjusted R-squared 
0.1065 0.0597 0.0166 0.1384 0.0778 0.0231 
 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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Table 3.6: Predictive power of the downside jump risk value in explaining the realised probability of jumps 
This table reports the coefficients and the adjusted R-squared of the OLS regression with HAC robust standard errors of model 4: Realised probability of jumps = 
f(Downside jump risk value), where the predicted downside jump risk value measures the difference in predicted prices of the catastrophe bond between the 
conditional and unconditional models. The realised probability of jumps is measured by dividing the number of jumps over the next 22 trading days by 22. 
 SUB-MODEL 1 SUB-MODEL 2 
 
Using the Merton Jump-Diffusion framework conditioning 
only instantaneous volatility on VIX 
Using the Merton Jump-Diffusion framework conditioning both 
instantaneous volatility and jump volatility on VIX 
  
5% cut-off point 
2.5% cut-off 
point  
1% cut-off point  5% cut-off point 2.5% cut-off point  1% cut-off point  
 (left tail of 5%) (left tail of 2.5%) (left tail of 1%)  (left tail of 5%) (left tail of 2.5%) (left tail of 1%) 
Intercept 
0.0098*** 0.0044 -0.0018 0.0153*** 0.0084*** 0.0008 
Downside jump risk value 
0.8622*** 0.7102*** 0.7318*** 0.8302*** 0.6807*** 0.6982*** 
Adjusted R-squared 
0.3863 0.2950 0.2598 0.3930 0.3007 0.2659 
 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.  
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Table 3.7: Summary of profit/loss of the trading strategy using “jumps” predictions 
This table provides a summary of the performance of two variations of the trading strategy using “jumps” (below 5% cut-off point) prediction of our second sub-model in a 
comparison with the performance of the buy-and-hold strategy. In the first variation of the trading strategy, we short one-month futures contracts on the S&P 500 when there is a 
prediction of jumps. We realise the loss/profit of the transaction at the maturity (in one month or 22 trading days) by taking the difference between the selling price (one-month 
futures price of the S&P 500 when selling futures contracts) and the buying price (spot price of the S&P 500 at maturity). With regard to the second variation of the trading strategy, 
we short one-month futures contracts of the S&P 500 when there is a prediction of jumps. Over the next 22 trading days, when our model reverses its signal (meaning that the 
prediction changes from “jumps” to “no jumps”), we realise the loss/profit of the transaction by taking the difference between the selling price (one-month futures price of the S&P 
500 when selling futures contracts) and the buying price (one-month futures price of the S&P 500 when our model reverses its prediction). If the model persistently predicts jumps 
over the next 22 trading days, we realise the loss/profit of the transaction at the end of the next 22 trading days as what is done in the first variation of the strategy.  
Panel A reports the performance of the trading strategy over the whole sample period whereas panel B reports that performance during the GFC (7/2007-6/2009). 
Panel A. Whole sample 
 
  
 Based on jumps prediction Based on the 
buy- and-hold 
strategy 
 
Holding the futures position  
for 22 trading days 
Closing out the futures position  
when the signal changes 
Difference 
P&L in index point 1,506.09 4268.72  442.52 
P&L in $ ($250/index point) 376,522.5 1,067,180 -690,657.5 110,630 
Average daily volume of 1-month 
futures (in contracts) 
64,887 64,887 
  
Average daily volume per Investor 0.1% 0.15% 0.2% 0.1% 0.15% 0.2%   
Daily number of future contracts 
traded per Investor 
65 97 130 65 97 130 
  
P&L in $   24,473,963     36,522,683     48,947,925   69,366,700     103,516,460     138,733,400    
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Panel B. GFC  
 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.  
 Based on jumps prediction Based on the 
buy and hold 
strategy 
 
Holding the futures position  
for 22 trading days 
Closing out the futures position  
when the signal changes 
Difference 
P&L in index point 13,579.64 13,579.64  -584.03 
P&L in $ ($250/index point) 3,394,910 3,394,910 0 -146,007.5 
Average daily volume of 1-month 
futures (in contracts) 
64,887 64,887 
  
Average daily volume per Investor 0.1% 0.15% 0.2% 0.1% 0.15% 0.2%   
Daily number of future contracts 
traded per Investor 
65 97 130 65 97 130 
  
P&L in $ 220,669,150     329,306,270   441,338,300  220,669,150     329,306,270   441,338,300    
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Table 3.8: Summary of profit/loss of the trading strategy using “no jumps” predictions 
This table provides  a summary of the performance of two variations of the trading strategy using “no jumps” (below the 5% cut-off point) prediction of our second sub-model in a 
comparison with the performance of the buy-and-hold strategy. In the first variation of the trading strategy, we long one-month futures contracts on the S&P 500 when there is a 
prediction of no jumps. We realise the loss/profit of the transaction at the maturity (in one month or 22 trading days) by taking the difference between the selling price (spot price of 
the S&P 500 at maturity) and the buying price (one-month futures price of the S&P 500 when buying futures contracts). With regard to the second variation of the trading strategy, 
we long one-month futures contracts of the S&P 500 when there is a prediction of no jumps. Over the next 22 trading days, when our model reverses its signal (meaning that it 
predicts jumps instead), we realise the loss/profit of the transaction by taking the difference between the selling price (one-month futures price of the S&P 500 when our model 
reverses its prediction) and the buying price (one-month futures price of the S&P 500 when buying futures contracts). If the model persistently predicts no jumps over the next 22 
trading days, we realise the loss/profit of the transaction at the end of the next 22 trading days following the process described in the first variation of the strategy. 
Panel A reports the performance of the trading strategy over the whole sample period whereas panel B reports that performance during the GFC (7/2007-6/2009). 
Panel A. Whole sample 
 
  
 Based on no jumps prediction Based on the 
buy- and-hold 
strategy 
 
Holding the futures position  
for 22 trading days 
Closing out the futures position  
when the signal changes 
Difference 
P&L in index point 624.81 -481.67  442.52 
P&L in $ ($250/index point) 156,202.5 -120,417.5 276,620 110,630 
Average daily volume of 1-month 
futures (in contracts) 
64,887 64,887  
 
Average daily volume per Investor   0.1% 0.15% 0.2% 0.1% 0.15% 0.2%   
Daily number of future contracts 
traded per Investor 
65 97 130 65 97 130 
  
P&L in $   10,153,163     15,151,643     20,306,325  -    7,827,138  -  11,680,498  -  15,654,275    
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Panel B. GFC 
 
 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively.  
 Based on no jumps prediction Based on 
the buy and 
hold 
strategy 
 
Holding the futures position  
for 22 trading days 
Closing out the futures position  
when the signal changes 
Difference 
P&L in index point 0 0  -584.03 
P&L in $ ($250/index point) 0 0 0 -146,007.5 
Average daily volume of 1-month 
futures (in contracts) 
64,887 64,887 
  
Average daily volume per Investor 0.1% 0.15% 0.2% 0.1% 0.15% 0.2%   
Daily number of future contracts traded 
per Investor 65 97 130 65 97 130 
  
P&L in $ 0 0 0 0 0 0   
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Table 3.9: Comparison of profit/loss between the trading strategies using “jumps” predictions and “no jumps” 
predictions 
This table provides a comparison of the performance of the two trading strategies, one of which is based on the second sub-model’s “jumps” prediction and the other is based on the 
second sub-model’s “no jumps” predictions. The former is conducted as follows: we short one-month futures contracts on the S&P 500 when there is a prediction of jumps. We 
realise the loss/profit of the transaction at the maturity (in one month or 22 trading days) by taking the difference between the selling price (one-month futures price of the S&P 500 
when selling futures contracts) and the buying price (spot price of the S&P 500 at maturity). With regard to the latter, we long one-month futures contracts of the S&P 500 when 
there is a prediction of no jumps. Over the next 22 trading days, when our model reverses its signal (meaning that it predicts jumps instead), we realise the loss/profit of the 
transaction by taking the difference between the selling price (one-month futures price of the S&P 500 when selling futures contracts) and the buying price (one-month futures price 
of the S&P 500 when our model reverses its prediction). If the model persistently predicts no jumps over the next 22 trading days, we realise the loss/profit of the transaction at the 
end of the next 22 trading days taking the difference between the selling price (spot price of the S&P 500 at maturity) and the buying price (one-month futures price of the S&P 500 
when buying futures contracts). 
Panel A reports the performance of the trading strategy over the whole sample period whereas panel B reports that performance during the GFC (7/2007-6/2009). 
Panel A. Whole sample 
 
 
Closing out the futures position when the signal 
changes based on JUMPS prediction 
Holding the futures position for 22 trading days 
based on NO JUMPS prediction  
Difference 
P&L in index point 4268.72 624.81  
P&L in $ ($250/index point) 1,067,180 156,202.5 910,977.5 
Average daily volume of 1-month futures (in 
contracts) 
64,887 64,887 
 
Average daily volume per Investor 0.1% 0.15% 0.2% 0.1% 0.15% 0.2%  
Daily number of future contracts traded per Investor 65 97 130 65 97 130  
P&L in $  69,366,700      103,516,460    138,733,400     10,153,163  15,151,643   20,306,325   
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Panel B. GFC  
 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
 
 
Closing out the futures position when the signal 
changes based on JUMPS prediction 
Holding the futures position for 22 trading 
days based on NO JUMPS prediction 
Difference 
P&L in index point 13,579.64 0  
P&L in $ ($250/index point) 3,394,910 0 3,394,910*** 
Average daily volume of 1-month futures (in 
contracts) 
64,887 64,887 
 
Average daily volume per Investor 0.1% 0.15% 0.2% 0.1% 0.15% 0.2%  
Daily number of future contracts traded per 
Investor 
65 97 130 65 97 130 
 
P&L in $     220,669,150    329,306,270     441,338,300  0 0 0  
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Chapter 4 
 
STATE PREFERENCE APPROACH TO 
INDIVIDUAL DOWNSIDE JUMP RISK AND 
VALUE AT RISK 
 
 
“Perhaps the greatest advantage of value at risk (VAR) is that it summarizes in a 
single, easy to understand number of downside risk of an institution due to 
financial market variables”. 
Jorion (2001, p.107) 
 
4.1 Introduction  
Following the successful prediction of future downside jump risk of the S&P 500 in the previous 
chapters, this chapter is a further application of the state preference approach to predict downside 
jump risk at an individual stock level. More specifically, in chapter two, we develop the concept of 
a catastrophe bond and theoretically illustrate the correlation of its price with the probability of 
future downside jump risk. Subsequent to the theory development, we estimate prices of catastrophe 
bonds and then construct downside jump risk predictors using the Black-Scholes (chapter two) and 
Merton jump-diffusion (chapter three) risk neutral frameworks. Our constructed downside jump risk 
predictors are shown to perform well in predicting market downside jump risk. Taking the analysis 
one step further, in this chapter, we focus on the prediction of future downside jump risk of 30 U.S. 
banks and then extend the method to predict their Value at Risk (VaR). The contribution of this 
chapter is threefold.  
First, it develops a forward looking measure of individual volatility via a unified pricing kernel to 
the market index. If VIX is used as a volatility input for the conditional model when predicting 
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downside jump risk of the market index in the previous chapters, such a counterpart volatility 
measure of the individual bank stock does not exist in the market. We thus start with the 
development of an individual expected volatility (𝐻𝑖) measure using the state preference approach. 
In a complete market, 𝐻𝑖2 can be view as a financial asset, the payoff of which is the squared return 
of an individual bank conditioned on the squared market return (Liu, 2013). As our conditional 
volatility estimation method does not require an input of individual option implied volatility, it 
possesses a good performance even with thinly-traded options stocks. In other words, it outperforms 
alternative predictors which rely on options data of individual stocks. Specifically, it is estimated 
based on the state preference approach, a fundamental economic valuation theory which can be 
used to value any financial asset. Under the assumption of a complete market that leads to a unique 
set of state prices, a proxy for conditional volatility can be estimated using the market state price 
and a correspondent payoff. Its predictability is tested against the realised volatility, 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22, 
compared with other conventional volatility measures such as 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣 and backward 
looking 22-trading day volatility, 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22, and shown to perform well during the whole sample 
period, and especially the GFC. While the 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣 are tested and shown to be 
biased estimators of the 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22, 𝐻𝑖, in contrast, performs as an unbiased estimator. We thus use 𝐻𝑖 
as the conditional volatility input when measuring downside jump risk and estimating VaR. 
The second contribution of the chapter lies in the fact that it examines downside jumps of individual 
stocks in a theoretical way whereas the previous literature on jumps measures downside jumps in an 
atheoretical way i.e., it relies only on mathematical or statistical models.11 Our results show that our 
downside jump risk predictors developed based on the state preference approach, on average, 
possess a high out-of-sample predictive power of realised jump risk. 
Third, we use our measure of forward looking individual volatility as an input to measure Value at 
risk (VaR). The test of model accuracy reveals that our VaR estimate possesses a high quality of 
prediction and offers a better 1 month/95% VaR estimate than that of the 250-day historical 
volatility. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the sample. Section 4.3 outlines the 
method of the individual conditional volatility estimation, then presents the results of its predictive 
power in comparison with 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣. Section 4.4 reports the predictive power of 
downside jump risk predictors when the volatility estimator in the previous section is employed. 
                                                
11 Refer to chapter two for more details 
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Section 4.5 extends the method to measure individual bank’s value at risk. Conclusion is offered in 
section 4.6. 
4.2 Data and sample 
We apply the state preference approach to measure individual expected volatility, downside jump 
risk and value at risk. Based on the industry definition in Kenneth French’s website,12 we obtain the 
SIC code for the banking industry (group 45: SIC code is from 6000 to 6199) and then download 
prices and returns data for all these banks in CRSP from 04/01/1996 to 25/04/2013. As mentioned 
in the previous chapters, 04/01/1996 is chosen as this is the first date where data for market 
dividend yield are available in Option Metrics. For each of the banks where data are available over 
the whole sample period, we calculate daily price volume data. Our sample includes thirty (30) of 
the largest banks based on their average price volume data over the whole sample period. PERMNO 
and names of those sample banks together with the summary statistics of their returns can be found 
in Appendix A. We obtain risk free rate from the Fama-French database, market dividend yield from 
Option Metrics and VIX from CBOE indexes. 
4.3 Individual expected volatility  
4.3.1 Estimation of individual expected volatility under the state preference 
approach 
As indicated in the previous chapter, under the state preference approach, an investor 𝑘 estimates 
the price of any asset 𝑖 based on his set of state prices (𝜙𝑖+1,𝑠𝑘 ) and their correspondent payoff 
�𝑑𝑖+1,𝑠𝑖 �. 
 
𝑃𝑖
𝑖,𝑘 = �𝜙𝑖+1,𝑠𝑘 𝑑𝑖+1,𝑠𝑖𝑆
𝑠=1
        ∀𝑖 (22) 
In a complete market, as state prices are the same across all investors,13 market state prices, 𝜙𝑖+1,𝑠𝑚 , 
can be used to value any financial asset. Equation (22) can thus be written as: 
 
𝑃𝑖
𝑖 = �𝜙𝑖+1,𝑠𝑚 𝐸(𝑑𝑖+1,𝑠𝑖 |𝑑𝑖+1,𝑠𝑚 )𝑆
𝑠=1
        ∀𝑖 (23) 
                                                
12 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library/det_49_ind_port.html  
13 See page 9, chapter two for a more detailed explanation 
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It is documented in the literature that variance can be viewed as a financial asset whose payoff is 
measured by its squared returns (Liu, 2013). Consequently, under the state preference approach, an 
individual conditional variance, 𝐻𝑖2, can be measured as follows: 
 𝐻𝑖,𝑖2  = Σ𝑠=1𝑆 𝜙𝑖+1,𝑠𝑚 𝐸�𝐺𝑖+1,𝑠2,𝑖 �𝐺𝑖+1,𝑠2,𝑚 � (24) 
The conditional expectation, 𝐸�𝐺𝑖+1,𝑠2,𝑖 �𝐺𝑖+1,𝑠2,𝑚 �, can be projected in many different ways, in either 
linear or non-linear manners. As the linear projection is the most common method in the literature 
(Smith & Walsh, 2013), it is applied in our research. However, it is noted that non-linear projections 
can also be done using basis functions (Hastie et al., 2009).  
Under the linear projection, 𝐻𝑖2 is estimated as: 
 𝐻𝑖,𝑖2  = Σ𝑠=1𝑆 𝜙𝑖+1,𝑠𝑚 �𝛼 + 𝛽𝐺𝑖+1,𝑠2,𝑚 � (25) 
  = Σ𝑠=1𝑆 𝜙𝑖+1,𝑠𝑚 𝛼 + Σ𝑠=1𝑆 𝜙𝑖+1,𝑠𝑚 𝛽𝐺𝑖+1,𝑠2,𝑚   
  = 𝛼Σ𝑠=1𝑆 𝜙𝑖+1,𝑠𝑚 + 𝛽Σ𝑠=1𝑆 𝜙𝑖+1,𝑠𝑚 𝐺𝑖+1,𝑠2,𝑚   
  = 𝛼𝑒−𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝑆𝑃𝐻𝑖2 (26) 
Where:  
𝑟 denotes the risk free rate. 
𝑇 denotes the maturity. 
𝑆𝑃𝐻2 denotes the market forward-looking state price volatility. 
Using the above derivations, we can estimate 𝐻𝑖 in two different ways. Based on (25), we could start 
with the estimation of 𝛼 and 𝛽, then use the “Delta-security” method introduced by Breeden and 
Litzenberger (1978) to estimate 𝜙𝑖+1,𝑠𝑚 . Using this approach, however, the estimation error in 𝛼 and 
𝛽 when predicting 𝐺𝑖2 would be magnified during the process of multiplying by 𝜙𝑖+1,𝑠𝑚 . Thus, we 
apply the second approach to estimate 𝐻𝑖2. Under this approach, we would estimate 𝛼 and 𝛽 based 
on (26). As VIX is documented in Liu (2013) to be almost perfectly correlated with one-month 
𝑆𝑃𝐻, we estimate one-month 𝐻𝑖 directly based on VIX following (27). 
 𝐻𝑖,𝑖2  = 𝛼𝑒−𝑟𝑟 + 𝛽𝐻𝑉𝑋𝑖2 (27) 
To obtain the out-of-sample prediction, 𝛼 and 𝛽 are estimated using the growing windows where 
the initial window starts from 04/01/1996 to 31/12/1999. We are then able to predict 𝐻𝑖 based on the 
reported 𝐻𝑉𝑋 since 2000. 
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4.3.2  Individual expected volatility as a predictor of realised volatility 
4.3.2.1 Research hypotheses 
Consistent with the previous literature that options markets can efficiently form prices, 𝐻𝑖, 
calculated indirectly from market option prices, is believed to be a good predictor of realised 
volatility. Two hypotheses are examined as follow: 
H1. 𝐻𝑖 is an unbiased estimate of the ex post 1-month realised volatility. 
H2. 𝐻𝒊 is superior to 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣 as it subsumes the information in 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣. 
4.3.2.2 Tests of research hypotheses  
As aforementioned, 𝐻𝑖 is measured as a proxy of the conditional volatility of an individual security. 
It is therefore intuitive to test the predictability of this proxy by running a regression of the ex post 
monthly volatility 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 on 𝐻𝑖 .  
 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑖 (28) 
where the 30-day realised volatility, 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22, is measured as: 
 
𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙𝑖,22𝑖 = �Σ𝑗=122 R𝑖+𝑗−12,i × 25222  (29) 
If 𝐻𝑖 is an unbiased estimate of 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 as stated in H1, we expect that 𝛼1 is not statistically 
significantly different from 0 and that 𝛽1 is not statistically significantly different from 1. In other 
words, we can test the first hypothesis using t-tests of 𝛼1 and 𝛽1 of (28). 
Two testable implications can be drawn from H2. First, under H1, 𝐻𝑖 is unbiased estimate of 
𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22. As a result, it would be superior to 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣 if 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣 are biased estimates of 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22. Similar to the test for H1, we can test the first 
implication of H2 by doing t-tests of 𝛼2, 𝛼3, 𝛽2 and 𝛽3 where 𝛼2 or 𝛼3, 𝛽2 or 𝛽3 are intercepts and 
slopes of the following regressions: 
 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 = 𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 (30) 
 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 = 𝛼3 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣 (31) 
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Where the 30-day historical volatility, 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and the generalised autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣)14 are calculated as: 
 
𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙𝑖,22𝑖 = �Σ𝑗=−22−1 𝐺𝑖+𝑗2,𝑖 × 25222  (32) 
 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣 = �𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑟 (33) 
𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣 would be biased estimates of 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 if their correspondent 𝛼𝑠 are 
statistically different from 0 and their correspondent 𝛽𝑠 are statistically significant from 1. 
Second, if  𝐻𝒊 subsumes the information in 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣 as expected in H2, R-
squared of (28) should be higher than those of (30) and (31). 
4.3.3  Empirical results 
4.3.3.1 General results 
Using the method outlined in the previous section, we predict out-of-sample individual 30-day 
expected volatility, 𝐻𝑖. Table 4.1 summarises the statistics of 𝐻𝑖 and the subsequent 30-day volatility 
with trading day convention, 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22.
15 
Insert Table 4.1 about here 
As can be seen in Table 4.1, comparing 𝐻𝑖 with 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22, we find that the sample mean of 𝐻𝑖, on 
average, is approximately 2 percentage points higher than that of the realised volatility 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22. 
Table 4.1 also indicates that our volatility estimation 𝐻𝑖 is not as volatile as the realised volatility RVol22, which leads to a narrower maximum – minimum range.  
Table 4.2 reports the correlation between 𝐻𝑖 and 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22. As expected, 𝐻𝑖 and 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 are positively 
correlated. The correlation is, on average, 0.633. 
                                                
14 To be consistent with the previous chapter, the parameters of 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑟 are calibrated using the growing 
window from the beginning of the sample period up to the day before the prediction day. 
15 This chapter adopts the trading day annualisation. Alternatively, calendar day annualisation can be used to measure 
𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22. In that case, 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙𝑖,30𝑖 = �𝛴𝑗=122 𝐺𝑖+𝑗−12,𝑖 × 36530 . Whenever 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙30𝑖  is used rather than 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22𝑖 , results still hold. To 
conserve spaces, we do not report the results using 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙30𝑖 . Moreover, results are also robust when realised variance is 
used instead of squared returns. 
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Insert Table 4.2 about here 
4.3.3.2 Predictability of individual expected volatility 
We examine the predictive power of 𝐻𝑖 in forecasting 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and compare with the predictability of 
𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣. The results are reported in Table 4.3. 
Insert Table 4.3 about here 
Among the three proxies of the conditional volatility, 𝐻𝑖 appears to be an unbiased estimate of 
𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22. During the whole period, we find that on average, 𝛼1 is -0.031 and not significantly 
different from 0, 𝛽1 is 1.039 and not significantly different from 1. In contrast, both 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣 provide biased estimates of 1-month realised volatility 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22. Regressing 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 
on either 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 or 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣, we obtain a slope which is significantly different from 1 at a 
1% significance level.  
Our conclusion is strongly supported when Figure 4.1 is examined. Based on the histograms of the 
regression intercepts (illustrated in the first row of Figure 4.1, panel A), over the whole sample 
period, the intercepts of the sample banks are clustered around 0 when 𝐻𝑖 is used as the predictor 
whereas the numbers are all positive when 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 is used, and mostly positive when 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣 is used. Looking at the second row of panel A, Figure 4.1, we find that when 𝐻𝑖 is 
used to predict 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22, the null hypothesis that 𝛼 = 0 cannot be rejected in most of the sample 
banks. It is not true when 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣 are used. Similarly, the third row of Figure 
4.1 indicates that the slopes of the sample banks are clustered around 1 when 𝐻𝑖 is chosen as the 
independent variable. Meanwhile, most of the numbers are less than 1 when 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣 are used. The test of the null hypothesis that 𝛽 = 1 reported in the fourth row again 
supports the conclusion that 𝐻𝑖 is an unbiased estimate of 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and that 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and 
𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣 are biased estimates of 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22. As a result, even though 𝐻𝑖 does not perform as 
well as 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 in predicting 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 when the R-squareds of the two models are compared (see the 
fifth row of Figure 4.1, panel A), its unbiasedness makes it become a more favourable measure of 
individual expected volatility.  
We also compare the predictability of 𝐻𝑖, 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣 during the GFC and report 
the regression output in panel B, Table 4.3. Overall, the results remain mostly consistent. 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 
and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣 are biased estimates of 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22. However, two exceptions need to be 
addressed. First, when 𝐻𝑖 is used to predict future realised volatility during the GFC, the intercept is 
significantly different from 0 at a 10% significance level. Second, among the three volatility 
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proxies, we obtain the highest R-squared when 𝐻𝑖 is used. This result is in line with the finding in 
Liu (2013). 
In summary, we conclude that 𝐻𝑖, constructed using the state preference approach, provides an 
unbiased estimate for the conditional volatility and outperforms the other volatility forecast 
estimators such as 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣. As 𝐻𝑖 is estimated based on the information of the 
option market, this finding implies that the option-implied volatility outperforms other common 
volatility predictors. This result is consistent with the previous literature (Day & Lewis, 1992; 
Fleming, 1998; Szakmary, Ors, Kyoung Kim, & Davidson Iii, 2003). It is, therefore, used as a 
volatility input to predict future downside jump risk and value at risk in the next sections. 
4.4 Prediction of downside jump risk 
As concluded in the previous section, the expected individual volatility 𝐻𝑖 constructed on the state 
preference approach outperforms 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣 in predicting 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22. We thus use 𝐻𝑖 
as one input to estimate state prices, then prices of catastrophe bonds to predict future downside 
jump risk. 
As addressed in the previous two chapters, state prices can be measured based on the Black-Scholes 
or Merton jump-diffusion risk neutral frameworks. To identify the superior framework to measure 
state prices, and then estimate the downside jump risk predictors of an individual bank, we first 
compare the performance of the Black-Scholes and Merton jump-diffusion risk-neutral frameworks 
based on the results in the previous two chapters using the Bayesian Information criterion (BIC). 
The evidence from BIC indicates that the Black-Scholes risk-neutral framework (chapter two) 
outperforms the Merton jump-diffusion model (chapter three) after the number of parameters 
included in the model is penalised (see Appendix B). 
We, therefore, apply the method outlined in chapter two to value the price of catastrophe bonds and 
construct the downside jump risk predictors of an individual security. Following the statistical 
procedure in chapter two, we measure the realised jump risk indicator and the realised jump risk 
probability. The predictability of our constructed downside jump risk predictors can be examined 
when running regressions of the realised downside jump risk on the downside jump risk predictors. 
This section presents the cross-sectional average of the output of the regressions. The output for 
individual banks can be found in Appendix C. 
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4.4.1 Predictive power of the constructed downside jump risk predictors 
in explaining the realised jumps indicator 
We examine the predictive power of the constructed downside jump risk predictors including the 
downside jump risk indicator and the downside jump risk value in explaining the realised jumps 
indicator by running two probit regressions of the realised jumps indicator on the two downside 
jump risk predictors.  
4.4.1.1 Predictive power of the downside jump risk indicator in explaining the 
realised jump risk indicator 
a. Running a probit regression 
We regress the realised jump risk indicator on the constructed downside jump risk indicator (model 
1) and report the output in Table 4.4. 
Insert Table 4.4 about here 
As expected, the average coefficient of the downside jump risk indicator is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% significance level regardless of the chosen threshold. This indicates that when 
the downside jump risk indicator takes the value of 1 or in other words, when our model predicts 
the occurrence of jumps over the next month (or 22 trading days), realised jumps are indeed more 
likely to occur. Among the three cut-off points, the constructed downside jump risk indicator 
performs the best when predicting the realised jump risk indicator below the 5% cut-off point. This 
is illustrated by the highest Mc-Fadden R-squared when the downside jump risk indicator is used to 
predict the realised jump risk indicator below 5% cut-off point (11.87% compared with 10.38% and 
9.49%). The findings are consistent with those in both chapter two and chapter three. However, if 
the McFadden R-squareds, when predicting jumps below three cut-off points, seem to be quite 
different in the previous chapters, the difference is much less noticeable in this chapter. 
b. Measuring model classification accuracy 
Moving one step further, we measure the classification accuracy of model 1 (see Table 2.1 and 
Table 2.2 for details of the classification accuracy measures) and summarise the average output 
across thirty (30) sample banks in Table 4.5. 
Insert Table 4.5 about here 
Consistent with the findings in the previous chapters, we find that our constructed downside jump 
risk indicator performs well regardless of the chosen cut-off point. We obtain, on average, a high 
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level of correct classification rate when predicting the future downside jump indicator. The average 
correct classification rate is 69.91%, 70.60% and 70.29% when predicting 5%, 2.5% and 1% 
downside jumps respectively implying that about 70% of the time, the constructed downside jump 
risk indicator is correct in predicting whether or not jumps are going to occur in the next 22 trading 
days.  
Examining the negative predictive power, we can conclude that over 72% of the time our model 
predicts no jumps in the future, no jumps actually occur over the next 22 trading days. In other 
words, our model is correct 72 out of 100 times it predicts no jumps. With regard to the prediction 
of jumps below the three cut-off points, we observe the positive predictive power of 66.2%, 52.06% 
and 39.67% respectively.  
The results are attributable to the fact that 𝐻𝑖 tends to over-estimate the future occurrence of 
downside jumps, which is in line with the findings in the previous two chapters that VIX is found to 
over-estimate the future downside jumps of the logarithmic return of the S&P 500. As a result, even 
when the predicted chance of future downside jump is inflated using 𝐻𝑖 but the model still predicts 
that no jumps would occur, it is likely that we would not observe any jumps in the next 22 trading 
days (leading to the high negative predictive power). Meanwhile, due to the over-estimation of 
future downside jumps, the ratio of accurate jump predictions to the number of jump predictions 
will not be as high as that of the “no jumps” ones. 
Comparing the prediction of downside jumps below the three cut-off points, we realise that the 
negative predictive power is highest in the model predicting downside jump risk below the 1% cut-
off point. In contrast, the positive predictive power takes the lowest value in this model.  
Moreover, a high level of specificity (79.79%, 75.67% and 72.68%) or a low level of false positive 
rate (20.21%, 24.33% or 27.32%) indicates that on average for our 30 sample banks, our model can 
capture more than 72% of the time when no jumps occur. Besides, we also obtain a relatively high 
level of sensitivity (57.02%, 60.14% and 62.86%) or a relative low level of false negative rate 
(42.98%, 39.86% and 37.14%). This implies that our model predicts future downside jumps 
accurately about 60 times out of 100 times.  
In summary, the results above suggests that our constructed downside jump risk indicator performs 
relatively well in predicting the future realised jump indicator of the sample U.S. banks. 
 
 
86 
 
4.4.1.2 Predictive power of the downside jump risk value in explaining the 
realised jump risk indicator 
For each of the sample banks, we run a probit model of the realised jumps indicator on the 
downside jump risk value and report the cross-sectional average of the coefficients and McFadden 
R-squareds in Table 4.6. 
Insert Table 4.6 about here 
Similar to what we find in section 4.4.1.1, on average, the coefficient of downside jump risk value is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% significance level. This implies that the higher the 
downside jump risk value, the more likely that a downside jump is realised in the next 22 trading 
days. Again, we obtain the highest McFadden R-squareds when predicting the 5% downside jumps 
of individual banks (17.08% compared with 15.17% and 14.52%). 
4.4.2 Predictive power of the constructed downside jump risk predictors 
in explaining the realised probability of jumps 
This section reports the output of the two regressions of the realised probability of jumps on the 
constructed downside jump risk predictors. 
4.4.2.1 Predictive power of the constructed downside jump risk indicator in 
explaining the realised probability of jumps 
We run a regression of the realised probability of jumps on the downside jump risk indicator and 
present the output in Table 4.7. 
Insert Table 4.7 about here 
We find that when our model predicts the occurrence of jumps in the future, the realised probability 
of jumps is higher or we are more likely to observe jumps in the next 22 trading days. More 
specifically, when the downside jump risk indicator takes the value of 1, the realised probability of 
jumps below the 5% cut-off point increases by 6.55% on average and it is significant at the 1% 
significance level. 
These figures are 4.83% and 3.56% for jumps below the 2.5% and 1% cut-off points. It is noted that 
we would not expect the average coefficients to be close to 5%, 2.5% and 1% respectively for 
jumps below the three cut-off points. The reason is that when our constructed downside jump risk 
indicator takes the value of 1, it does not mean that the model predicts an exact one jump to occur 
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in the next 22 trading days. Moreover, even if it does, 5%, 2.5% and 1% are only the expected 
probabilities of the downside jumps in the unconditional model. We construct our downside jump 
risk indicator based on both the unconditional and conditional models. Comparing the power in 
predicting jumps below different cut-off points, it is clear that our model performs the best when 
predicting smaller jumps. We obtain the higher cross-sectional average of adjusted R-squared 
(15.96%) when predicting the realised probability of jumps below the 5% cut-off point. These 
numbers when predicting the realised probability of jumps below 2.5% and 1% are 12.5% and 
10.21% respectively. 
4.4.2.2 Predictive power of the constructed downside jump risk value in 
explaining the realised probability of jumps 
Table 4.8 reports the cross-sectional average of the coefficients and adjusted R-squareds when 
regressing our constructed downside jump risk value in predicting the realised probability of jumps.  
Insert Table 4.8 about here 
Consistent with the findings based on the previous three regression models, we obtain a statistically 
significant and positive average coefficient of the downside jump risk value at the 1% significance 
level. Across three sub-models predicting jumps below different cut-off points, the coefficients of 
downside jump risk value are close to 1 (0.886, 0.886 and 0.931 respectively). This implies that 
when our constructed downside jump risk value increases by 1%, the realised probability of jumps 
increases by almost 1%. Nevertheless, these average coefficients are less than 1 suggesting the 
upward bias of our downside jump risk value. 
The average adjusted R-squared is highest (32.42%) when our model is applied to predict future 
downside jumps below the 5% cut-off point. However, in contrast with chapter two and chapter 
three where we find a big difference in adjusted R-squareds when predicting jumps below different 
cut-off points, this difference is hardly noticeable in this model. This finding is in line with what is 
reported in section 4.4.1.1, part a. 
In brief, the earlier analyses based on the four regressions of the realised downside jump risk on the 
downside jump risk predictors indicate that the downside jump risk predictors constructed using the 
state preference approach under the Black-Scholes risk neutral framework possess a high level of 
out-of-sample predictability. Moreover, across all of the four regressions, we obtain the highest R-
squareds when predicting downside jumps below the 5% cut-off point. Consistent with the findings 
in the previous chapters when downside jumps at the market level are predicted, we conclude that 
our model has a better prediction of smaller downside jumps compared with larger ones.  
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4.5 Prediction of Value at Risk  
This section is an extension of the state preference approach to Value at Risk (VaR). It is noted that 
our focus is not the measure of VaR of the trading portfolios of individual banks as documented in 
many papers in the literature (Berkowitz, Christoffersen, & Pelletier, 2011; Pérignon & Smith, 
2010a, 2010b). Instead, we apply the state preference approach to measure VaR of a portfolio 
consisting of individual banks’ stocks.  
4.5.1 State preference approach and VaR 
As section 4.4 points out, a comparison between the Black-Scholes and the Merton Jump-Diffusion 
models indicates that the former outperforms the latter in estimating market state prices after we 
penalise the number of parameters. Under the Black-Scholes framework, the logarithmic return of 
the market index, 𝐺𝑚, follows a normal distribution. Assuming that an individual return is a linear 
projection of the market return, the logarithmic return of an individual bank, 𝐺𝑖, also follows a 
normal distribution. When returns of an individual bank are normally distributed, VaR of the 
portfolio consisting of that bank’s stocks can easily be estimated using Covariance, the widely used 
and most popular method of VaR estimation (Best, 2000). 
Using Covariance, with a 95% confidence level16 over a t-day horizon, VaR of a position of an 
individual bank’s stocks can be measured as follows (Best, 2000; Jorion, 1996): 
 𝐻𝐶𝐺 = 1.6449 × 𝜎 × 𝑃 × √𝑡 (34) 
Where: 
𝜎 denotes volatility. 
𝑃 denotes the position value, which is calculated based on the individual bank’s stock price and the 
number of shares in the portfolio. 
𝑡 denotes the time horizon over which 𝐻𝐶𝐺 is estimated. 
To simplify the measure without losing the generality of the method (as in this chapter, our focus is 
on the portfolio of individual bank stocks), 𝑃 is proxied by the stock price of the bank. Furthermore, 
as illustrated in section 4.3, the state preference approach can be applied to provide unbiased 
volatility predictors of individual banks, 𝐻𝑖. Therefore, our state price volatility, 𝐻𝑖, is used in this 
section to improve the prediction of VaR. As 𝐻𝑖 measures the expected volatility of individual banks 
                                                
16 A 95% confidence level is most widely used by banks (Best, 2000). Moreover, section 4.4 also indicates that our 
model using 𝐻𝑖 as the volatility input performs the best in predicting future downside jumps below the 5% cut-off point.  
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over the next month, we calculate 1-month VaR. To be consistent with the previous chapters, we 
follow the trading day convention where VaR is estimated over the next 22 trading days. Under the 
state preference approach, a 1 month/95% VaR is calculated as follows: 
 1 month/95% 𝐻𝐶𝐺𝑖 = 1.6449 × 𝐻𝑖 × 𝑃𝑖 × √22 (35) 
As it is documented in the literature that banks normally estimate one-day ahead VaRs (Pérignon & 
Smith, 2010a), it is desirable to predict 1 day/95% VaR using the state preference approach.  
 1 day/95% 𝐻𝐶𝐺𝑖 = 1.6449 × 1 − 𝑑𝐶𝑣 𝐻𝑖 × 𝑃𝑖 (36) 
In that case, we need to obtain a 1-day state price volatility. Equation (26) indicates that the 
individual 1-day state price volatility can be measured based on the market 1-day state price 
volatility, which in turn can be estimated in the same manner as described in Liu (2013) using short-
dated SPX options data. As the estimation of 1-day state price volatility does not belong to the 
scope of the thesis, prediction of 1 day/95% VaR is reserved for future study. 
4.5.2 Testing model accuracy using backtesting 
We follow Pérignon and Smith (2010b) to perform the test of VaR forecast accuracy using the 
Likelihood Ratio (LR) test of Kupiec (1995): 
 𝐿𝐺 = −2 ln{(1 − 𝑒)𝑟−𝑋𝑒𝑋} + 2ln{(1 − ?̂?)𝑟−𝑋?̂?𝑋} (37) 
Where: 
𝑒 = 0.05 is the exception rate under the null hypothesis. 
?̂? is the exception rate obtained from the sample. 
𝑋 denotes the number of exceptions. 
𝑇 denotes the number of observations. 
𝐿𝐺 ~ 𝜒12  
Using the 𝐿𝐺, we can formally test the null hypothesis that only 5% of the time the actual loss is 
greater than the 95% monthly VaRs. In other words, we test whether the sample exceptions, 𝑋, are 
statistically significant from 5% × 𝑇. A small likelihood ratio 𝐿𝐺 implies a small difference 
between the likelihood of observing 𝑋 exceptions under the null and alternative hypotheses. Thus, 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. On the other hand, when there is a significant difference 
between the log likelihood of observing 𝑋 exceptions under the null and alternative hypotheses, we 
obtain a large 𝐿𝐺. The null hypothesis is more likely to be rejected. 
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We compare our model’s predictability with the historical simulation. Among different methods of 
VaR estimation, the historical simulation is chosen as it is the most popular method used in the 
international setting. According to Pérignon and Smith (2010b), 73% of VaR disclosing banks use 
the historical simulation. We estimate VaR based on a series of 250-day historical stock prices of 
individual banks. Obtaining the monthly price change series and sorting them into percentiles, we 
predict  1-month VaRs based on a 95% confidence level.  
As a robustness check, we also measure 1 month/99% VaR using both the state preference approach 
and the historical simulation. Results are reported in Appendix D. 
4.5.3 Empirical results 
We predict 1 month/95% VaRs of the sample banks using the state price volatility, 𝐻𝑖, developed in 
section 4.3, and test the model accuracy. Backtesting results are presented in Table 4.9. 
Insert Table 4.9 about here 
Over the thirty (30) banks, on average we observe 156 exceptions compared with the expected 
number of exceptions of 166. The sample proportion of exceptions of 4.7% leading to a LR of 0.631 
and p-value of 0.427 indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 10% significance 
level. This result illustrates that our model works well in predicting 1 month/95% VaR. The sample 
exception rate, on average, is not statistically significant from 5%. More specifically, we do not 
reject the null hypothesis in 6 out of the 30 sample banks, which means that our model predicts 
accurately out-of-sample 1 month/95% VaR for those 6 banks. Out of the 24 remaining banks, we 
reject the null hypothesis that the sample proportion of exceptions is not statistically different from 
5% in 21 banks at a 1% significance level and in 3 banks at a 10% significance level. 
We compare the 1 month/95% VaR predicted using the state preference approach with the historical 
simulation and report the output in Table 4.10.  
Insert Table 4.10 about here 
When predicting the 1 month/95% VaR using the historical simulation, on average, we observe 206 
actual exceptions compared with the expected number of 166. This method results in the sample 
proportion of exceptions of 6.2% leading to the LR of 9.336 and its correspondent p-value of 0.002. 
The null hypothesis is rejected at a 1% significance level. In other words, the sample exceptions are 
statistically significantly different from 5%. Out of the 30 sample banks, the historical simulation 
results in a correct prediction of the out-of-sample 1 month/95% VaR for 7 out of 30 banks. With 
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regard to the 23 remaining banks where the null hypothesis is not rejected, the LR coverage test 
suggests that the above conclusion is significant at 1% for 20 banks, at 5% for 1 bank and at 10% 
significance levels for 2 banks.  
We observe a systematically lower number of exceptions under the state preference approach than 
under the historical simulation (in 24 out of 30 banks). It is noted that the higher the actual VaR 
compared with the reported VaR, the more penalties and the more VaR capital charge would incur. 
As a result, VaR capital charge would be lower if VaR is predicted under the state preference 
approach. This property is desirable given the earlier conclusion of a high quality VaR prediction 
under the state preference approach. 
In brief, Table 4.9 and Table 4.10 indicate that on average, the 1 month/95% VaR developed using 
the state preference approach possesses a better predictive quality compared with those constructed 
using the historical simulation. Even though the performance of bank specific VaR prediction 
between the two methods is quite similar, the later seems to result in a systematically higher VaR 
capital charge.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter extends the method applied in chapter two to model the downside jump risk of 30 U.S. 
banks using the Black-Scholes risk neutral framework. We use the state preference approach to 
estimate the 1-month expected volatility and use it as the volatility input to measure downside jump 
risk, and then extend it to banks’ value at risk prediction. The empirical results suggest that our 
measure of volatility, 𝐻𝑖, provides an unbiased estimate for the conditional volatility and 
outperforms the 30-day historical volatility, 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣 in predicting future 
realised volatility, especially during the GFC. Using this unbiased estimate of future volatility, we 
construct downside jump risk predictors and test their predictability. On average, our downside 
jump risk predictors possess a high out-of-sample forecast accuracy, which is in line with the 
findings in the previous chapters. The last part of the chapter focuses on the development of one-
month VaR estimates at a 95% confidence level. Overall, the test of model accuracy indicates the 
high quality of VaR developed based on the state preference approach. We also discover that, 
compared with the historical simulation, this method produces a better 1 month/95% VaR with a 
systematically lower VaR capital charge.  
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Figure 4.1: Histograms of regression output 
This figure contains five rows where each row depicts the histograms of 𝛼, t-test of 𝛼 = 0, 𝛽, t-test of 𝛽 = 1 
and R-squared of the following regressions: 
𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝐻𝑖  
𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 = 𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22   
𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 = 𝛼3 + 𝛽3𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣 
The 3 columns of the histograms represent the regression output where 𝐻𝑖, 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1)𝑣𝑣𝑣  are 
used as independent variables individually to predict 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22. 
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Panel B. GFC 
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Table 4.1: Summary of statistics of 𝐕𝐢 and 𝐑𝐕𝐑𝐥𝟐𝟐 
This table reports the cross-sectional summary statistics of our individual expected volatility measure 𝐻𝑖, the 
realised 30-day volatility with trading day convention 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 where 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙𝑖,22𝑖 = �𝛴𝑗=122 𝐺𝑖+𝑗−12,𝑖 × 25222 . 
  𝐻𝑖 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 
Mean 0.3645 0.3476 
Median 0.3329 0.2749 
Maximum 1.3893 1.8137 
Minimum 0.1112 0.0799 
Standard Deviation 0.1545 0.2493 
Skewness 2.1437 2.4501 
Kurtosis 10.0502 11.6439 
 
 
 
Table 4.2: Correlation between 𝐕𝐢 and 𝐑𝐕𝐑𝐥𝟐𝟐 
This table reports the cross-sectional average of correlation between the constructed individual expected 
volatility 𝐻𝑖 and the realised 30-day volatility with trading day convention, 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22, where 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙𝑖,22𝑖 =
�𝛴𝑗=1
22 𝐺𝑖+𝑗−1
2,𝑖 × 252
22
.  
Correlation 𝐻𝑖 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 
𝐻𝑖 1.0000 0.6332 
𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 0.6332 1.0000 
Observations 3327 3327 
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Table 4.3: Predictability of 𝐕𝐢, 𝐇𝐕𝐑𝐥𝟐𝟐 and 𝐆𝐆𝐑𝐆𝐇(𝟏,𝟏)𝐯𝐑𝐥 
This table reports the cross-sectional average of the regression output (with HAC robust standard errors) of 
the realised 30-day volatility computed with trading day convention 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 on the state price volatility 
measure 𝐻𝑖, 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and 30-day 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑣𝑣𝑣(1,1), where 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙𝑖,22𝑖 = �𝛴𝑗=122 𝐺𝑖+𝑗−12,𝑖 × 25222  and 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙𝑖,22𝑖 =
�Σ𝑗=−22
−1 𝐺𝑖+𝑗
2,𝑖 × 252
22
. 
Panel A. Whole sample 
 𝑽𝒊 𝑯𝑽𝑯𝒍𝟐𝟐 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑯(𝟏,𝟏)𝒗𝑯𝒍 
α   -0.0311 0.1006 0.0489 
t-test α = 0 -0.2263 4.6382 1.5311 
β  1.0388 0.7055 0.7828 
t-test β = 1 -0.1673 -4.5632 -2.5647 
R-squared 0.4128 0.5089 0.3958 
 
Panel B. GFC 
 𝑽𝒊 𝑯𝑽𝑯𝒍𝟐𝟐 𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑮𝑯(𝟏,𝟏)𝒗𝑯𝒍 
α  0.2295 0.2918 0.3526 
t-test α = 0 1.7860 3.6287 3.0051 
β  0.8994 0.5751 0.5197 
t-test β = 1 -0.9711 -5.1358 -4.1140 
R-squared 0.3645 0.3598 0.2304 
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Table 4.4: Predictive power of the downside jump risk indicators in explaining 
the realised jumps indicator 
This table presents the cross-sectional average of the coefficients and the McFadden R-squared of the probit 
regressions of model 1: Realised jumps indicator = f(Downside jump risk indicator). The predicted downside 
jump risk indicator takes the value of 1 if the predicted price of the catastrophe bond under the conditional 
model is larger than that of the unconditional model and 0 otherwise.  
  
5% cut-off point 2.5% cut-off point  1% cut-off point  
 (left tail of 5%) (left tail of 2.5%) (left tail of 1%) 
Intercept -0.6098*** -0.8971*** -1.1596*** 
Downside jump risk indicator 1.0429*** 0.9469*** 0.8845*** 
McFadden R-squared 0.1187 0.1038 0.0949 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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Table 4.5: Measures of classification accuracy of model 1 
This table reports cross-sectional average of measures of classification accuracy of model 1: Realised jumps indicator = f(Downside jump risk indicator) following 
methods reviewed by Fielding and Bell (1997). The predicted downside jump risk indicator takes the value of 1 if the predicted price of the catastrophe bond under 
the conditional model is larger than that of the unconditional one, and 0 otherwise. Meanwhile, the realised jump risk indicator takes the value of 1 if at least 1 jump 
occurs over the next 22 trading days and 0 otherwise. 
 
Formula 
5% cut-off point 
 (left tail of 5%) 
2.5% cut-off point 
 (left tail of 2.5%) 
1% cut-off point 
 (left tail of 1%) 
Summary Actual Predicted Count % Count % Count % 
-          TP + + 772 23.20% 607 18.25% 463 13.92% 
-          TN - - 1554 46.71% 1742 52.35% 1876 56.37% 
-          FP - + 403 12.11% 567 17.05% 712 21.39% 
-          FN + - 598 17.98% 411 12.35% 277 8.32% 
Number of predictions (N)    3327  3327  3327  
Measures of classification accuracy          
- Prevalence = (𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)/𝑁  41.18%  30.60%  22.24% 
- Overall diagnostic power = (𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁)/𝑁  58.82%  69.40%  77.76% 
- Correct classification rate = (𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁)/𝑁  69.91%  70.60%  70.29% 
- Sensitivity = 𝑇𝑃/(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)  57.02%  60.14%  62.86% 
- Specificity = 𝑇𝑁/(𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁)  79.79%  75.67%  72.68% 
- False positive rate = 𝐹𝑃/(𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁)  20.21%  24.33%  27.32% 
- False negative rate = 𝐹𝑁/(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)  42.98%  39.86%  37.14% 
- Positive predictive power = 𝑇𝑃/(𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃)  66.20%  52.06%  39.67% 
- Negative predictive power = 𝑇𝑁/(𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑁)  72.32%  81.00%  87.18% 
- Misclassification rate = (𝐹𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁)/𝑁  30.09%  29.40%  29.71% 
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Table 4.6: Predictive power of the downside jump risk value in explaining the 
realised jumps indicator 
This table presents the cross-sectional average of the coefficients and the McFadden R-squared of the probit 
regressions of model 2: Realised jumps indicator = f(Downside jump risk value), where the predicted 
downside jump risk value measures the difference in predicted prices of the catastrophe bond between the 
conditional and unconditional models. The realised jumps indicator takes the value of 1 if at least 1 jump 
occurs over the next 22 trading days and 0 otherwise. 
  
5% cut-off point 2.5% cut-off point  1% cut-off point  
 (left tail of 5%) (left tail of 2.5%) (left tail of 1%) 
Intercept -0.1727** -0.5920*** -0.9329*** 
Downside jump risk value 15.6863*** 17.1668*** 20.5318*** 
McFadden R-squared 0.1708 0.1517 0.1452 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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Table 4.7: Predictability of downside jump risk indicator in explaining the 
realised probability of jumps 
This table reports the cross-sectional average of the coefficients and the adjusted R-squared of the OLS 
regressions with HAC robust standard errors of model 3: Realised probability of jumps = f(Downside jump 
risk indicator), where the predicted downside jump risk indicator takes the value of 1 if the predicted price of 
the catastrophe bond under the conditional model is larger than that of the unconditional one, and 0 
otherwise. The realised probability of jumps is measured by dividing the number of actual jumps over the 
next 22 trading days by 22. 
  
5% cut-off point 2.5% cut-off point 1% cut-off point 
(left tail of 5%) (left tail of 2.5%) (left tail of 1%) 
Intercept 0.0235*** 0.0147*** 0.0090*** 
Downside jump risk indicator 0.0655*** 0.0483*** 0.0356*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1596 0.1250 0.1021 
 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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Table 4.8: Predictability of downside jump risk value in explaining the realised 
probability of jumps  
This table reports the cross-sectional average of the coefficients and adjusted R-squared of the OLS 
regressions with HAC robust standard errors of model 4: Realised probability of jumps = f(Downside jump 
risk value), where the predicted downside jump risk value measures the difference in predicted prices of the 
catastrophe bond between the conditional and unconditional models. The realised probability of jumps is 
measured by dividing the number of jumps over the next 22 trading days by 22. 
  
5% cut-off point 2.5% cut-off point 1% cut-off point 
(left tail of 5%) (left tail of 2.5%) (left tail of 1%) 
Intercept 0.0471*** 0.0279*** 0.0157*** 
Downside jump risk value 0.8860*** 0.8856*** 0.9312*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3242 0.3165 0.3113 
 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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Table 4.9: 1 month/95% VaR backtesting results of the state preference 
approach 
This table reports the 1 month/95% VaR back-testing results for 30 sample banks, where VaR is predicted 
using the state preference approach. We perform the Likelihood Ratio test introduced in Kupiec (1995): 
𝐿𝐺 = −2 ln{(1 − 𝑒)𝑟−𝑋𝑒𝑋} + 2ln{(1 − ?̂?)𝑟−𝑋?̂?𝑋}  where 𝑒 is the target exception rate of 0.05, 𝑋 is the 
observed number of exceptions, 𝑇 is the number of observations and ?̂? denotes the sample proportion of 
exceptions, 𝐿𝐺~𝜒12.  
Bank 
Expected 
Exceptions 
Target 
Exception 
rate 
Actual 
Exceptions 
Sample 
proportion of 
Exceptions 
LR Coverage  
Test 
p-Value 
1 166.35 0.05 97 0.029 35.570 0.000 
2 166.35 0.05 55 0.017 104.834 0.000 
3 166.4 0.05 188 0.056 2.838 0.092 
4 166.35 0.05 253 0.076 41.261 0.000 
5 166.35 0.05 65 0.020 83.754 0.000 
6 166.35 0.05 366 0.110 190.796 0.000 
7 166.45 0.05 148 0.044 2.233 0.135 
8 166.35 0.05 57 0.017 100.341 0.000 
9 166.35 0.05 106 0.032 26.306 0.000 
10 166.35 0.05 110 0.033 22.704 0.000 
11 166.35 0.05 115 0.035 18.623 0.000 
12 166.35 0.05 110 0.033 22.704 0.000 
13 166.35 0.05 134 0.040 7.074 0.008 
14 166.35 0.05 284 0.085 72.947 0.000 
15 166.35 0.05 190 0.057 3.391 0.066 
16 166.35 0.05 95 0.029 37.857 0.000 
17 166.35 0.05 233 0.070 25.132 0.000 
18 166.35 0.05 117 0.035 17.117 0.000 
19 166.35 0.05 181 0.054 1.322 0.250 
20 166.35 0.05 153 0.046 1.158 0.282 
21 166.35 0.05 211 0.063 11.670 0.001 
22 166.35 0.05 166 0.050 0.001 0.978 
23 166.35 0.05 119 0.036 15.683 0.000 
24 166.35 0.05 314 0.094 110.675 0.000 
25 166.35 0.05 144 0.043 3.305 0.069 
26 166.35 0.05 128 0.038 10.075 0.002 
27 166.35 0.05 80 0.024 57.907 0.000 
28 166.35 0.05 161 0.048 0.183 0.669 
29 166.35 0.05 133 0.040 7.535 0.006 
30 166.35 0.05 181 0.054 1.322 0.250 
Average 166.36 0.05 156 0.047 0.631 0.427 
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Table 4.10: 1 month/95% VaR backtesting results of the historical simulation 
This table reports the 1 month/95% VaR backtesting results for 30 sample banks, where VaR is predicted 
using historical simulation of 250 days. We perform the Likelihood Ratio test introduced in Kupiec (1995): 
𝐿𝐺 = −2 ln{(1 − 𝑒)𝑟−𝑋𝑒𝑋} + 2ln{(1 − ?̂?)𝑟−𝑋?̂?𝑋}  where 𝑒 is the target exception rate of 0.05, 𝑋 is the 
observed number of exceptions, 𝑇 is the number of observations and ?̂? denotes the sample proportion of 
exceptions, 𝐿𝐺~𝜒12. 
 
Bank 
Expected 
Exceptions 
Target 
Exception 
rate 
Actual 
Exceptions 
Sample 
proportion of 
Exceptions 
LR 
Coverage 
Test p-Value 
1 166.35 0.05 203 0.061 7.966 0.005 
2 166.35 0.05 234 0.070 25.853 0.000 
3 166.4 0.05 200 0.060 6.727 0.009 
4 166.35 0.05 191 0.057 3.677 0.055 
5 166.35 0.05 203 0.061 7.966 0.005 
6 166.35 0.05 183 0.055 1.701 0.192 
7 166.45 0.05 177 0.053 0.690 0.406 
8 166.35 0.05 153 0.046 1.158 0.282 
9 166.35 0.05 188 0.057 2.851 0.091 
10 166.35 0.05 181 0.054 1.322 0.250 
11 166.35 0.05 248 0.075 36.898 0.000 
12 166.35 0.05 210 0.063 11.171 0.001 
13 166.35 0.05 231 0.069 23.717 0.000 
14 166.35 0.05 182 0.055 1.506 0.220 
15 166.35 0.05 179 0.054 0.989 0.320 
16 166.35 0.05 173 0.052 0.276 0.599 
17 166.35 0.05 203 0.061 7.966 0.005 
18 166.35 0.05 199 0.060 6.364 0.012 
19 166.35 0.05 216 0.065 14.316 0.000 
20 166.35 0.05 200 0.060 6.749 0.009 
21 166.35 0.05 220 0.066 16.611 0.000 
22 166.35 0.05 241 0.072 31.156 0.000 
23 166.35 0.05 206 0.062 9.278 0.002 
24 166.35 0.05 224 0.067 19.061 0.000 
25 166.35 0.05 234 0.070 25.853 0.000 
26 166.35 0.05 210 0.063 11.171 0.001 
27 166.35 0.05 222 0.067 17.817 0.000 
28 166.35 0.05 212 0.064 12.179 0.000 
29 166.35 0.05 221 0.066 17.209 0.000 
30 166.35 0.05 240 0.072 30.371 0.000 
Average 166.36 0.05 206 0.062 9.336 0.002 
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Chapter 5 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
State preference theory, first proposed by Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959), is an elegant approach 
to asset selection under uncertainty. Under the state preference approach, the price of any asset can 
be valued as the sum of the multiplication of state prices and their correspondent payoffs. Applying 
the state preference approach, we introduce the concept of catastrophe bonds and construct out-of-
sample downside jump risk predictors based on prices of catastrophe bonds under conditional and 
unconditional models. The thesis consists of three essays. While the first two essays measure the 
downside jump risk at the market level, the third one predicts future downside jump risk at the 
individual security level and extends further to the value at risk estimation. 
In the first essay, we develop a theoretical framework for downside jump risk prediction and 
implement empirical tests for their predictability over the period of 1996-2010. Using the Black-
Scholes (1973) risk neutral framework, we estimate prices of catastrophe bonds under both the 
conditional model (using VIX) and unconditional model (using historical volatility), then construct 
the S&P 500 downside jump risk predictors based on their price difference. Running a regression of 
the realised downside jumps variables (indicator and probability) on the constructed predictors 
(indicator and value) we obtain an output consistent with what is theoretically expected. When our 
model indicates a downside jump in the next 22 trading days, jumps are more likely to occur. 
Moreover, the higher the predicted downside jump risk value, the more likely that jumps are to 
occur. The result also supports the conclusion that VIX performs better than the historical volatility 
in forecasting future downside jump risk. The relatively accurate prediction of the model is utilised 
to develop trading strategies, which are shown to be profitable over the whole sample period and 
even during the GFC.  
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The second essay is a modified version of the first essay where the assumption of log normal price 
under the Black-Scholes (1973) framework is relaxed. Instead, stock prices are assumed to follow a 
jump-diffusion process. Downside jump risk predictors are estimated under the Merton (1976) risk 
neutral jump-diffusion framework based on the prices of catastrophe bonds under both conditional 
and unconditional models. In this essay, two conditional sub-models are estimated. While we only 
estimate the conditional instantaneous volatility on VIX in the first sub-model, we condition both 
the instantaneous volatility and jumps volatility on VIX in the second sub-model. The results of the 
two sub-models are consistent but the second sub-model slightly outperforms the first one in 
forecasting future downside jumps. Employing the same set of tests as the first essay, we obtain 
similar findings in the second one. Profitable trading strategies are also developed based on the 
model’s predictions. 
The third essay of the thesis extends the method proposed in the previous essays to project the 
downside jump risk of 30 U.S. banks from 1996 to April, 2013. We begin by comparing the models 
applied in the first two essays using the Bayesian Information Criteria and conclude that the Black-
Scholes (1973) risk neutral framework outperforms the Merton (1976) risk neutral jump-diffusion 
framework after allowance for the number of parameters estimated. As a result, we use the Black-
Scholes (1973) risk neutral framework to estimate prices of catastrophe bonds of individual banks 
in this essay. We then employ the state preference approach to estimate the individual expected 
volatility, 𝐻𝑖, which serves as the volatility input of the conditional model. 𝐻𝑖 is shown to be an 
unbiased volatility estimate and outperforms the 𝐺𝐻𝐻𝑙22 and 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺(1,1) volatility. Downside 
jump risk predictors of individual banks using 𝐻𝑖 are, on average, shown to possess high out-of-
sample forecast accuracy, which is in line with the findings of the first two essays.  
 
To finish, we explore the possibility of using the state preference approach to predict monthly VaR 
at a 95% confidence level of the sample banks. The model accuracy test demonstrates the high 
quality of our estimated VaR. A comparison between our VaR estimates and those obtained using 
historical simulation suggests that the former outperforms the latter in predicting 1 month/95% VaR 
due to the fact that it utilises the state price volatility, 𝐻𝑖, where 𝐻𝑖 is a forward looking volatility 
measure over the next month (or 22 trading days). 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 30 U.S. sample banks 
 
This appendix reports the names and PERMNOs of 30 sample banks in chapter four.  
Table A.1: Names and PERMNOs of 30 U.S. sample banks 
 
BANK PERMNO BANK NAME 
1 80223 BOSTON PRIVATE FINL HLDGS INC 
2 77114 WORLD ACCEPTANCE CORP 
3 68021 CAPSTEAD MORTGAGE CORP 
4 80072 VALLEY NATIONAL BANCORP 
5 82107 WESTAMERICA BANCORPORATION 
6 12169 DORAL FINANCIAL CORP 
7 35167 FIRSTMERIT CORP 
8 75811 MITSUBISHI UFJ FINANCIAL GP INC 
9 76639 TOTAL SYSTEM SERVICES INC 
10 75846 ISTAR FINANCIAL INC 
11 82311 CREDICORP LTD 
12 81284 BANK MONTREAL QUE 
13 82654 ROYAL BANK CANADA MONTREAL QUE 
14 75152 BANCO SANTANDER S A 
15 20053 SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP 
16 12073 PEOPLES UNITED FINANCIAL INC 
17 79859 NEW YORK COMMUNITY BANCORP INC 
18 65947 HEALTH CARE REIT INC 
19 35554 M & T BANK CORP 
20 64995 KEYCORP NEW 
21 66325 S L M CORP 
22 71563 B B & T CORP 
23 49680 DANAHER CORP 
24 82775 HARTFORD FINANCIAL SVCS GRP INC 
25 60442 P N C FINANCIAL SERVICES GRP INC 
26 72726 STATE STREET CORP 
27 49656 BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP 
28 81055 CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP 
29 59176 AMERICAN EXPRESS CO 
30 47896 JPMORGAN CHASE & CO 
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Table A.2: Summary of statistics of individual banks’ returns  
 
Bank Mean Median Max Min 
Standard 
Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
1 0.0002 0.0000 0.2441 -0.3090 0.0330 -0.2179 11.1883 
2 0.0005 0.0000 0.2210 -0.2684 0.0326 0.0511 9.3493 
3 0.0004 0.0000 0.3059 -0.3664 0.0274 0.2822 35.7414 
4 0.0002 0.0000 0.2171 -0.1748 0.0196 0.4845 17.3401 
5 0.0003 0.0000 0.1418 -0.1516 0.0195 0.2640 9.5014 
6 -0.0009 0.0000 0.5163 -0.4346 0.0463 0.1793 18.8443 
7 0.0002 0.0000 0.1772 -0.2065 0.0223 -0.0215 13.5082 
8 -0.0002 0.0000 0.1699 -0.1468 0.0258 0.3127 6.3589 
9 0.0003 0.0000 0.1237 -0.2362 0.0217 -0.6094 11.9695 
10 0.0005 0.0000 0.5379 -0.7754 0.0493 -0.2518 39.3169 
11 0.0007 0.0000 0.1478 -0.2084 0.0209 -0.3269 10.8963 
12 0.0005 0.0002 0.1532 -0.1484 0.0172 0.0989 9.8931 
13 0.0007 0.0004 0.1514 -0.1637 0.0170 0.0038 11.4121 
14 0.0003 0.0007 0.2069 -0.1793 0.0261 -0.0991 8.8984 
15 0.0000 0.0000 0.2486 -0.3007 0.0312 -0.1365 14.9356 
16 0.0005 0.0000 0.1645 -0.1700 0.0189 -0.0148 12.3061 
17 0.0006 0.0000 0.1306 -0.1486 0.0205 -0.1397 9.8927 
18 0.0006 0.0004 0.1417 -0.1564 0.0174 -0.2408 12.1803 
19 0.0004 0.0003 0.1911 -0.1697 0.0198 0.1969 14.3809 
20 0.0000 0.0000 0.4334 -0.4055 0.0298 -0.4143 37.4582 
21 0.0003 0.0000 0.2999 -0.3906 0.0315 -0.9120 26.9234 
22 0.0003 0.0000 0.2120 -0.2661 0.0223 0.1095 19.2721 
23 0.0006 0.0000 0.1111 -0.1196 0.0177 0.0548 7.2367 
24 0.0001 0.0002 0.7049 -0.7249 0.0372 -0.4102 84.1668 
25 0.0003 0.0000 0.3155 -0.5344 0.0251 -1.3323 63.7694 
26 0.0004 0.0002 0.2727 -0.8925 0.0301 -5.7103 188.7727 
27 0.0003 0.0000 0.2216 -0.3169 0.0258 -0.0589 17.2598 
28 0.0005 0.0004 0.2345 -0.5069 0.0338 -1.0676 22.6723 
29 0.0004 0.0000 0.1877 -0.1935 0.0247 0.0132 10.4014 
30 0.0003 0.0000 0.2239 -0.2323 0.0269 0.2307 13.4989 
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APPENDIX B Black-Scholes (1973) risk neutral model vs Merton 
(1976) risk neutral jump-diffusion model 
 
This appendix reports the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), which is calculated based on the 
model’s log likelihood and the number of estimated parameters, of the two different models 
employed in chapter two and chapter three. 
Table B.1: BIC of the Black-Scholes (1973) risk neutral model vs. Merton (1976) risk neutral 
jump-diffusion model 
 
Models BIC 
Black-Scholes -13.86 
Merton Jump – Diffusion (sub-model 1) 10.14 
Merton Jump – Diffusion (sub-model 2) 10.29 
 
Obtaining the smallest BIC, the Black-Scholes (1973) framework is shown to perform better than 
the Merton (1976) risk neutral jump-diffusion model in estimating market state prices after taking 
into account the number of parameters in the models. 
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APPENDIX C Prediction of downside jump risk in 30 U.S. banks 
This appendix reports the performance of the downside jump risk predictors in explaining future 
downside jump risk variables. As we construct two downside jump risk predictors (including 
downside jump risk indicator and downside jump risk value) to predict two realised jumps variables 
(including realised jumps indicator and realised probability of jumps), we test the performance of 
our downside jump predictors by running four regression models: 
 
Model 1 Realised jumps indicator = f(Downside jump risk indicator) 
Model 2 Realised jumps indicator = f(Downside jump risk value) 
Model 3 Realised probability of jumps= f(Downside jump risk indicator) 
Model 4 Realised probability of jumps = f(Downside jump risk value) 
 
  
 113 
 
Table C.1: Predictability of the downside jump risk indicators in explaining the realised 
jumps indicator 
This table presents the coefficients and the McFadden R-squared of the probit regressions of model 1: 
Realised jumps indicator = f(Downside jump risk indicator). The predicted downside jump risk indicator 
takes the value of 1 if the predicted price of the catastrophe bond under the conditional model is larger than 
that of the unconditional model and 0 otherwise. 
Bank 
5% cut-off point 2.5% cut-off point 1% cut-off point 
Intercept 
Downside 
jump risk 
indicator 
McFadden 
R-squared 
Intercept 
Downside 
jump risk 
indicator 
McFadden 
R-squared 
Intercept 
Downside 
jump risk 
indicator 
McFadden 
R-squared 
1 -0.703*** 1.213*** 0.147 -1.019*** 1.140*** 0.139 -1.231*** 1.183*** 0.152 
2 -0.374*** 0.337*** 0.012 -0.709*** 0.386*** 0.016 -1.183*** 0.568*** 0.038 
3 -0.836*** 0.530*** 0.031 -1.062*** 0.458*** 0.024 -1.449*** 0.366*** 0.017 
4 -0.451*** 1.096*** 0.117 -0.754*** 1.007*** 0.106 -0.951*** 0.862*** 0.082 
5 -0.437*** 0.817*** 0.068 -0.752*** 0.894*** 0.085 -1.300*** 1.085*** 0.131 
6 0.237*** 0.338*** 0.012 -0.162*** 0.434*** 0.019 -0.412*** 0.517*** 0.028 
7 -0.482*** 1.073*** 0.113 -0.760*** 0.962*** 0.097 -0.980*** 0.680*** 0.052 
8 -0.409*** 0.777*** 0.061 -0.795*** 0.623*** 0.043 -1.062*** 0.685*** 0.054 
9 -0.522*** 0.697*** 0.050 -0.781*** 0.482*** 0.026 -1.038*** 0.365*** 0.015 
10 -1.216*** 0.540*** 0.035 -1.409*** 0.640*** 0.049 -1.470*** 0.593*** 0.043 
11 -0.384*** 0.575*** 0.034 -0.907*** 0.722*** 0.058 -1.063*** 0.431*** 0.022 
12 -0.764*** 1.275*** 0.162 -1.008*** 1.243*** 0.162 -1.333*** 1.170*** 0.151 
13 -0.653*** 1.335*** 0.172 -0.974*** 1.119*** 0.133 -1.222*** 1.066*** 0.126 
14 -0.452*** 1.124*** 0.122 -0.774*** 1.103*** 0.125 -1.180*** 1.063*** 0.125 
15 -0.509*** 1.249*** 0.148 -0.850*** 1.187*** 0.145 -1.032*** 1.104*** 0.131 
16 -0.864*** 0.994*** 0.105 -1.166*** 0.973*** 0.106 -1.404*** 0.865*** 0.088 
17 -0.518*** 0.941*** 0.090 -0.723*** 0.801*** 0.069 -1.046*** 0.898*** 0.090 
18 -0.196*** 0.633*** 0.041 -0.537*** 0.517*** 0.028 -0.864*** 0.557*** 0.035 
19 -0.510*** 1.641*** 0.229 -0.846*** 1.385*** 0.190 -1.116*** 1.297*** 0.177 
20 -0.930*** 1.496*** 0.219 -1.031*** 1.297*** 0.174 -1.248*** 1.162*** 0.148 
21 -0.594*** 0.980*** 0.097 -0.846*** 0.883*** 0.084 -0.983*** 0.876*** 0.084 
22 -0.717*** 1.410*** 0.190 -0.957*** 1.239*** 0.159 -1.117*** 1.205*** 0.155 
23 -0.784*** 1.178*** 0.141 -0.973*** 0.957*** 0.100 -1.269*** 0.861*** 0.086 
24 -0.866*** 1.661*** 0.256 -1.157*** 1.470*** 0.220 -1.407*** 1.259*** 0.173 
25 -0.717*** 1.333*** 0.173 -0.983*** 1.095*** 0.128 -1.187*** 0.820*** 0.077 
26 -0.721*** 1.138*** 0.132 -0.916*** 1.042*** 0.116 -1.080*** 0.923*** 0.095 
27 -0.622*** 1.140*** 0.129 -1.052*** 1.160*** 0.143 -1.433*** 1.159*** 0.150 
28 -0.779*** 1.130*** 0.131 -1.012*** 0.840*** 0.078 -1.213*** 0.880*** 0.089 
29 -0.786*** 1.412*** 0.194 -1.042*** 1.201*** 0.152 -1.294*** 1.047*** 0.123 
30 -0.733*** 1.224*** 0.150 -0.959*** 1.149*** 0.139 -1.223*** 0.985*** 0.109 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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Table C.2: Predictive power of the downside jump risk value in explaining the realised jumps 
indicator 
This table presents the coefficients and the McFadden R-squared of the probit regressions of model 2: 
Realised jumps indicator = f(Downside jump risk value), where the predicted downside jump risk value 
measures the difference in predicted prices of the catastrophe bond between the conditional and 
unconditional models. The realised jumps indicator takes the value of 1 if at least 1 jump occurs over the 
next 22 trading days and 0 otherwise. 
Bank 
5% cut-off point 2.5% cut-off point 1% cut-off point 
Intercept 
Downside 
jump risk 
value 
McFadden 
R-squared 
Intercept 
Downside 
jump risk 
value 
McFadden 
R-squared 
Intercept 
Downside 
jump risk 
value 
McFadden 
R-squared 
1 -0.138*** 28.144*** 0.186 -0.588*** 28.343*** 0.184 -0.823*** 34.515*** 0.175 
2 -0.273*** 8.559*** 0.030 -0.621*** 13.984*** 0.057 -1.057*** 20.267*** 0.092 
3 -0.646*** 5.268*** 0.045 -0.930*** 5.254*** 0.032 -1.422*** 8.808*** 0.074 
4 0.012 14.723*** 0.152 -0.419*** 18.219*** 0.158 -0.755*** 24.372*** 0.166 
5 -0.083*** 13.593*** 0.134 -0.458*** 18.951*** 0.157 -1.023*** 27.213*** 0.213 
6 0.365*** 9.740*** 0.025 -0.025 13.727*** 0.031 -0.267*** 19.776*** 0.032 
7 -0.001 17.104*** 0.164 -0.424*** 20.904*** 0.162 -0.827*** 18.810*** 0.118 
8 -0.116*** 11.700*** 0.091 -0.617*** 12.516*** 0.083 -0.901*** 17.568*** 0.095 
9 -0.267*** 12.454*** 0.070 -0.640*** 12.844*** 0.058 -0.965*** 14.561*** 0.052 
10 -1.075*** 12.518*** 0.178 -1.271*** 16.219*** 0.222 -1.355*** 16.954*** 0.188 
11 -0.172*** 5.811*** 0.031 -0.677*** 10.461*** 0.070 -0.974*** 10.840*** 0.052 
12 -0.224*** 19.586*** 0.222 -0.581*** 22.763*** 0.205 -1.001*** 28.098*** 0.204 
13 -0.063** 21.905*** 0.243 -0.608*** 21.842*** 0.205 -0.947*** 25.881*** 0.194 
14 -0.008 11.237*** 0.158 -0.441*** 13.747*** 0.161 -0.917*** 15.340*** 0.156 
15 0.116*** 23.046*** 0.239 -0.420*** 24.482*** 0.206 -0.723*** 31.465*** 0.191 
16 -0.490*** 18.938*** 0.181 -0.870*** 23.384*** 0.193 -1.196*** 25.427*** 0.170 
17 -0.137*** 16.539*** 0.141 -0.470*** 16.698*** 0.116 -0.809*** 23.922*** 0.143 
18 0.024 9.665*** 0.076 -0.413*** 11.370*** 0.081 -0.781*** 15.716*** 0.106 
19 0.326*** 24.950*** 0.317 -0.360*** 24.597*** 0.246 -0.761*** 29.301*** 0.213 
20 -0.318*** 17.127*** 0.259 -0.600*** 18.456*** 0.206 -0.910*** 17.034*** 0.153 
21 -0.219*** 12.553*** 0.134 -0.579*** 13.827*** 0.126 -0.758*** 15.748*** 0.116 
22 -0.096*** 19.697*** 0.242 -0.532*** 19.240*** 0.182 -0.774*** 26.566*** 0.179 
23 -0.297*** 18.158*** 0.202 -0.665*** 18.741*** 0.159 -1.058*** 22.330*** 0.151 
24 -0.215*** 15.988*** 0.261 -0.673*** 13.197*** 0.196 -1.010*** 10.095*** 0.148 
25 -0.130*** 17.799*** 0.240 -0.631*** 17.662*** 0.193 -0.999*** 15.678*** 0.137 
26 -0.261*** 15.476*** 0.186 -0.574*** 14.048*** 0.129 -0.822*** 15.382*** 0.111 
27 -0.095*** 19.275*** 0.220 -0.658*** 19.907*** 0.196 -1.100*** 23.781*** 0.206 
28 -0.320*** 13.410*** 0.195 -0.780*** 13.598*** 0.154 -1.038*** 19.269*** 0.171 
29 -0.174*** 19.593*** 0.265 -0.640*** 18.553*** 0.187 -1.014*** 21.725*** 0.173 
30 -0.208*** 16.031*** 0.235 -0.593*** 17.470*** 0.195 -0.997*** 19.513*** 0.177 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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Table C.3: Predictability of downside jump risk indicator in explaining the realised 
probability of jumps 
This table reports the coefficients and the adjusted R-squared of the OLS regressions with HAC robust 
standard errors of model 3: Realised probability of jumps = f(Downside jump risk indicator), where the 
predicted downside jump risk indicator takes the value of 1 if the predicted price of the catastrophe bond 
under the conditional model is larger than that of the unconditional model and 0 otherwise. The realised 
probability of jumps is measured by dividing the number of actual jumps over the next 22 trading days by 22. 
Bank 
5% cut-off point 2.5% cut-off point 1% cut-off point 
Intercept 
Downside 
jump risk 
indicator 
Adjusted R-
squared Intercept 
Downside 
jump risk 
indicator 
Adjusted R-
squared Intercept 
Downside 
jump risk 
indicator 
Adjusted R-
squared 
1 0.021*** 0.069*** 0.188 0.012*** 0.053*** 0.163 0.009*** 0.042*** 0.148 
2 0.021*** 0.029*** 0.059 0.013*** 0.024*** 0.071 0.006*** 0.020*** 0.067 
3 0.012*** 0.021*** 0.050 0.007*** 0.015*** 0.042 0.004*** 0.010*** 0.030 
4 0.026*** 0.079*** 0.209 0.016*** 0.059*** 0.165 0.011*** 0.043*** 0.124 
5 0.028*** 0.067*** 0.157 0.018*** 0.052*** 0.140 0.008*** 0.041*** 0.142 
6 0.063*** 0.037*** 0.039 0.045*** 0.018*** 0.013 0.032*** 0.015*** 0.015 
7 0.028*** 0.073*** 0.179 0.018*** 0.054*** 0.152 0.013*** 0.030*** 0.077 
8 0.025*** 0.040*** 0.111 0.015*** 0.024*** 0.057 0.008*** 0.021*** 0.061 
9 0.019*** 0.033*** 0.086 0.013*** 0.022*** 0.053 0.007*** 0.012*** 0.033 
10 0.011*** 0.030*** 0.039 0.008*** 0.026*** 0.038 0.006*** 0.022*** 0.038 
11 0.027*** 0.030*** 0.051 0.011*** 0.025*** 0.065 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.028 
12 0.018*** 0.070*** 0.192 0.011*** 0.056*** 0.161 0.005*** 0.043*** 0.137 
13 0.021*** 0.077*** 0.210 0.012*** 0.052*** 0.147 0.006*** 0.039*** 0.129 
14 0.028*** 0.066*** 0.158 0.016*** 0.051*** 0.132 0.009*** 0.038*** 0.099 
15 0.029*** 0.105*** 0.242 0.019*** 0.082*** 0.197 0.012*** 0.060*** 0.157 
16 0.013*** 0.045*** 0.154 0.008*** 0.032*** 0.109 0.005*** 0.017*** 0.060 
17 0.026*** 0.066*** 0.152 0.019*** 0.053*** 0.125 0.012*** 0.040*** 0.107 
18 0.036*** 0.060*** 0.096 0.022*** 0.047*** 0.083 0.014*** 0.037*** 0.069 
19 0.026*** 0.106*** 0.285 0.017*** 0.081*** 0.225 0.011*** 0.063*** 0.188 
20 0.024*** 0.085*** 0.169 0.017*** 0.071*** 0.152 0.011*** 0.053*** 0.126 
21 0.023*** 0.079*** 0.161 0.016*** 0.061*** 0.131 0.011*** 0.052*** 0.136 
22 0.027*** 0.086*** 0.188 0.018*** 0.064*** 0.144 0.012*** 0.050*** 0.141 
23 0.015*** 0.048*** 0.160 0.011*** 0.028*** 0.085 0.006*** 0.018*** 0.068 
24 0.017*** 0.097*** 0.246 0.011*** 0.075*** 0.173 0.007*** 0.055*** 0.122 
25 0.021*** 0.087*** 0.221 0.012*** 0.064*** 0.164 0.007*** 0.044*** 0.114 
26 0.021*** 0.075*** 0.179 0.012*** 0.050*** 0.142 0.008*** 0.037*** 0.123 
27 0.021*** 0.067*** 0.173 0.010*** 0.051*** 0.151 0.005*** 0.040*** 0.139 
28 0.016*** 0.071*** 0.198 0.009*** 0.047*** 0.144 0.005*** 0.035*** 0.126 
29 0.021*** 0.091*** 0.233 0.012*** 0.057*** 0.169 0.007*** 0.038*** 0.119 
30 0.020*** 0.076*** 0.203 0.013*** 0.055*** 0.158 0.006*** 0.040*** 0.138 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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Table C.4: Predictability of downside jump risk value in explaining the realised probability of 
jumps  
This table reports the coefficients and adjusted R-squared of the OLS regressions with HAC robust standard 
errors of model 4: Realised probability of jumps = f(Downside jump risk value), where the predicted 
downside jump risk value measures the difference in predicted prices of the catastrophe bond between the 
conditional and unconditional models. The realised probability of jumps is measured by dividing the number 
of jumps over the next 22 trading days by 22. 
Bank 
5% cut-off point 2.5% cut-off point 1% cut-off point 
Intercept 
Downside 
jump risk 
value 
Adjusted R-
squared Intercept 
Downside 
jump risk 
value 
Adjusted R-
squared Intercept 
Downside 
jump risk 
value 
Adjusted R-
squared 
1 0.046*** 1.196*** 0.360 0.029*** 1.254*** 0.387 0.019*** 1.338*** 0.384 
2 0.030*** 0.810*** 0.202 0.019*** 0.754*** 0.200 0.010*** 0.830*** 0.197 
3 0.020*** 0.258* 0.110 0.011*** 0.223** 0.086 0.005*** 0.251** 0.099 
4 0.054*** 0.942*** 0.372 0.033*** 1.000*** 0.381 0.018*** 1.116*** 0.405 
5 0.053*** 0.945*** 0.348 0.033*** 0.932*** 0.313 0.016*** 1.006*** 0.341 
6 0.075*** 1.062*** 0.111 0.051*** 0.658** 0.038 0.035*** 0.971** 0.059 
7 0.055*** 0.960*** 0.348 0.034*** 0.942*** 0.341 0.018*** 0.839*** 0.271 
8 0.039*** 0.625*** 0.232 0.021*** 0.576*** 0.187 0.012*** 0.739*** 0.239 
9 0.031*** 0.691*** 0.199 0.019*** 0.724*** 0.202 0.009*** 0.837*** 0.302 
10 0.022** 0.749*** 0.233 0.015** 0.744*** 0.223 0.011** 0.720*** 0.196 
11 0.038*** 0.435** 0.099 0.018*** 0.463*** 0.132 0.011*** 0.396*** 0.081 
12 0.043*** 0.940*** 0.377 0.026*** 1.029*** 0.389 0.014*** 1.146*** 0.404 
13 0.048*** 0.948*** 0.367 0.026*** 0.955*** 0.381 0.014*** 0.990*** 0.373 
14 0.052*** 0.704*** 0.332 0.029*** 0.755*** 0.351 0.013*** 0.888*** 0.395 
15 0.068*** 1.299*** 0.431 0.043*** 1.368*** 0.423 0.025*** 1.427*** 0.403 
16 0.029*** 0.724*** 0.299 0.017*** 0.740*** 0.284 0.009*** 0.562*** 0.178 
17 0.049*** 1.076*** 0.354 0.033*** 1.159*** 0.349 0.020*** 1.089*** 0.275 
18 0.054*** 1.084*** 0.361 0.031*** 1.170*** 0.399 0.017*** 1.283*** 0.401 
19 0.067*** 1.131*** 0.460 0.040*** 1.172*** 0.423 0.023*** 1.352*** 0.439 
20 0.055*** 0.928*** 0.331 0.036*** 0.973*** 0.313 0.021*** 1.015*** 0.329 
21 0.050*** 0.916*** 0.287 0.033*** 0.882*** 0.249 0.022*** 0.960*** 0.273 
22 0.059*** 1.012*** 0.316 0.037*** 1.024*** 0.283 0.022*** 1.125*** 0.314 
23 0.033*** 0.712*** 0.339 0.019*** 0.626*** 0.260 0.009*** 0.602*** 0.278 
24 0.048*** 0.723*** 0.343 0.029*** 0.756*** 0.331 0.015*** 0.776*** 0.331 
25 0.054*** 1.078*** 0.490 0.030*** 1.165*** 0.497 0.014*** 1.208*** 0.465 
26 0.048*** 0.932*** 0.354 0.026*** 0.858*** 0.359 0.015*** 0.813*** 0.312 
27 0.046*** 0.864*** 0.357 0.025*** 0.886*** 0.380 0.013*** 0.970*** 0.410 
28 0.043*** 0.833*** 0.423 0.021*** 0.817*** 0.417 0.012*** 0.759*** 0.346 
29 0.056*** 1.095*** 0.444 0.028*** 1.018*** 0.456 0.014*** 0.957*** 0.376 
30 0.049*** 0.909*** 0.445 0.027*** 0.946*** 0.460 0.012*** 0.973*** 0.464 
NOTES: *, **, *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% significance, respectively. 
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APPENDIX D 1 month/99% VaR backtesting results 
 
This appendix reports the 1 month/99% VaR back-testing results for 30 sample banks. VaR is predicted 
using both the state preference approach and the historical simulation.  We perform the Likelihood Ratio test 
introduced in Kupiec (1995): 𝐿𝐺 = −2 ln{(1 − 𝑒)𝑟−𝑋𝑒𝑋} + 2ln{(1 − ?̂?)𝑟−𝑋?̂?𝑋}  where 𝑒 is the target 
exception rate of 0.01, 𝑋 is the observed number of exceptions, 𝑇 is the number of observations and ?̂? 
denotes the sample proportion of exceptions, 𝐿𝐺~𝜒12.  
Table D.1: Backtesting results of 1 month/99% VaR using the state preference 
approach 
Bank Expected Exceptions 
Target 
Exception 
rate 
Actual 
Exceptions 
Sample 
proportion of 
Exceptions 
LR Coverage  
Test p-Value 
1 33.27 0.01 40 0.012 1.292 0.256 
2 33.27 0.01 12 0.004 18.203 0.000 
3 33.28 0.01 100 0.030 87.963 0.000 
4 33.27 0.01 127 0.038 155.474 0.000 
5 33.27 0.01 12 0.004 18.203 0.000 
6 33.27 0.01 226 0.068 492.021 0.000 
7 33.29 0.01 61 0.018 18.699 0.000 
8 33.27 0.01 8 0.002 27.930 0.000 
9 33.27 0.01 50 0.015 7.362 0.007 
10 33.27 0.01 61 0.018 18.733 0.000 
11 33.27 0.01 35 0.011 0.089 0.765 
12 33.27 0.01 55 0.017 11.978 0.001 
13 33.27 0.01 64 0.019 22.569 0.000 
14 33.27 0.01 161 0.048 257.272 0.000 
15 33.27 0.01 97 0.029 81.372 0.000 
16 33.27 0.01 74 0.022 37.358 0.000 
17 33.27 0.01 146 0.044 210.297 0.000 
18 33.27 0.01 37 0.011 0.408 0.523 
19 33.27 0.01 74 0.022 37.358 0.000 
20 33.27 0.01 81 0.024 49.382 0.000 
21 33.27 0.01 119 0.036 134.114 0.000 
22 33.27 0.01 67 0.020 26.691 0.000 
23 33.27 0.01 66 0.020 25.286 0.000 
24 33.27 0.01 237 0.071 536.063 0.000 
25 33.27 0.01 52 0.016 9.092 0.003 
26 33.27 0.01 59 0.018 16.342 0.000 
27 33.27 0.01 21 0.006 5.260 0.022 
28 33.27 0.01 63 0.019 21.257 0.000 
29 33.27 0.01 70 0.021 31.089 0.000 
30 33.27 0.01 61 0.018 18.733 0.000 
Average 33.27 0.01 78 0.023 43.837 0.000 
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Table D.2: Backtesting results of 1 month/99% VaR using the historical 
simulation 
Bank 
Expected 
Exceptions 
Target 
Exception 
rate 
Actual 
Exceptions 
Sample 
proportion of 
Exceptions 
LR 
Coverage 
Test p-Value 
1 33.27 0.01 79 0.024 45.815 0.000 
2 33.27 0.01 86 0.026 58.736 0.000 
3 33.28 0.01 80 0.024 47.557 0.000 
4 33.27 0.01 65 0.020 23.912 0.000 
5 33.27 0.01 67 0.020 26.691 0.000 
6 33.27 0.01 80 0.024 47.585 0.000 
7 33.29 0.01 57 0.017 14.060 0.000 
8 33.27 0.01 68 0.020 28.127 0.000 
9 33.27 0.01 73 0.022 35.748 0.000 
10 33.27 0.01 61 0.018 18.733 0.000 
11 33.27 0.01 83 0.025 53.049 0.000 
12 33.27 0.01 65 0.020 23.912 0.000 
13 33.27 0.01 88 0.026 62.646 0.000 
14 33.27 0.01 56 0.017 13.015 0.000 
15 33.27 0.01 71 0.021 32.613 0.000 
16 33.27 0.01 59 0.018 16.342 0.000 
17 33.27 0.01 78 0.023 44.070 0.000 
18 33.27 0.01 68 0.020 28.127 0.000 
19 33.27 0.01 68 0.020 28.127 0.000 
20 33.27 0.01 67 0.020 26.691 0.000 
21 33.27 0.01 94 0.028 74.931 0.000 
22 33.27 0.01 95 0.029 77.056 0.000 
23 33.27 0.01 74 0.022 37.358 0.000 
24 33.27 0.01 82 0.025 51.203 0.000 
25 33.27 0.01 77 0.023 42.352 0.000 
26 33.27 0.01 77 0.023 42.352 0.000 
27 33.27 0.01 75 0.023 38.996 0.000 
28 33.27 0.01 75 0.023 38.996 0.000 
29 33.27 0.01 87 0.026 60.679 0.000 
30 33.27 0.01 93 0.028 72.827 0.000 
Average 33.27 0.01 75 0.023 38.883 0.000 
 
 
 
 
